The Evolution and Jurisprudence of The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review by Donohue, Laura K.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2021 
The Evolution and Jurisprudence of The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review 
Laura K. Donohue 
Georgetown University Law Center, lkdonohue@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 




Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 12, Forthcoming. 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
 1 
Laura K. Donohue, The Evolution and Jurisprudence of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, 12 HARVARD NAT’L SECURITY 




The Evolution and Jurisprudence of  
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and  
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
 
Laura K. Donohue* 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The past eight years have witnessed an explosion in the number of publicly-available 
opinions and orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review. From only six opinions in the public domain 1978–2012, by early 2021, 
eighty-eight opinions had been released. The sharp departure is even more pronounced in relation to 
orders: from only one order declassified during 1978–2012, since 2013, 288 have been formally 
released. These documents highlight how the courts’s roles have evolved since 2004 and reveal four 
key areas that dominate the courts’ jurisprudence: its position as a specialized, Article III court; the 
effort to understand the existing statutory language in light of new and emerging technologies; the 
tension among constitutional rights, the need for information, and the implications of increasingly 
broad surveillance programs; and the courts’s growing role in conducting oversight and having to 
respond to Executive Branch errors, noncompliance, and misrepresentations. This Article details these 
tensions in light of the courts’ jurisprudence, noting the areas where we are likely to continue to see 





In 1978, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to govern domestic 
electronic intercepts undertaken for foreign intelligence purposes.1 The statute represented the 
culmination of years of hearings directed to understanding the scope of surveillance programs 
conducted with little to no oversight that had resulted in the collection of significant amounts 
of information on U.S. citizens.2 It also reflected the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that 
 
* Professor of Law, Anne Fleming Research Professor, and Director, Center on National Security and the Law, 
Georgetown Law. All FISC/FISCR opinions and orders cited in the Article have been declassified and released. 
They are available at the Foreign Intelligence Law Collection, which was built by the author, Jeremy McCabe, 
and Leah Prescott, and is hosted by Georgetown Law Library at 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052698 [https://perma.cc/68BH-AWZS]. I am 
grateful to Jeremy McCabe, at the Georgetown Law Library, for his help in cite checking the Article and to Judge 
James E. Boasberg for his comments on an earlier draft. 
1 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–85c (West)). 
2 See e.g., Intelligence Activities: S. Res. 21: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States, 94th Cong., vol. 5, at  1 (1975); 124 
CONG. REC. 34,845 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) (the Church Committee 
reports, divided into six books); THE UNEXPURGATED PIKE REPORT: REPORT OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
INTELLIGENCE, 1976 (Gregory Andrade Diamond ed., 1992), 
https://archive.org/details/PikeCommitteeReportFull/page/n103/mode/2up [https://perma.cc/3ZCJ-
UWJ3]; Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. 
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the Fourth Amendment prohibited the government from undertaking surveillance for domestic 
security purposes absent independent judicial oversight.3  
 
The statute created two specialized Article III courts: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) and the (appellate) Foreign Intelligence Court of Review (FISCR).4 The FISC’s 
role was to review applications for electronic surveillance to determine whether probable 
cause existed that the target to be placed under surveillance was a foreign power or an agent 
of a foreign power, and whether the individual was likely to use the facility to be placed under 
surveillance, prior to issuing orders.5  
 
During the first two years that FISA operated, the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted 
warrantless physical searches outside of the statutory framing. But in 1980, it adopted a new 
approach, in which it applied to the FISC for orders to approve nonconsensual physical 
searches of personal (not real) property.6 In each case, the Justice Department asserted that the 
search in question would have required a warrant in a law enforcement context.7 The court 
issued the orders without any accompanying opinions.  In October of that year, however, the 
Presiding Judge of the FISC submitted a memorandum that the Court’s Legal Adviser had 
prepared, concluding that the FISC had no authority to issue orders approving a physical 
search or the opening of mail.8  
 
In 1981, the Justice Department, now under the Reagan Administration, submitted an 
application to the FISC to issue an order approving physical search of nonresidential premises 
under the direction and control of a foreign power as well as personal property of agents of a 
foreign power located on the premises.9 The government simultaneously submitted a 
memorandum of law explaining that the court lacked jurisdiction over the request.10 Assuming 
that the court denied the application, if Congress wanted to bring such searches within FISA, 
it would have to amend the statute. Otherwise, the Executive Branch could proceed on the 
basis of its own, independent authority. The court, as expected, declined to issue an order 
approving the application on the grounds that it lacked any statutory, implied, or inherent 
authority or jurisdiction to issue orders approving for physical search or mail opening.11 The 
full court concurred in the judgment.12 It did not address the merits of the government’s claim 
 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 767–83 (discussing the history leading to heightened protections afforded to domestic 
collection of U.S. citizens' information) (2014). 
3 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 317-22 (1972) (finding government’s security concerns did 
not justify departure from requirement of judicial approval prior to a search or surveillance).  
4 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)–(b); see also In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under 
the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00127, at 6 (FISA Ct. Jan. 25, 2017) (Collyer, J.); In 
re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731, GID.CA.00001, at 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam); United States v. 
Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 
788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986). 
5 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a); 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (statement of Sen. Mathias). 
6 S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 3. 
7 Id. 
8 Letter from Hon. George L. Hart, Jr., presiding judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Oct. 31, 
1980, cited in S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 3, n. 3. 
9 S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 4. 
10 Id. 
11 In re Application of the United States for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises 




that it had the independent authority to undertake such actions. Although the Senate in 1981 
considered amending the statute to take account of physical search, it did not do so.13 
 
Thirteen years later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Aldrich Hazen Ames, 
a Central Intelligence Agency counterintelligence officer suspected of being a KGB agent.14 
The Attorney General, citing national security, approved a warrantless search of his home 
outside of either FISA or ordinary criminal provisions. Ames pled guilty before the case went 
to trial, but the Clinton Administration was sufficiently concerned about the legality of the 
search as to seek to amend the statute.  
 
The 1995 Intelligence Authorization Act, accordingly, altered FISA to allow for warrantless, 
covert physical searches when targeting “premises, information, material, or property used 
exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive control of, a foreign power or powers.”15 For 
property not under exclusive control of foreign powers, the statute requires an application to 
the FISC. The requirements parallel those for electronic surveillance, including the probable 
cause requirements.16 In February 1995, President Bill Clinton issued an Executive Order 
extending certification authority in support of physical search applications submitted to the 
FISC to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, 
as well as their deputies and the Director of the FBI.17 
 
Congress subsequently added two more types of foreign intelligence collection to what has 
come to be known as “Traditional FISA.” In 1998, Congress provided for the first by 
authorizing the acquisition of pen register and trap and trace (PRTT) data for foreign 
intelligence or international terrorism investigations.18 In 2001, Congress extended PRTT 
beyond telephone numbers to empower the government to obtain any “dialing, routing, 
addressing, or signaling information” identifying the source or end point of a 
communication—including those that travel via email or through the internet.19 Further 
changes in 2006 allowed the government to obtain subscriber records relating to past calls, as 
well as real-time information.20 
 
The second additional type of collection stemmed from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. 
During the investigation, it was unclear whether the FBI had the authority to obtain business 
records related to a Ryder truck and a storage locker in Arizona that Timothy McVeigh, the 
Oklahoma City bomber, had rented. So in 1998, Congress expanded FISA to allow the 
government to obtain records from “a common carrier, public accommodation facility, 
 
13 S. REP. NO. 97-280 (1981), at 8. It continued to keep the matter under advisement. See S. REP. NO. 98-660 
(1984), at 24.  
14 See Complaint, United States v. Ames, No. 94-cr-00166 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 1994), 
https://cryptome.org/jya/ames.htm [https://perma.cc/KP6U-VR69]. 
15 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, sec. 807(a)(3), § 302(a)(1)(A)(i), 108 
Stat. 3423, 3444 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(i)). There must be no substantial likelihood that 
the facilities targeted are the property of a U.S. person. Id. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
16 Id. § 1823. 
17 Exec. Order No. 12,949, 60 Fed. Reg. 8169 (Feb. 9, 1995). 
18 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601–02, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–12 
(1998) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841–46, 1861–64). Previously, although the Government could 
request (and the court could issue) orders authorizing pen register and trap and trace devices (PRTT), it could 
only do so by going through the application procedures that enabled the government to obtain electronic content. 
See Donohue, supra note 2, at 793. 
19 USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 216, 115 Stat. 272, 290 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3127). 
20 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 128(a), 120 Stat. 192, 
228 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d)). 
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physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility.”21 The Director of the FBI, or a designated 
high-ranking official, had to state that the records are sought for an “investigation to gather 
foreign intelligence information or . . . international terrorism.”22 The application also had to 
include “specific and articulable facts” as to why the person to whom the records pertain are 
a foreign power or an agent thereof.23  (These last two requirements no longer apply.) 
 
Under Traditional FISA, from 1978 to 2001, the FISC essentially functioned as a warrant-
granting body, issuing more than 14,000 orders and just one public opinion.24 Applications 
were sealed and procedures conducted in camera and ex parte.25 No additional opinions—and 
no orders—ever saw light of day. The Oklahoma City-derived provision, for its part, saw little 
use: between 1998 and 2001, the FBI only obtained one FISA order for business records. But 
following the attacks of 9/11, that all changed. 
 
The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act altered FISA in several ways: in addition to amending PRTT, 
it introduced temporary provisions to allow for roving wiretaps; changed the duration of 
certain orders; increased the number of judges; and amended the definition of “electronic 
surveillance.”26 By far, the most significant alterations though were the expansion of the 
business records provision in Section 215 to incorporate requests for any tangible goods, as 
well as the insertion of the word “significant” into the purpose for which FISA’s electronic 
intercepts could be sought.27 The latter, together with a provision that authorized coordination 
between intelligence and law enforcement—and a prominent case that came before the FISCR 
in 2002—brought down the wall that had previously existed within the Department of Justice 
between foreign intelligence collection and criminal investigations.28 In 2004, Congress 
further amended the statute to incorporate temporary “lone wolf” powers, permitting the 
surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism, without requiring 
evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization.29  
 
 
21 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 sec. 602, § 502, 112 Stat. at 2411. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Just two months before the Oklahoma City attack, President William J. Clinton issued Executive Order 
12,949, which expanded the use of FISA for physical searches. See Exec. Order No. 12,949, 60 Fed. Reg. 8169 
(Feb. 9, 1995). 
24 FISA Annual Reports to Congress, 1979–2002, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS,  
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ [https://perma.cc/Z4QH-73A3] (last updated July 28, 2020); In re Application 
of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises and Pers. Prop., 
GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16-19 (1981). 
25 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 488 n.12, GID.C.00021, at 6 n.12 (FISA Ct. 2007) 
(Bates, J.). The law provides special protections for U.S. persons, who can only be considered an “agent of a 
foreign power” when the government has evidence of some level of criminality on a par with criminal law. 50 
U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(2); see also Donohue, supra note 2, at 789–90. Even then, further minimization procedures 
apply. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(h)(2). Where special non-judicial procedures targeting non-US persons are used, the 
Attorney General can only authorize collection where there is “no substantial likelihood” that citizens’ 
communications will be obtained or that the search will involve the “premises, information, material, or property 
of a” U.S. person. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(ii). In the event that a citizen’s communications or property are 
involved, the government must obtain a court order within 72 hours before the information or property in 
question can be “disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(h)(4) (electronic 
surveillance); id. § 1821(4)(D) (physical search). 
26 USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 206–08, 214, 504, 1003, 115 Stat. 272, 282-83, 286-87, 
291, 364–65, 392 (§§ 206 (roving wiretaps), 207 (duration of orders for non-US persons), 208 (expanding FISC 
to 11 judges), 214 (amending PRTT), 504 (authorizing coordination), 1003 (amending the definition)). 
27 Id. §§ 215, 218, 115 Stat. at 287–88, 291. 
28 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). 
29 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3742. 
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Despite Congress’s explicit direction in 1978 that FISA be the sole means for conducting 
domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, following 9/11, the Bush 
Administration instituted a program entirely outside the FISA framework. STELLARWIND 
intercepted the contents of certain domestic and international telephone calls and Internet 
communications, as well as telephony and Internet metadata. Starting in 2004 with Jack 
Goldsmith’s arrival at the Office of Legal Counsel, the Justice Department began to try to 
shoehorn some of the existing intelligence collection into the FISA framing. The statute, 
though, had been designed to ensure that surveillance could only be undertaken with particular 
targets in mind. Even with the USA PATRIOT Act changes, it took creative legal 
interpretations to find a way to bring parts of the program within FISA.30 
 
The ill-fitting nature of bulk collection programs in the existing statutory framing prompted 
further statutory revision and ushered in what is colloquially referred to as “Modernized 
FISA.” The 2008 FISA Amendments Act (FAA) added a new provision (Section 704), which 
provided for the acquisition of the communications of U.S. persons located outside the United 
States—a category that previously fell within the guidelines set by Executive Order 12333. 
Simultaneously, two other provisions liberalized the FISA rules for targeting individuals 
outside the United States, with Section 702 providing for the domestic collection for non-U.S. 
persons, and Section 703 for U.S. persons, reasonably believed to be outside the United 
States.31 The statute empowered the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
to jointly authorize (without court approval), for up to one year, the targets of such intercepts.32 
 
These changes significantly altered the courts’ role. Instead of just issuing orders targeted at 
particular individuals inside the U.S., the FISC and FISCR now monitor programmatic 
collection of international electronic communications.33 The courts tackle questions related to 
jurisdiction, separation of powers, and the rule of law. They wrestle with how to understand 
new technologies in light of old statutory language, and they engage in complex analysis to 
apply the fourteen statutes that now constitute FISA.34 The courts routinely confront difficult 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment questions that impact the lives of every person in the 
United States, as well as certain individuals overseas.35 And they have to police an Executive 
that makes technical errors, fails to comply with court orders, omits critical information, and 
makes misrepresentations to the court.36 Instead of just issuing orders approving applications, 
 
30 See generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A 
DIGITAL AGE (2016). 
31 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, §§ 702–04, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438–57 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1881a–c (West)). 
32 Certain restrictions apply. See id. 
33 The courts also became enmeshed in considering bulk collection of domestic and international 
communications, until subsequent statutory changes prohibited such collection for telephony metadata. See 
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 2. 
34 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033 (FISA Ct. Dec. 
12, 2008) (Walton, J.). 
35 See, e.g., In re Proc. Required by Section 702(i) of the FISA Amends. Act of 2008, No. Misc 08-01, 
GID.C.00028, 2008 WL 9487946 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.) (First and Fourth Amendments); 
Opinion on Motion for Disclosure of Prior Decisions, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00112 (FISA 
Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.) (Fifth Amendment); Memorandum, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, 
GID.C.00086 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.) (First and Fourth Amendments); In re Sealed Case, 310 
F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (Fourth Amendment). 
36 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things [REDACTED], No. BR 09-15, GID.C.00048, at 3–4 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) (Walton, J.) (NSA 
sent query results to email list of 189 analysts, “only 53 of whom had received the required training”); 
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 15–18, 78–80, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5–6, *28 (FISA Ct. 
Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.) (NSA misled Court, violating FISA and the Fourth Amendment); Memorandum 
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the FISC routinely issues opinions, which the Executive Branch, amici, non-specialized 
Article III judges (and their clerks and parties before them), cite to as precedent.37 This is not 
the role that Congress envisioned for the FISC/FISCR in 1978. 
 
An important and robust body of law is now emerging from a court that, for decades, has been 
largely shielded from public inspection. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, nearly ninety 
declassified FISC/FISCR opinions and 290 orders are now in the public domain, as are 
hundreds of FISC/FISCR filings.38 
 
Previously Classified FISC/FISCR Opinions 




2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
 6         
January      1 6   
February         1 
March    2   1  2 
April   7  3 2   1 
May      1    
June   1 1  12    
July    1      
August  3 3  1  7   
September  3 4 1  1   6 
October  1      3  
November  2    1   1 
 
Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00092, at 3, 18, 100–05 (FISA Ct.) (Bates, J.) (“NSA 
exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than [REDACTED] years of 
acquisition”; FBI, CIA, and NCTC “accessed unminimized U.S. person information”; NSA disseminated “reports 
containing U.S. person information”; government requested permission to violate law); Memorandum Opinion, 
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00078, at 26–27 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2012) (NSA misrepresented 
upstream collection, acquiring U.S. person domestic communications). 
37 For FISC/FISCR reference to prior opinions as precedent, see, e.g., In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to 
Sec. 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010, GID.CA.00002, at 13, 15 (FISA Ct. Rev. 
2008) (Selya, J.); Memorandum, In re Application of the FBI, No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00086, at 4–5 (analyzing 
Judge Eagan’s constitutional analysis in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. 
Jones); see also Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00092, at 6, 74–75; 
Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 14-96, GID.C.00103, at 2–3 (FISA Ct. June 19, 2014) (Zagel, J.); Amended 
Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, GID.C.00083, at 19–20 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (Eagan, J.). For similar 
references by the U.S. Department of Justice, see, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 16, Am. C.L. Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015), 2013 WL 5744828 (“[S]ince May 
2006, fourteen separate judges of the FISC have concluded on thirty-four occasions that the FBI satisfied this 
requirement, finding ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that the telephony metadata . . . ‘are relevant to authorized 
investigations.’”) (citation and quotation omitted); United States’ Legal Brief to the En Banc Court in Response 
to the Court’s Order of March 22, 2017 at 1, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data 
Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1056062/Misc%252013-
08%2520United%2520States%2527%2520Legal%2520Brief%2520to%2520the%2520En%2520Banc%2520Co
urt.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKA5-CT8P ] (“It is well-settled that there is no First Amendment public right of 
access to the proceedings, records, and rulings of this Court,” citing to four FISC opinions and orders in support.) 
38 More than two decades after its 1981 opinion, the Court issued two opinions. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 
GID.CA.00001; In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 
GID.C.00002 (FISA Ct. 2002), rev’d by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001. It published two more 
opinions between 2007 and 2008. In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc Pursuant to Sec. 105B of Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, GID.CA.00002 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (Selya, J.); In re Motion for Release of 
Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, GID.C.00021 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.). 
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December   2 1      
Total 6 9 17 6 4 18 14 3 11 
Figure 1 
 
Previously Classified FISC/FISCR Orders 




2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
 1         
January   24   2 12  4 
February   1  1  1  6 
March   1 4 1 4   5 
April   51  16 5  1 4 
May   2   2 2   
June   3 2  18   1 
July  1 3 2     2 
August  2 7 1 1  28   
September  8 11 2  14   5 
October  3 1 1  1  3 1 
November  2 1      1 
December   8 1    3 1 
Total 1 16 113 13 19 46 43 7 30 
Figure 2 
 
The timing and pattern of the declassification of the courts’ opinions and orders illustrate the 
suddenness with which the courts have found themselves in the public eye.  
 
It would be hard to overstate the importance of the documents leaked by Edward Snowden in 
June 2013 in driving this phenomenon. They took the study of foreign intelligence from a 
niche, classified legal specialization to a matter of public discourse. By the end of the year, 
nine new opinions and sixteen orders had been formally declassified and released by the 
government, in sharp contrast to just six opinions and one order that had been released over 
the previous 35 years of the statute’s existence. Similarly, from zero public filings prior to 
June 2013, within five months of the Snowden leaks, the FISC’s public docket had exploded.39 
These filings put the courts in the position of having to determine a range of difficult questions, 
including under what conditions its opinions would be made public. Like some of the other 
roles assumed by the court, this was not a function envisioned by Congress in 1978. 
 
As the FISC/FISCR have been forced to wrestle with difficult constitutional and statutory 
questions, non-specialized Article III courts increasingly have had to take account of their 
jurisprudence. In part this also has to do with changed conditions regarding standing. In 
 
39 Four days after the first articles appeared in The Guardian and Washington Post, for instance, on June 10, 2013 
the ACLU and Yale Media Freedom Information Access Clinic (MFIAC) filed a motion to obtain all FISC 
opinions evaluating the meaning, scope, and constitutionality of bulk collection. Four days later, Yahoo! moved 
under FISC Rule 62(a) to request the Court to order publication of an opinion from 2008, which had been 
appealed to FISCR and referenced in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, GID.CA.00002. On June 19, Microsoft 
requested permission to disclose the aggregate information related to FISC orders with which it had been served. 
Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn soon filed parallel requests. On June 28, sixteen members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of the ACLU/MFIAC motion—a move followed on July 8 by the 
First Amendment Coalition, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and 
on July 15 by a formidable media conglomerate: the Reporters’ Committee, ABC News, the Associated Press, 
Bloomberg News, Dow Jones, the Los Angeles Times, National Public Radio, Reuters, the New Yorker, 
Newsweek, the Washington Post, and others. By mid-November 2013, further motions for judicial records had 
been filed by the Center for National Security Studies and ProPublica. For further discussion, see discussion in 
Part II.E, Standing, infra. 
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Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Solicitor General represented to the Supreme Court that 
the Justice Department would inform criminal defendants if FISA-derived information was 
used against them.40 It was not until a New York Times article revealed in 2013 that the 
government was not in the practice of doing so, however, that the policy changed.41 The 
definition of “derived from” remains classified. Nevertheless, an increasing number of 
defendants are being informed that evidence against them derives from FISA. Simultaneously, 
dozens of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits over the past decade have sought access 
to FISC opinions and orders.42 A number have been successful in contributing to the material 
in the public domain.43  
 
There are now more than 180 FISA-related cases in regular Article III courts—approximately 
twice the total number of FISC/FISCR cases that have been made publicly available by the 
courts, Office of the Director National Intelligence (ODNI), or FOIA litigation.44 The 
specialized Article III courts (FISC/FISCR) and the non-specialized, geographic Article III 
courts (i.e., District Courts and Courts of Appeal) are increasingly in dialogue as the caselaw 
evolves, making it all the more important to address the scope of FISC/FISCR jurisprudence. 
 
This Article suggests that the bulk of the issues that come before the courts derive from four 
key areas. Each can be explained by tensions inherent in the FISC/FISCR current role and the 
structure developed by Congress in 1978. Understanding these areas can help to clarify 
questions before the courts by placing them in their broader context and provide a framework 
for how to think about any future legislative changes. The goal is to ensure a deeper theoretical 
grasp of the role of the courts in foreign intelligence law. 
 
 
40 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 421–22 (2013). 
41 See Nina Totenberg, Government Takes a U-Turn on Warrantless Wiretaps, NPR (Oct. 23, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/10/23/240163063/government-changes-policy-on-warrantless-wiretap-defendants 
[https://perma.cc/ZBA2-THYX]; Eric Schmidt et al., Administration Says Mining Data Is Crucial to Fight 
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/08/us/mining-of-data-is-called-crucial-
to-fight-terror.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/TH3B-G3CY]; Adam Liptak, A Secret Surveillance 
Program Proves Challengeable in Theory Only, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/us/double-secret-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/PLH6-JADQ]; 
Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
26, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-warrantless-
wiretaps-as-evidence.html [https://perma.cc/B9MB-HPQJ].  
42 See, e.g., ACLU v. ODNI, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 5563520 (Nov. 15, 2011); New York Times 
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 872 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 892 
F.Supp.2d 95 (D.D.C. 2012); Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for D.C., 739 F.3d 1, 
Jan. 3, 2014; cert. denied Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 135 S.Ct. 356 (2014); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. 
v. DOJ, No. 13cv1961, 2016 WL 447426 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2016). 
43 See, e.g., ACLU v. ODNI, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2011 WL 5563520 (Nov. 15, 2011); Elec. Frontier 
Found. v. DOJ, No.: 4:11-cv-05221-YGR, 2014 WL 3945646 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014). 
44 Despite the increasing importance of the courts’ jurisprudence, FISC/FISCR opinions and orders have not 
hitherto been easily accessible. Less than two dozen declassified and redacted opinions are available on the 
court’s web site. Some opinions are only available through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI). Others are only available from individuals who have submitted Freedom of Information Act requests or 
engaged in litigation with the Department of Justice to obtain the materials—and decided to place them online. 
Neither Westlaw nor Lexis, moreover, carry most of the opinions, despite FISA issues regularly now appearing in 
ordinary Article III courts. No site has all of the declassified and redacted court filings available. Accordingly, 
Jeremy McCabe, Leah Prescott, and I have created a text-searchable database at Georgetown Law Library with 
all of the formally released (and often redacted) FISC/FISCR opinions and orders, along with all of the publicly 
available guidelines. Foreign Intelligence Law Collection, DIGITAL GEO., 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052698 [https://perma.cc/NQ4B-CQYN] (last updated 
Mar. 17, 2021). 
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The first area of tension arises from the courts’ statutory jurisdiction, Article III status, and the 
specialized nature of the cases that they consider. Somewhat surprisingly, there is almost no 
attention paid in the Federal Courts scholarship to the role of specialized Article III entities in 
contrast to non-specialized, geographic courts—much less their distinction from the myriad 
other types of federal courts in existence.45 Yet the associated questions are foundational and 
particularly important for the FISC/FISCR. Separation of powers, issues related to the standing 
of third parties and the public, the scope of the courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction, and the 
relationship between specialized and non-specialized courts have all played a central role in 
the courts’ jurisprudence. The cases also reveal efforts by the Executive to classify judicial 
opinions that reveal Executive Branch malfeasance—raising further concern about efforts by 
Article II to undermine the constitutional powers and responsibilities of an Article III entity. 
 
The second cluster finds root in the tension between new technologies and old statutory 
language—i.e., text drafted with very different technologies in mind. Here, the FISC has 
repeatedly had to return to questions about what, precisely, constitutes “electronic 
surveillance,” how to understand “electronic communications,” and what is included in the 
definition of a “facility.” So, too, has it wrestled with the line between intercepts and searches 
in the mobile digital world. Distinguishing between “content” versus “non-content” in relation 
to PRTT, and how to handle technologies like the use of post-cut-through-dialed-digits 
provide just a few examples. Further issues arise in relation to business records, bulk 
collection, and Section 702 acquisition.  
 
The third cluster centers on constitutional rights, wherein the tension between secrecy (as 
statutorily required or as demanded by the Executive Branch), surveillance, and individual 
rights comes to the fore. The courts have had to wrestle here with matters related to the First 
Amendment right of access that derives from the right to petition the government, as well as, 
to a lesser extent, associational rights. Equally important have been Fourth Amendment 
concerns—particularly in relation to third party data and the reasonableness requirement. The 
Fifth Amendment has appeared around the edges in the context of due process protections. 
 
The fourth and final cluster centers on process and compliance, where tension marks the 
frontier between public and private accountability. Innumerable instances of noncompliance, 
coupled with blatant misrepresentations to the court, have put the FISC in the position of 
having to conduct ongoing oversight of the intelligence community. Irregularities in regard to 
special as well as standard minimization procedures (SMPs), targeting, and querying 
procedures have repeatedly presented. The court has had to address inaccurate, materially 
omitted, erroneous, and false statements. Some opinions further call attention to the problem 
of overcollection and what could be termed the “data dilemma”: i.e., what to do with 
information obtained outside statutory or judicial restrictions.  
 
Having examined each of these areas, the Article concludes by underscoring some of the trends 
that we are now seeing, as well as areas where we might expect to see more concentration in 
the future, based on the structural pressures. 
 
II. Cluster 1: The FISC/FISCR as Specialized, Article III Courts 
 
 
45 For scholarship on the distinction between Article III specialized and geographic courts, as well as the full 
panoply of federal courts, see Laura K. Donohue and Jeremy J. McCabe, Federal Courts: Art. III(1), Art. I(8), 
Art. IV(3), Art. II(2)/I(8) Hybrid, and Art. II(1) Adjudication (working paper), 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2373/. 
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One of the most important tensions to which the FISC/FISCR has had to return repeatedly is 
how to understand its status as a specialized Article III court. To some extent the questions 
that mark this area reflect a dearth in the scholarship: surprisingly little has been written on 
the range of federal courts and their distinguishing characteristics. Nevertheless, what is clear 
from statutory language, legislative history, and jurisprudence of both specialized and non-
specialized, geographic Article III courts, is that the FISC and FISCR find their constitutional 
nexus in Article III(1) and thus carry with them the inherent powers of such entities. The FISC, 
accordingly, has exercised some ancillary powers even as it has wrestled with the scope of its 
jurisdiction. 
 
A. Constitutional Grounding 
 
Article III(1) non-specialized courts are those entities that enter the mind when envisioning 
federal courts: i.e., the U.S. Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeal, and the District Courts. 
With the exception of the Supreme Court, each is brought into being by Congress. They are 
provided with broad subject-matter jurisdiction and designated as the courts of record for 
distinct geographic regions.46  
 
Less well-known are the specialized Article III(1) courts. Over the course of U.S. history, 
there have been at least a dozen such entities, five of which are still in existence.47 
Distinguishing between the two categories by referring to the narrower subject matter of 
specialized tribunals, though, is somewhat of a misnomer: all federal Article III(1) courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction.48 As the Supreme Court explained in 1812, “[T]he power which 
congress possess to create Courts of inferior jurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit 
the jurisdiction of those Courts to particular objects.”49 The legislature merely grants 
geographic Article III(1) courts the authority to hear more types of cases. 
 
Whether a court falls within Article III of the Constitution turns in part on whether it satisfies 
structural requirements: i.e., unity, supremacy, and inferiority within the Judicial Branch. 
The composition and operation of the court also must comply with the constitutional 
requirements of tenure of office during good behavior and undiminished compensation, as 
well as the case-or-controversy stipulations.  
 
Courts that do not meet these requirements are considered alternately (and misleadingly)50 
“non-constitutional,” “legislative,” or “Article I” courts—i.e., tribunals “created by Congress 
 
46 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77, 78–79 (district and defunct circuit courts); 
Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2, 6, 26 Stat. 826, 826–27, 828 (circuit courts of appeals). 
47 Past Article III specialized courts include: the Customs Court (replaced by U.S. Court of International Trade); 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; Emergency Court of Appeals (WWII challenges to Price Administration 
regulations); Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals; Commerce Court; Special Railroad Court; Court of 
Claims; and Courts of the District of Columbia (which are now considered Article I entities). The current 
specialized courts include the FISC and FISCR, Alien Terrorist Removal Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. For more discussion of each of these entities, and their 
designation, see Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45.  
48 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906–07 (2018); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256–58 (2013); Bender 
v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 
374 (1978); Owen Equip. & Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799). 
49 United States v Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812).  
50 All federal courts derive from a constitutional nexus. Some non-Article III entities, moreover, are created by 
legislation, but others are not. Further, while some tribunals derive from provisions in Article I, others stem from 
Article IV or Article II. For more detailed discussion of the myriad federal courts introduced over the course of 
U.S. history, see Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45. 
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in the exertion of other powers.”51 They “are not . . . [c]ourts, in which the judicial power 
conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited.”52 Instead, they 
arise out of other constitutional provisions, such as Congress’s tax powers,53 commerce, 
bankruptcy, and citizenship authorities,54 copyrights and patents,55 control of the military,56 
governance over Washington, D.C.,57 or regulation of the territories.58 Pari passu, consular 
courts, and certain adjudicatory bodies find their locus in the Executive Branch and do not 
constitute the Judicial Branch of government.59 
 
The distinction matters: these other courts do not exercise the judicial power of the United 
States. Article III(1) constitutional courts, like the FISC and FISCR, do.60 They have the 
authority to enter final, binding judgments relating to constitutional law and common law. As 
the Supreme Court put it in 1888, “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the 
authentic exposition and interpretation of the law.”61 It is thus within the purview of Article 
III courts to dispose of cases, applying law to the facts, before rendering a final, binding 
judgment.  
 
As a matter of separation of powers, once this process is put into motion, Congress and the 
Executive cannot interfere.62 Nor can they insert themselves into the process after the fact—a 
principle famously recognized in Hayburn’s Case.63 If the political branches could interfere 
(for instance, by overturning the court’s final judgment or stripping the court of authority over 
their own opinions), it would render the independence of the judiciary of no consequence. It 
would not matter what the court said or did.  All the courts have is their judgment as to matters 
of law.  
 
B. FISC/FISCR Article III Status 
 
Every Article III court—specialized and non-specialized—that has considered the question of 
whether the FISC and FISCR are Article III courts has answered in the affirmative.64 As FISC 
Judge John Bates explained in 2007, “Notwithstanding the esoteric nature of its caseload, the 
FISC is an inferior federal court established by Congress under Article III.”65 Efforts to 
 
51 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929) (emphasis added). 
52 Am. Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (emphasis added). 
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
54 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 4. 
55 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
56 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, 16. 
57 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
58 Id. art. IV. 
59 See generally Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45. 
60 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494–95 (2011). 
61 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). 
62 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.  (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1871). 
63 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.† (1892); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
217–18 (1995). 
64 See, e.g.,  United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Megahey, 553 F. 
Supp. 1180, 1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 727 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 
1306, 1313 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (district court judges 
retain "Article III status" when acting as members of the FISC), aff d, 788 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1986); Opinion and 
Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00085, at 4 
(FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.) (“The FISC is an Article III Court.”); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 
731, GID.CA.00001, at 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam) (applying to the FISC “the constitutional bounds 
that restrict an Article III court.”). 
65 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486, GID.C.00021, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, 
J.). 
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question their status on the grounds of the judges’ seven-year tenure have been roundly 
defeated.66 As a Ninth Circuit District Court explained in 1985, “The FISA court is wholly 
composed of United States District Court judges, who have been appointed for life by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and whose salaries cannot be reduced.”67 
The constitutional requirement of tenure of office is thus satisfied, as is the protection against 
diminished compensation. 
 
The statutorily-required in camera, ex parte procedures do not remove the FISC/FISCR from 
the ambit of Article III. The legislative design in 1978 laid out a process not dissimilar from 
ordinary warrant procedures—an approach that made sense in light of the courts’ initially 
limited role in granting or denying applications for surveillance. Giving such powers to the 
court did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of authority. As the FISCR reflected in 
2002, “In light of Morrison v. Olson and Mistretta v. United States, we do not think there is 
much left to an argument made by an opponent of FISA in 1978 that the statutory 
responsibilities of the FISA court are inconsistent with Article III case and controversy 
responsibilities of federal judges because of the secret, non-adversary process.”68  
 
Nor does limited subject matter jurisdiction impact the courts’ status. In 1982, the FISC 
explained, “[a]s an inferior court established by Congress pursuant to Article III of the 
Constitution,” the court is limited to “only such jurisdiction as the FISA confers upon it and 
such ancillary authority as may fairly be implied from the powers expressly granted to it.”69 
All federal courts, in this sense, are courts of limited jurisdiction. More recently, in 2018, the 
court stated, “the FISC’s authority and inherent secrecy is cabined by—and consistent with —
Article III of the Constitution.”70 The FISC therefore acts with the understanding that its 
“jurisdiction is governed by Article III, section 2, of the Constitution.”71 
 
C. Inherent Powers 
 
Owing to their constitutional status within the third branch of government, the FISC and 
FISCR carry with them the same inherent powers of all Article III courts.72 FISA 
acknowledges, “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to reduce or contravene the inherent 
authority of a court established under this section to determine or enforce compliance with an 
order or a rule of such court or with a procedure approved by such court.”73 FISC Presiding 
Judge John Bates later attributed the source of the court’s inherent authorities to its Article III 
status.74 
 
Inherent powers incorporate a range of powers central to the courts’s role in administering 
justice, foremost amongst which is the importance of being able to ensure fairness in the course 
 
66 Cavanagh, 807 F.2d at 791 (“[Appellant] . . . appears to suggest that the FISA court is not properly constituted 
under [A]rticle III because the statute does not provide for life tenure on the FISA court. This argument has been 
raised in a number of cases and has been rejected by the courts. We reject it as well.”) (citations omitted). 
67 Kevork, 634 F. Supp. at 1014. 
68 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732 n.19, GID.CA.00001, at 732 n.19 (citation omitted). 
69 In re Application of the United States for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises 
& Pers. Prop., GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280 at 16 (1981).  
70 In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev., GID.CA.00006, at 8 (FISA 
Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018). 
71 Id. 
72 For more detailed discussion of Article III courts’ inherent powers, see Donohue & McCabe, supra note 45. 
73 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(h) (West). 
74 In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486, GID.C.00021, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, 
J.). 
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of adjudication.  This includes, inter alia, the exercise of equitable remedies, as established by 
Article III(2), which extends the judicial power “to all Cases, in Law and Equity.” Article III 
entities, accordingly, can appoint auditors, special masters, and commissioners to undertake 
investigations.75 Like its sistren, the foreign intelligence courts can require the production of 
statements and parties to attend hearings.76 To ensure matters of law are addressed, they can 
require additional legal memoranda and briefing,77 appoint counsel to serve standby,78 and 
designate amici curiae.79 This the court has done on a number of occasions—including prior 
to the USA FREEDOM Act, which explicitly allowed for the appointment of amici. In 2013, 
Judge Mary A. McLaughlin, relying on non-specialized Article III caselaw, determined that 
the FISC had the inherent power to allow amicus curiae to brief the court.80 Because of their 
constitutional status, the FISC and FISCR also retain “all the inherent powers that any court 
has when considering a warrant. There is no delegation of judicial power to the Executive 
Branch.”81  
 
In addition to ensuring fairness and justice, Article III courts have broad authority to facilitate 
the efficient use of resources, which translates into an ability to manage their own affairs.82 
Thus, while dockets themselves may include mandatory elements, how that docket is handled 
falls within the courts’ purview.83 This includes, amongst other instruments, setting the order 
in which issues will be addressed,84 as well as consolidating cases.85 
 
The FISC has exercised these powers as well as other ancillary authorities that go to efficiency, 
such as comity and the first-to-file rule—both of which are considered classic inherent powers. 
In 2013, for example, Judge Dennis Saylor found standing on First Amendment grounds for 
an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) motion for the release of Section 215-related 
opinions, but then stayed the case on the grounds that a substantially similar one was moving 
through the Southern District of New York pursuant to FOIA.86 The court wrote, “As a matter 
of comity, and in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid inconsistent judgments, 
federal courts do not engage in parallel adjudications involving the same parties and issues.”87 
Similarly, in 2015, FISC Judge Michael Mosman denied Ken Cuccinelli and FreedomWorks 
 
75 See In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 304-07, 312-14 (1920); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982), 
amended in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Schwimmer v. United 
States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 1956); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127–29 (1864). 
76 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11–12 (1st Cir. 1985). 
77 Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1047 (1st Cir. 1980). 
78 United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 1002, 1018 (3d Cir. 1993). 
79 In re Utils. Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1937). 
80 The Court applies previous Article III case precedent to the FISC to conclude it has the inherent authority to 
allow “amicus curiae briefs within the context of the statutory provisions that set out the ex parte and classified 
nature of proceedings under the . . . . Section 215.” Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the 
FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00090, at 5 (FISA Ct. Dec. 18, 
2013) (McLaughlin, J.). 
81 In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
82 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 
626, 630-31 (1962)); In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 143 (1st Cir. 2002); Arthur Pierson & Co., v. Provimi 
Veal Corp., 887 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1989). 
83 See Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 
1805 (1995)). 
84 Marinechance Shipping, Ltd. v. Sebastian, 143 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1998). 
85 See MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958). 
86 Opinion and Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, 
GID.C.00085, at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.) (referencing Am. C.L. Union v. FBI, 2015 WL 
1566775, No. 11cv7562 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)). 
87 Id. at 13. 
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a motion to intervene in a suit under the first-to-file rule. The parties and issues involved, as 
well as the relief sought, “extensively overlap[ped] with a suit previously commenced in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.”88 The judge noted the risk of 
“duplicative effort and risk of inconsistent outcomes.”89 The movants, as plaintiffs in the other 
suit suing brought against largely the same individuals, presented the same standing questions 
present in the non-specialized, Article III entity.  
 
The final category of inherent powers within the purview of Article III stems from the courts’s 
ability to protect their own integrity, independence and reputation. These powers are well-
recognized in the non-specialized, geographic courts, where they assume a range of powers to 
prevent fraud on the court, such as launching their own investigations,90 or setting aside 
decisions if they are later determined to be based on fraudulent representations.91 As addressed 
in Part V below, the FISC has had to implement a number of steps in this category to respond 
to government misrepresentation. Like all Article III courts, the FISC can sanction 
contumacious behavior and impose penalties on individuals who act in bad faith.92 It has had 
occasion to do so, such as its March 2020 opinion forbidding not just Kevin Clinesmith, the 
attorney who made a deliberate, material misrepresentation to the court from appearing before 
it, but also any attorney under disciplinary or criminal investigation for their work before the 
FISC.93  
 
D. Control of Judicial Records 
 
Tension between the courts’ Article III status and the specialized nature of their proceedings 
forcefully presents in regard to who controls the courts’ records. The issue stems from the 
subject matter before the court. The classification regime, which is designed to protect 
sensitive national security information, exists by executive fiat and is thus part and parcel of 
the Executive Branch.94 So, what happens when the third branch of government uses classified 
information as a basis for their work product? Although the government has become 
increasingly strident in its arguments, the FISC, for the most part, has guarded its 
constitutional authority while taking steps to protect against the unwitting release of harmful 
information.  
 
1. Non-specialized Courts 
 
 
88 Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 
15-75, GID.C.00117, at 4 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (Mosman, J.). 
89 Id. at 6. 
90 Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refin. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946). 
91 As the Supreme court explained, the “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments” is 
central to judicial integrity because “tampering with the administration of justice in [this] manner . . . involves far 
more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the 
public.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Harford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245, 246 (1946); see also Universal Oil 
Prods. Co, 328 U.S. at 580 (citing Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. 238); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 
(1991) (quoting Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245, 246). 
92 See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 
630–31); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765–
66 (1980); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1183–84 (2017) (holding that federal courts 
have inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 
240, 258–59 (1975) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 
(1974)). 
93 Corrected Opinion and Order, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. 
Misc. 19-02, GID.C.00272, at 18 (FISA Ct. Mar. 5, 2020) (Boasberg, J.). 
94 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
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The ability to decide a case lies at the heart of Article III authority: as the Supreme Court 
observed in 1825, “The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction in certain specified 
cases, in all of which it has the power to render judgment.”95 Neither the Executive Branch nor 
Congress can dictate to the courts how to decide cases or require a court to issue—or stop the 
court from issuing—a decision. 
 
Article III(1) courts, accordingly, recognize their inherent authority “to protect their 
proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities.”96 
They have the power “to command respect for the court’s orders, judgments, procedures, and 
authority”97 Article III courts thus have supervisory power over their own records and files.98 
They can issue opinions, and they can seal, unseal, revoke, or rescind orders.99 Courts 
routinely exercise jurisdiction over third party requests for records, as well as motions for 
common law or First Amendment right of access.100 This ranges from applications for 
warrants to judicial opinions.101 The tipping point is whether the records are “judicial 
documents,” understood as materials that go to “the exercise of Article III judicial power.”102 
The moment at which they become so, the public has a presumptive right of access through 
the court in which they were filed.103  
 
Article III courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over their records after the conclusion of 
the matter before the court.104
 
They have “the inherent power to correct errors, remedy 
omissions, and correct clerical errors in its records.”105 They can “modify or lift protective 
orders that [have been] entered.”106 They can unseal records after the fact.107 And they can re-
open a case.108 Their jurisdiction “is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but 
 
95 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825); see also Doe v. Apfel, No. 98-CV-182, 1999 WL 
182669, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1999) (“Courts have recognized that a judicial opinion deciding a case lies at 
the heart of the exercise of Article III powers.”) 
96 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996). 
97 In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (1996). 
98 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). See also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 
F.3d 133, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 
1177 (6th Cir. 1983). In Nixon, SCOTUS held that neither the common law right of access nor the First 
Amendment, nor the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial compelled the release of tapes from the 
custody of the District Court. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609-611. 
99 See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (1961). 
100 See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979); United States v. Bus. of Custer Battlefield 
Museum & Store, 658 F.3d 1188, 1192–96 (9th Cir. 2011); Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 263 F.3d 
1304, 1310–13 (11th Cir. 2001); In re Nat’l Sec. Archive, No. 08 Civ. 6599, 2008 WL 8985358, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 26, 2008); In re Am. Hist. Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. 2d 274, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
101 See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265–68 (4th Cir. 2014); Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597; United States v. 
Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 56-59 (1st Cir. 2013); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119–24, 126 
(2d Cir. 2006); In re Providence J. Co., 293 F.3d 1, 9–13 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 
228 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 
1107–13 (3d Cir. 1985); Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429–30 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers 
(In re Nat’l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 947–48 (2d Cir. 1980). 
102 United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (2d Cir. 1995). 
103 See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119; Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048-52; Stern v. Cosby, 529 F.Supp.2d 417, 420 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
104 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 853 F.3d 792, 798 (5th Cir. 2017) (A court “has the power to manage its 
records, even though the proceeding that generated those records has concluded.”); Qureshi v. United States, 
600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 2010) (“That the court loses jurisdiction over the litigation does not, however, 
deprive the district court of its inherent supervisory powers.” (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 395 (1990)). 
105 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 25, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021) (citations omitted). 
106 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987). 
107 See Doe, 749 F.3d at 252-53; Oregonion Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1465–68 (9th Cir. 1990). 
108 United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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continues.”109 Courts can punish those who might “disregard . . . the product of their 
functioning, their judgments.”110 
 
Should courts not be able to control their own determinations, it would undermine their 
constitutional role. “Courts of record can speak only by or through their records, and what 
does not so appear does not exist in law.”111 If the other branches could divest the courts of 
ownership over their records, they could alter the principles of law according to their own 
interests. They could hide malfeasance, with deep implications for democratic representation 
and accountability. And they could undermine the judicial branch. The core of judicial power 
is the ability to render decisions. 
 
Like the powers addressed in the prior section, control of judicial records is an inherent power 
of Article III entities: in none of the cases in which courts have entertained requests for their 
records has Congress made a statutory grant of power over the records in question. Some 
courts go so far as to recognize it even when it conflicts with the statutorily-derived rules.112 
In one case, historians filed a motion requesting that a court unseal grand jury transcripts 
from an Espionage Act case seventy years prior.113 The district court regarded the request as 
well within its power.114 On appeal, the court noted that “Every federal court to consider the 
issue” has determined that “a district court’s limited inherent power to supervise a grand jury 
includes the power to unseal grand-jury materials when appropriate.”115 The plaintiff “chose 
the Northern District of Illinois because it was the court that originally had supervisory 
jurisdiction over the grand jury in question.”116 He argued that this same court has continuing 
common-law authority over matters pertaining to that grand jury.117 It did not matter that that 
the individual himself had no connection to the underlying action.118 “[R]epresentatives of 
the press and general public must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of . . . 
access to documents.”119 “To hold otherwise would raise First Amendment concerns.”120 The 
line is the point at which the documents become part of the judicial record. Accordingly, the 
case law includes materials deep in litigation, all the way up to final judgment.121 
 
 2. The Foreign Intelligence Courts 
 
The first time this issue came to the FISC appears to have been in 2007, when Judge Bates, 
following Warner Communications, held that the FISC has supervisory jurisdiction over its 
own documents. He rejected the government’s argument that the court lacked jurisdiction 
over  its own opinions, writing, it would be “quite odd if the FISC did not have jurisdiction 
 
109 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 23 (1825). 
110 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis omitted). 
111 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 22, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021) (citations omitted) (“The court record is 
the permanent account of that court’s proceedings in particular cases, as well as the court’s opinion or decision.”) 
112 See, e.g., In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997). 
113 Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 756-61 (7th Cir. 2016). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 755-56. 
116 Id. at 757. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 759. 
119 Id. (quoting Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
120 Id. 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 868 F.3d 385, 390–96 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that the 
district court had jurisdiction to determine whether a common law qualified right of access extended to pre-
indictment search materials). 
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in the first instance to adjudicate a claim of right to the court’s very own records and files.”122 
In 2013, Judge Reggie Walton cited back to Bates’s opinion to determine that the FISC 
continues to exercise jurisdiction over records following final determination of the matter 
before it, as reflected in the FISC Rules of Procedure.123 
 
FISC Rule 62 acknowledges the court’s control of its records, allowing for the court to 
determine when to make its opinions public. In 2014, “in the exercise of its discretion,”124 
the FISC determined that it was “appropriate to take steps toward publication of any Section 
215 Opinions” that were not subject to parallel FOIA litigation, without reaching the merits 
of an asserted right of public access under the First Amendment.125 The court ordered the 
government to identify which opinions were and were not subject to the FOIA litigation and 
to “propose a timetable to complete a declassification review and submit to the Court its 
proposed redactions, if any.”126 The government returned with just one opinion, stating that 
it should be withheld in full.127 The court did not accept the government’s position.128 
Ordered to provide further documentation, the government determined “upon review and as 
a discretionary matter . . . that it does not object if this Court determines, pursuant to Rule 
62(a), that those portions of the Opinion that are not classified and release of which would 
not jeopardize” an ongoing investigation be published.129 Again, the court pushed back, 
leading to broader publication.130 
 
Similarly, in February 2020, the FISC held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a Motion 
for the Release of Court Records, and ancillary jurisdiction over the claim. The court 
recognized jurisdiction following the second prong of Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., which allows jurisdiction outside of a statutory grant “to enable a court to function 
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its 
 
122 Memorandum Opinion, In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, GID.C.00021, at 4 (FISA 
Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.). This opinion was also cited favorably in Opinion and Order, In re Motion for Consent to 
Disclosure of Ct. Recs. or, in the Alternative, A Determination of the Effect of the Ct’s Rules on Statutory Access 
Rights, No. 13-01, GID.C.00082, at 2, (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013) (Walton, J). 
123 In re Motion, GID.C.00082, at 2–3. In that case, the Government had been trying to play two ends off against 
the middle: the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) had brought a FOIA request in the District of Columbia for 
a FISC record. The Justice Department argued to the District Court that the FISC, by operation of Rule 62, had 
authority and control over copies of the opinion in the Government’s possession. The EFF moved to stay and 
brought a parallel motion before the FISC. Before the specialized court, the Government contended that the FISC 
did not have jurisdiction because the copies of the opinion were in the Government’s possession and EFF was 
thus asserting a statutory, and not a constitutional, right of access against the Executive Branch. The FISC 
rejected the Government’s argument that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. 
124 See Opinion and Order Directing Declassification of Redacted Opinion, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00104, at 3 (FISA Ct. Aug. 7, 2014) (Saylor IV, J.).  
125 See In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 GID.C.00085, at 17, 2013 
WL 5460064, at *8 (FISA Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.). 
126 Id. at 18, 2013 WL 546064, at *8. 
127 In re Ords. of this Ct., GID.C.00104 at 4 (citing Second Submission of the United States in Response to the 
Court's Oct. 8, 2013 Order at 2, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 
(FISA Ct. Nov. 18, 2013), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1055928 
[https://perma.cc/Q3TV-W9TR]. 
128 Two days later, the court responded, ordering the Government to submit a detailed explanation of why the 
opinion could not be made public, even in redacted form, and to provide an unclassified explanation, under FISC 
Rule 7(j) to the two parties in the suit. Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. 
Misc. 13-02, GID.C.00181, at 2 (FISA Ct. Nov. 20, 2013) (Saylor IV, J.). 
129 In re Ords. of this Ct., GID.C.00104, at 5. 
130 The court reviewed the First Redaction proposal and questioned its scope. Id. at 5–6. On February 6, 2014, the 
Government submitted a second redaction proposal, which the court accepted and ordered to be published. Id. at 
6–7. 
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decrees.”131 In drafting opinions, an action contemplated by Congress, the FISC has the 
inherent power of any Article III court.132 Thus, the FISCR, even as it decided not to exercise 
jurisdiction over a First Amendment right of access claim, simultaneously stated that it was 
declining to act on its ancillary authority.133 
 
Despite the government’s protestations, separation of powers means that the executive cannot 
bind the court and classify judicial opinions. No more so could it bind Congress—a fact 
recognized by rules in the Senate and House of Representatives that retain for the legislature 
the right to declassify material, even over Presidential objection.134 
 
3. Mischaracterization of Dep’t of the Navy v. Eagan 
 
The decisions and underlying briefs that have been made public over the past five years 
demonstrate that the government has become increasingly strident—and inaccurate—in 
arguments put forward to support its claim that it has control over FISC opinions as an 
extension of its classification authority. In doing so, it frequently mischaracterizes Dep’t of 
the Navy v. Egan as standing for the proposition that the authority to make national security 
judgments related to classified material lies solely with the Executive Branch.135 The 
Executive also uses Egan to buttress its claim that the Judiciary, unlike the Executive Branch, 
 
131 Opinion, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00267, at 11, 5 (FISA Ct. Feb. 11, 2020) (Collyer, J.) (quoting 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)). 
132 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a)(1), (b) (West). 
133 In re Ops. & Ords. by the FISC Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 
957 F.3d 1344, 1355–57, GID.CA.00013, at 22-23 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2020) (per curiam). 
134 See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8(a), (b)(1)–(5) (1976) (as amended through S. Res. 470, 113th Cong. (2014)), 
reprinted in S. PRT. NO. 116-4 (2019); Rules of H.R., 116th Cong., Rule X(g)(1) (2019). The Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”) controls information in its own records. S. Res. 400 § 10. Members may 
declassify witness names and make classified material available to Senators and to the public. SSCI R.P., 116th 
Cong., Rules 8.10, 9.5, 9.7; S. Res. 400, § 8(a). The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(“HPSCI”) safeguards sensitive national security information. HPSCI R.P., 116th Cong., Rules 12(a)–(b), 14 
(2019). Once the Executive Branch provides classified information, it becomes committee material. Id. at Rule 13 
(labelling it “executive session material”). HPSCI imposes an oath on Committee members and determines which 
members of the House gain access to the material. Id. at Rule 14(d), (f), (g), (i). It can release classified 
information to the entire House or to the public. Id. at Rule 14(l); House Rule X(11)(g). The committee takes into 
account national defense and “[s]uch other concerns, constitutional or otherwise, as may affect the public interest 
of the United States.” HPSCI R.P., Rule 14(f)(2)(A), (D). 
135 Dep’t. of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). For examples of the government making this claim before 
the FISC, see United States’ Reply Brief at 6, In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Ct. of Rev., No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056123 [https://perma.cc/RES3-ET5A]; Opening Brief 
for the United States at 21–22, In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev., 
No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Feb. 23, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. Opening Br.], 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056118 [https://perma.cc/X8EM-QUSY]; United States' 
Opposition to the Motion of the ACLU for the Release of Court Records at 11, In re Ops. and Ords. of this Ct. 
Containing Novel or Significant Interpretations of Law, No. Misc. 16-01 (FISA Ct. June 8, 2017) [hereinafter 
U.S. Opp. to Mot. of ACLU in No. Misc. 16-01], 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056116 [https://perma.cc/Y9VH-J622]; United States’ 
Response to Movant’s En Banc Opening Brief at 6, In re Ops.& Ords. of This Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of 
Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (May 1, 2017), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056064 [https://perma.cc/GZG4-2SJ8]; United States’ 
Legal Brief to the En Banc Court in Response to the Court’s Order of March 22, 2017 at 11 n.4, In re Ops. & 
Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 
(FISA Ct. No. Apr. 17, 2017), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056062 
[https://perma.cc/3489-4WMV]. 
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is ill-suited to make decisions bearing on national security.136 A parallel trend is appearing in 
the government’s submissions to other Article III courts.137 
 
These claims do not square with the facts and holding of the case itself, which focused on a 
two-track system for an agency to take adverse action against government employees.138 
Under the relevant statute, employees had a right to a hearing through appeal to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board—a non-Article III tribunal.139 The court held that the statute did 
not give the board control over security clearance determinations.140 That decision had to be 
made by the appropriate agency inside the executive branch with the necessary expertise.141 
To the extent that the court looked to the Commander-in-Chief powers, it was as to whether 
the Executive had the authority to classify information in the first place, as well as to give, or 
deny, access to that information to individuals hired by the Executive. The court explained: 
“no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”142 
 
Despite the government’s effort to credit this case with standing for the broader proposition 
that the executive has untrammeled authority to classify material—including judicial 
opinions—the case says nothing of the sort.143 As the court noted at the beginning of its 
 
136 See, e.g., U.S. Opening Br., supra note 135, at 21 (citing and quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529, for “holding that 
predictive judgments related to national security risks ‘must be made by those with necessary expertise in 
protecting classified information.’”); U.S. Opp. to Mot. of ACLU in No. Misc. 16-01, supra note 135, at 13 
(raising concern that the FISC might err in making the determination as “judges with expertise in national 
security matters cannot equal [the expertise] of the Executive Branch” (quotation omitted) (citing Egan, 484 U.S. 
at 529)). 
137 It has not always been the case: in the years immediately following Egan, the Executive appropriately 
appealed to it in security clearance or background check cases. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees, Stehney v. Perry, 
101 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1996) (No. 96-5036); Brief for Appellees at 11–12, Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 24, 1998) (No. 98-5036), 1998 WL 35240401. The Department of Justice still uses it in access-related 
contexts. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 32, Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2012) (No. 
12-20471), 2012 WL 5294782, at *32. Over the past decade, however, the government has increasingly begun to 
claim that the case supports a broad reading of Executive Branch power and expected judicial deference. See, 
e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 42, Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86 (Nov. 26, 2014), (No. 13-1402), 2014 WL 
6706838, at *42; Brief for the United States at 23, Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478 (Dec. 13, 
2010) (Nos. 09- 1298, 09-130), 2010 WL 5099376, at *23; Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellants at 12-13, 
ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 901 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 2017) (No. 17-779), 2017 WL 5152276, at *12-13; 
Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 41–42, 48, Dhiab v. Obama, 787 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2015) (No. 14-
5299), 2015 WL 1004459, at *41–42, *48; Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee at 115, United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 
F.3d 885 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (No. 11-30342), 2012 WL 3342732, at *115; Brief for the Appellees at 17, 19, 
34, Tenenbaum v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 407 Fed. App’x 4 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2009) (No. 09-1992), 2009 WL 
4831977; Brief for the Defendants-Appellants at 42–43, John Doe Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. Feb. 
14, 2008) (No. 07-4943), 2008 WL 6082598, at *42–43. 
138 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 526; 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7511–14, 7531–33 (West).  
139 See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7513(d), 7532(c).  
140 Egan, 484 U.S. at 530–32.  
141 Id. at 527. 
142 Id. at 528. 
143 This problem, while most pronounced in regard to Egan, is not limited to that case. Another case frequently 
cited in support of overbroad Executive Branch authorities is CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985). In that case, 
individuals were seeking access to the names and institutional affiliations of those working on MKULTRA. Id. at 
178–79. The Court noted that “Congress did not mandate the withholding of information that may reveal the 
identity of an intelligence source; it made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible only for protecting 
against unauthorized disclosures.” Id. at 180. The Court went on to suggest, “[I]t is the responsibility of the 
Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in 
determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency’s 
intelligence-gathering process.” Id. Although the holding was appropriately narrow (“We hold that the Director 
of Central Intelligence properly invoked § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 to withhold disclosure 
of the identities of the individual MKULTRA researchers as protected “intelligence sources.” Id. at 181), the 
Government looks to the case in support of broad judicial deference to the Executive Branch whenever national 
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decision “the narrow question presented by this case.”144 The statute in question did not 
transfer control over security clearances to the board, as access to classified material within 
the Executive Branch is overseen by the agency most directly involved in the sensitive 
areas.145 
 
The tension between the FISC as an Article III entity and its handling of classified material, 
and how it is resolved, has far-reaching implications for the rule of law. It is a foundational 
tenet in Western democracies that for law to be legitimate, it must be known and promulgated. 
Some scholars go so far as to suggest that failure to do so may result in something not properly 
called law at all.146 To the extent that FISC/FISCR opinions establish law, as they increasingly 
do, it becomes ever more important for this information to be public. As the foreign 
intelligence courts are increasingly put into a position of having to conduct oversight of the 
Executive, moreover, and to respond to Executive Branch malfeasance, there is a deeply 
democratic concern about whether the government should be able to control who sees judicial 




The special status of the FISC/FISCR as a specialized court—particularly one that deals with 
classified material—and its Article III status has also presented in regard to standing. Statutory 
provisions require in camera and ex parte proceedings, as well as the sealing of certain records 
as they are passed up the chain of review. Yet the courts’ decisions create precedent and 
operate as working law, with their contours having a direct impact on the rights of third 
parties—i.e., individuals who are not part of the application or certification processes. This 
tension results in numerous questions about who has the right to see the decisions of the court 
and the information on which those determinations are based.   
 
The question came to the fore on the heels of the predecessor to the 2008 FAA, when Judge 
Reggie Walton held that Yahoo! could challenge directives under the 2007 Protect America 
Act (PAA) as violative of its customers’ Fourth Amendment rights.147 The court read the 
statutory language, which contemplated companies refusing to comply with directives as 
sufficient to address third party rights.148 For the court, an unconstitutional directive could not 
be considered lawful, regardless of whose rights had been violated.149  
 
Upon review, FISCR Judge Bruce M. Selya held that the communications service provider 
had standing to challenge the legality of directives issued pursuant to PAA.150 The court 
 
security matters are on the line. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, 
EXEMPTION 1, at 15–16 & n.77 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file/1197091/download 
[https://perma.cc/X8K3-SXVY] (citing CIA v. Sims in support of the proposition that the judiciary is and ought to 
be extremely deferential to the executive when national security matters are on the line).  
144 Egan, 484 U.S. at 520. 
145 Id. at 530–32. 
146 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39, 47 (1964). 
147 Memorandum Opinion, In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Sec. 105B of the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01, GID.C.00025, at 43 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (Walton, J.) (GID.C.000238 
is the same opinion, but with different redactions).  
148 Id. at 54; see 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(b)(g) (West) (“In the case of a failure to comply with a directive . . . [t]he 
court shall issue an order requiring the person to comply with the directive if it finds that the directive was issued 
in accordance with subsection (e) and is otherwise lawful.”) 
149 In re Directives, GID.C.00025, at 45. 
150 In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to Sec. 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1009, 
GID.CA.00002, at 10 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (Selya, J.). 
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pointed to the statutory language permitting a provider receiving a directive to challenge the 
legality of that directive.151 The provider risked injury by assuming the burden it would have 
to shoulder to facilitate the government's request—an injury caused by the government and 
redressable by the court.152 
 
Two key developments subsequent to those cases had a profound impact on the more recent 
standing questions to come before the FISC/FISCR: first, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International; and, second, the release of the Snowden documents and 
what they did to demonstrate an injury-in-fact.  
 
Clapper involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 702.153 The plaintiffs admitted 
to not knowing anything specific about how the targeting practices worked but provided 
evidence that (a) they had engaged in communications that came within Section 702 purview; 
(b) the government had a strong motive to intercept the communications because of the subject 
matter/identities; (c) the government had already intercepted a large number of calls and 
emails involving a person who communicated regularly with the plaintiff; and (d) the 
government had the capacity to intercept the communications.154 The Court determined that 
the plaintiffs’ evidence was inadequate to establish standing because they relied on a “highly 
attenuated chain of possibilities” and displayed “no actual knowledge” as to whether plaintiffs 
ever specifically targeted.155 
 
Less than four months after the Court issued its opinion in Clapper, the Snowden documents 
burst on the scene.156 On June 6, 2013, the Guardian carried the first item: the now-infamous 
Section 215 secondary order showing that the National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting 
metadata from millions of Verizon customers, including from calls entirely within the United 
States.157 The next day, the Washington Post and others reported that the NSA was accessing 
data through back doors into U.S. internet companies like Google and Facebook via PRISM.158 
The following day, the papers revealed that over a thirty-day period, some 97 billion internet 
data records and 124 billion telephony data records had been collected.159 Inside the U.S., 
 
151 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (“A person receiving a production order may challenge the legality of the 
production order or any nondisclosure order . . . by filing a petition.”); id. § 1881a(i)(4)(A) (“An electronic 
communication service provider receiving a directive . . . may file a petition to modify or set aside such directive 
with the [FISC], which shall have jurisdiction to review such petition.”) 
152 In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1008-09, GID.CA.00002, at 8–10. 
153 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 404 (2013). 
154 Id. at 425–30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
155 Id. at 410–11 (majority opinion).  
156 For a detailed discussion of the documents released by Edward Snowden, the former Booz Allen Hamilton 
defense contractor at the National Security Agency, see generally BARTON GELLMAN, DARK MIRROR: EDWARD 
SNOWDEN AND THE AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE STATE (2020); GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD 
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014); EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, HOW AMERICA LOST ITS 
SECRETS: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE MAN AND THE THEFT (2017). 
157 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN 
(June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-
order [https://perma.cc/UN4Q-874P]. 
158 See Barton Gellman, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad 
Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-
mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/97B7-B8UE]; Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism 
Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data [https://perma.cc/E8UE-M28Q]. 
159 See Glenn Greenwald & Ewan MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The NSA’s Secret Tool to Track Global 
Surveillance Data, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-
informant-global-datamining [https://perma.cc/AE5C-2PFF]. 
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some 3 billion data elements were captured over a thirty-day period ending March 2013, giving 
the NSA more information on Americans inside the United States than Russia had over its 
citizens. On June 20, 2013, a Section 702 FISC order from 2010 approving targeting 
procedures, as well as the 2009 minimization procedures appeared, and, a week later, articles 
reported that the NSA was collecting and storing large quantities of Americans’ Internet 
metadata.160  
 
Over the following months, the Washington Post, New York Times, Guardian, and others 
published more information on Section 702 upstream collection, NSA monitoring of 
Americans’ email and text communications into and out of the country, warrantless searches, 
access to smartphones, monitoring of banking and credit institutions, collection of contact 
lists, and the augmentation of all of this data with other public and commercial sources to 
develop sophisticated pictures of citizens’ social relationships. When information began to 
emerge about the extent of surveillance overseas, even America’s closest allies began to 
express alarm.161 
 
The political climate shifted, with implications for all three branches of government. Within 
hours of the first leak, the Director of National Intelligence issued press releases 
acknowledging the Section 215 and Section 702 programs.162 Soon thereafter, President 
Obama ordered the declassification of scores of documents.163 In August, ODNI launched a 
Tumblr account, “IC on the Record,” to provide more information and to make its case in the 
intense public debates that ensued.164 The President simultaneously assembled a Review 
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, which in December 2013 formally 
 
160 See Glenn Greenwald & James Ball, The Top Secret Rules that Allow NSA to Use US Data Without a 
Warrant, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-
warrant [https://perma.cc/BZG3-L8C6]; Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Collected U.S. Email 
Records in Bulk for More than Two Years Under Obama, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-data-mining-authorised-obama [https://perma.cc/SL7K-
7VTR]. 
161 In September 2013, for instance, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff berated the United States at the United 
Nations General Assembly: “Meddling in such a manner in the life and affairs of other countries is a breach of 
international law, and, as such it is an affront to the principles that should otherwise govern relations among 
countries, especially among friendly nations.” News Wrap: Brazil President Calls U.S. Spying on Allies ‘Totally 
Unacceptable,’ PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/news-wrap-brazil-
president-calls-u-s-spying-on-allies-totally-unacceptable [https://perma.cc/H6VX-H844]. The following month, 
both French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel contacted the White House to 
condemn U.S. surveillance of the private calls and text messages of foreign nationals. Ian Traynor et al., Angela 
Merkel’s Call to Obama: Are You Bugging My Mobile Phone?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/23/us-monitored-angela-merkel-german [https://perma.cc/5HYK-
MUGL]. 
162 See James R. Clapper, DNI Statement on Activities Authorized Under Section 702 of FISA, OFF. OF THE DIR. 
OF NAT’L INTEL. (June 6, 2013), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-
2013/item/869-dni-statement-on-activities-authorized-under-section-702-of-fisa [https://perma.cc/5S5S-GSSQ]; 
James R. Clapper, DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information, OFF. OF THE 
DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL. (June 6, 2013), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-
2013/item/868-dni-statement-on-recent-unauthorized-disclosures-of-classified-information 
[https://perma.cc/8PAQ-DYWU]. 
163 See The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 916 (Aug. 9, 2013), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/09/remarks-president-press-conference 
[https://perma.cc/384E-BZHK]. 
164 See Off. of the Dir. of Nat’l Intel., IC ON THE REC., https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/ [https://perma.cc/UEY2-
B7Q5] (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). This database is also accessible now via intel.gov. IC on the Record 
Database, INTEL.GOV, https://www.intel.gov/ic-on-the-record-database [https://perma.cc/GSN2-E4Z3] (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2021); About, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-
features/123-about?start=6 [https://perma.cc/YGN2-ETQK]. 
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issued forty-six recommendations—including significant reforms of foreign intelligence 
surveillance directed at U.S. persons.165 The Privacy and Civil Liberties Board went from 
being underfunded and inactive to issuing its first, scathing report, centered on Section 215 
collection and operation of the FISC.166 To assuage the alarm being expressed by allies, Obama 
issued a new Presidential Policy Directive, underscoring that U.S. signals intelligence 
activities would henceforth “take into account that all persons should be treated with dignity 
and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and that all persons 
have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.”167 Special 
limitations would apply. 
 
The legislature, too, became swept up in the political fallout. Scores of bills proposing far-
reaching reforms suddenly appeared before Congress: from just three bills that had been 
brought forward the prior year (June 2012–May 2013), when specific clauses in FISA had 
actually been up for renewal, compared with the twelve months following the leaks, in which 
forty-two bills were before Congress, calling for everything from the elimination of the 
FISC/FISCR to a radical overhaul of FISA. Ultimately, Congress settled on the USA 
FREEDOM Act, which, inter alia, prohibited bulk collection under Section 215, FISA pen 
register/trap and trace authorities, and National Security Letters; required the appointment of 
at least five amici to address novel questions of law; required the Attorney General to submit 
any FISC/FISCR decision or order with a significant interpretation of FISA to Congress; and 
required a number of reports related to the operation of FISA authorities.168 
 
The judiciary did not remain immune. In non-specialized Article III courts, a slew of cases 
challenged the constitutionality of the surveillance programs. It started the same day the 
Guardian published the secondary order, with Klayman I filed in D.D.C. against Section 
215.169 On June 11, 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed in S.D.N.Y., 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the NSA collection program exceeded the statutory 
authority and violated both the First and Fourth Amendments.170 The following day Anna 
Smith, a neo-natal intensive care nurse in Spokane, filed a complaint in Idaho, requesting that 
the district court enjoin the NSA from collecting and analyzing her telephone data.171 In July, 
EPIC filed in the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to demand that the FISC order be 
 
165 See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTEL. & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING 
WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Dec. 12, 2013). 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6USQ-V634].  
166 See PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
COURT (Jan. 23, 2014), https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/ec542143-1079-424a-
84b3-acc354698560/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/K55Q-LFKM]. 
167 Directive on Signals Intelligence Activities, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 31 (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-
directive-signals-intelligence-activities [https://perma.cc/5UR5-MJWV]; see also The President’s News 
Conference, supra note 163. 
168 See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268. 
169 Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.C.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
170 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 799 (2d Cir. 2015) (challenged bulk collection).170 
171 See Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Idaho 2014), vacated and remanded, 816 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 
2014).  
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vacated,172 and twenty-two organizations filed suit in the Northern District of California, 
asserting First Amendment violations.173 
 
Like its sistren, the FISC found itself in the middle of a maelstrom. For thirty-five years, there 
had been no public filings before the FISC. But within days of the first leak, they began. On 
June 10, 2013, the ACLU and Yale Media Freedom Information Access Clinic (MFIAC) 
entered a motion to obtain FISC opinions that evaluated the meaning, scope, and/or 
constitutionality of Section 215.174 Over the next few weeks, sixteen members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of the motion, as did a number of 
advocacy organizations, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), the EFF, 
and the First Amendment Coalition.175 On July 15, 2013, they were joined by a formidable 
group of media representatives which included, inter alia, the Reporters Committee, ABC 
News, the Associated Press, Bloomberg News, Dow Jones & Company, Reuters, National 
Public Radio, the Los Angeles Times, The New Yorker, Newsweek, the Washington Post, and 
others.176 
 
With an eye towards their outraged customer base, corporate America engaged. On June 14, 
2013, just over a week after the first article appeared, Yahoo! moved the court under FISC 
Rule 62(a) to request publication of an April 2008 opinion, which had been appealed to the 
FISCR and referenced in In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).177 Five days 
later, Microsoft requested permission to disclose aggregate information regarding the FISC 
 
172 In re Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 571 U.S. 1023 (2013) (mem.) (petition filed on July 8, 2013 and denied on Nov. 
18, 2013). 
173 Amended Complaint, First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. NSA, No. 13-cv-3287 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013) 
(initial complaint was filed on July 16, 2013). 
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Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA Ct. June 12, 2013), 
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Frontier Foundation, and TechFreedom as Amici Curiae in Support of the Motions for Declaratory Judgment, In 
re Motion for Declaratory Judgment of Google Inc.'s First Amend. Right to Publish Aggregate Info. About FISA 
Orders, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. July 8, 2013), 
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Bloomberg, L.P., Dow Jones & Company, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Los Angeles Times, The McClatchy Company, 
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Company LLC, Reuters America LLC, Tribune Company, and The Washington Post in Support of the Motion 
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orders it had received.178 Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn later entered similar motions.179 
Further filings and motions to the court to obtain opinions and orders continued into the 
autumn and beyond.180  
 
As a result of these motions, the court immediately had to address questions of standing. It 
was an area fraught with tension, particularly in light of the recent Clapper decision which 
had predated the unprecedented public access to the surveillance programs underway. 
 
In September 2013, although the Government argued that the ACLU and Yale MFIAC had 
not been a party to the original judicial determination about bulk collection and therefore 
lacked standing, Judge Saylor found otherwise. Quoting Clapper, he noted, “To establish 
Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly 
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traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”181 The injury caused 
by withholding the opinions was actual, as they were not, in fact, available to the public, the 
concern could be alleviated by the court, and the injury was sufficiently concrete and 
particularized because release would enhance the public debate and, in particular, the ACLU’s 
activities. Withholding the opinions, on the other hand, was detrimental, because, the 
“ACLU’s active participant in the legislative and public debates about the proper scope of 
Section 215 and the advisability of amending that provision is obvious from the public 
record.”182  
 
Judge Saylor determined that the other movant, Yale MFIAC, though, had neither indicated 
how release of information would aid its activities nor how failure to release opinions would 
be detrimental. The clinic had not participated in public debate about Section 215 and 
therefore, lacking a concrete and particularized injury, did not have standing.183 Nearly a year 
later, the court granted a motion for reconsideration of the clinic’s dismissal.184 The decision 
recognized the recently-decided case, Company Doe v. Public Citizen, in which consumer 
advocacy organizations had asserted both a common law and First Amendment right of access 
to sealed documents.185 The Fourth Circuit had held that the groups had standing under Article 
III: “Their informational interests, though shared by a large segment of the citizenry, became 
sufficiently concrete to confer Art. III standing when they sought and were denied access to 
the information they claimed a right to inspect.”186 In the case of the FISC, the Court concluded 
in regard to the ACLU/MFIAC motion that principles of comity required that the motion be 
denied to the extent that it concerned FISC opinions at issue in separate suit brought by the 
ACLU in October 2011 in the Southern District of New York.187  
 
On Nov. 7, 2013, the ACLU and Yale MFIAC filed another motion for declassification of 
opinions addressing bulk collection.188 Two of the four opinions that the government 
determined were responsive to the request had already been made public in redacted form 
pursuant to FISCR Rule of Procedure 62(a).189 The other two were subsequently released by 
the government in redacted form.190 It was not until January 25, 2017 that the court ruled that 
the movants lacked standing for First Amendment right of access to the opinions.191 FISC 
 
181 Opinion and Order, In re Ords. of this Ct. Interpreting Sec. 215 of the Patriot Act, No. Misc. 13-02, 
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191 Opinion and Order, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. 
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Presiding Judge Rosemary Collyer determined that the movants failed the experience and logic 
tests for a First Amendment qualified right of access.192  
 
Meeting en banc, the FISC overturned the decision (6-5), saying that the standing requirement 
was satisfied.193 The court recognized that proper analysis turns on whether the injury is 
concrete and actual, assuming the claim has merit. In this case, the movants lacked access to 
the classified opinions, satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement.194 Judge Collyer certified the 
question to the FISCR on the grounds that it “would serve the interests of justice, a dispositive 
issue about standing was involved, and the split among the FISC Judges was very close and 
involved a difference of opinion about the law to apply, among other considerations.”195 
 
On January 9, 2018, the FISCR accepted certification and publicly appointed an amicus 
curiae.196 On March 16, 2018, the FISCR, agreeing with the en banc Court, held that Movants 
had met the requirements for standing.197 Denial of access to the redacted materials constituted 
an injury-in-fact. For standing purposes, the movants “need not show that they are ultimately 
entitled to access the materials in question. Instead, they need only show that their claim is not 
immaterial nor wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”198 The court explained, “The movants have 
demonstrated that their claimed right of access is judicially cognizable, and we agree with the 
FISC majority that their claim cannot be characterized as ‘completely devoid of merit,’ or 
‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous,’ even though it may ultimately be determined to be legally 
unsound.199 The court reached neither the merits of the movants’ claims nor jurisdictional 
issues. 
 
Along with direct efforts to obtain documents from the court, which necessarily implicated 
questions of standing, following the publication of the foreign intelligence programs, motions 
began to appear requesting to intervene in cases. In 2015, for instance, Judge Michael Mosman 
exercised his discretion sua sponte to dismiss one such request, without reaching the standing 
question.200 
 
E. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Numerous cases have dealt with FISC jurisdiction over FISA-specific electronic surveillance, 
physical search, PRTT, business records, and review of Section 702 certifications; targeting 
procedures; and minimization.201 A few cases address jurisdiction over outstanding matters 
once Congress removes the original authority. At the expiration of the PAA, for example, the 
FISA Court held that it retained jurisdiction even after the statute lapsed because it ordered 
 
192 See id. at 31–39. 
193 In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 
No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00140, 2017 WL 5983865 (FISA Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (en banc). 
194 See id. at 7-8, 2017 WL 5983865, at *4. 
195 In re Ops. & Ords of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 
No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00141, at 1, 2018 WL 396244, at *1 (FISA Ct. Jan. 5, 2018) (Collyer, J.). 
196 In re Certification of Questions of L. to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev., No. 18-01, GID.CA.00006, 
at 2, 6, 2018 WL 2709456, at *1, *3 (FISA Ct. Rev. Jan. 9, 2018) (per curiam). The FISCR appointed the author 
of this Article as amicus curiae. 
197 See id. at 8-15, 2018 WL 2709456, at *4–7. 
198 Id. at 2, 2018 WL 2709456, at *1. 
199 Id. at 15, 2018 WL 2709456, at *7.   
200 In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. Of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, 
GID.C.00117, 6-7 & n.6, 2015 WL 5637562, at *3 & n.6 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (Mosman, J.). 
201 See, e.g., In re Proc. Required by Section 702(i) of the FISA Amends. Act of 2008, No. Misc 08-01, 
GID.C.00028, 8-10, 2008 WL 9487946, at *4–5 (FISA Ct. Aug. 27, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.). 
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that the directives remain in effect until their expiration.202 This included jurisdiction over 
reviewing revised or additional procedures during the interim period.203 Similarly, in the USA 
FREEDOM Act, Congress provided for a 180-day grace period before bulk collection 
ended.204 The opinion, authored by Judge Mosman, began: “‘Plus ça change, plus c'est la 
même chose,’ well, at least for 180 days.”205 The determination of whether the court extends 
subject matter jurisdiction over a government request for surveillance or a court order evokes 
statutory questions about the subject matter before the court. Here, as the next Part discusses, 
the key question often turns on whether the technologies involved fit the statutory language or 
are able to cabin the amount and type of information sufficiently to ensure that the collection 
comports with FISA. 
 
III. Cluster 2: New Technologies / Old Statutory Language 
 
The second cluster of opinions centers on clarifying the type of surveillance allowable under 
FISA. Many of these appear to come about because of the basic question: how do new 
technologies fit with old statutory language? This impacts the type of information to be 
obtained, how it is to be collected, retained, accessed, and shared, and the ways in which 
technology can (or cannot) be used to limit collection or to ensure that certain information 
does not end up getting stored, analyzed, and shared. Three characteristics of technology drive 
the tension that marks this area.  
 
First, technology changes the information available. Volume is the most obvious shift. 
Collecting information about one telephone call is quantitatively and qualitatively different 
from collecting all telephone calls that an individual, much less an entire city or country, 
makes. The shifting nature of information extends beyond this, as the type of data that can be 
collected also changes. Previously, geolocational data, detailed mapping of social 
relationships, and certain religious and medical information was unavailable. Now it is 
available, along with sophisticated algorithms that generate more insight into what people do, 
think, and believe and, critically, are likely to do, think, and believe, in the future. The key 
question that the court has to confront here is whether the type of information being proposed 
for collection is the type of information anticipated by the statute. What constitutes “electronic 
surveillance” in a digital age? What about dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling 
information (DRAS)? Or content versus non-content? These distinctions matter, because 
which statutory language applies, and what steps the government has to go through to get the 
data, changes depending on how it is characterized. 
 
Second, how information can be obtained is rapidly changing in a way not contemplated by 
the statute. But the manner in which information is collected determines which statutory 
provision applies—and, consequently, how to analyze it under the First or Fourth Amendment 
as statutorily required by FISA. For instance, are searches of mobile devices  physical 
searches, and thus within Title III, or ELSUR, and thus subject to Title I? What about 
intercepts? Stored communications? Business records? How should chats be considered, or 
communication within online gaming systems? What constitutes a “search” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes? 
 
202 Memorandum Opinion, In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Sec. 105B of the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01, GID.C.00025, at 5-12 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (Walton, J.) 
(GID.C.000238 is the same opinion, but with different redactions); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
[REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00242, at 2–5 (FISA Ct. June 18, 2008) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
203 See [REDACTED], GID.C.00242, at 5. 
204 In re Application of the FBI, GID.C.00117, at 1, 2015 WL 5637562, at *1.  
205 Id. at 1, 2015 WL 5637562, at *1 (translated: “The more things change, the more they stay the same.”). 
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Third, FISC/FISCR jurisprudence makes apparent that technology also limits the ability of the 
government to meet constitutional requirements. What should the court do when confronted 
by the government’s ability to collect data, but inability to determine crucial information about 
the target, such as their identity or location? What if the facility can be targeted, but the user 
cannot be confirmed? The same issue presents with the question of content versus non-content: 
how should the court handle post-cut-through-dialed-digits, or multi-communication 
transactions carrying entirely domestic conversations? What about the problem of complicated 
technologies that carry unintended consequences, or overcollection? How should the court 
deal with this in light of the statutory regime?  
 
Technology is catapulting forward at a lightning rate. The average product life cycle in Silicon 
Valley is a matter of months. Title I has remained largely unchanged since 1978. Even the 
most recent major revisions were in 2015, six years ago. The government must adapt to the 
risks posed by these technologies, even as it uses them to try to head off national security 
threats. A growing body of jurisprudence addresses efforts by the court to reconcile the 
resulting tension between new technologies and swiftly antiquated statutory language. 
 
A. Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search 
 
The FISC, on multiple occasions, has acknowledged its jurisdiction over applications for 
electronic surveillance (ELSUR).206 For Title I, probable cause applies to each of the facilities 
to be surveilled.207 But interpretive problems have been caused by new technologies and 
collection techniques. What constitutes a “facility”? What falls within ELSUR? What is the 
line between ELSUR and physical search? The stakes are high: things that do not come within 
the statutory definition are outside the court’s purview. 
 
Title I of FISA requires that the government establish probable cause that the foreign power 
(FP) or agent of a foreign power (AFP) being targeted will use the facility to be placed under 
surveillance.208 The natural question then becomes, what is a facility? In 2007, the Justice 
Department’s National Security Division proposed a change that would have eviscerated 
statutory protections. It argued that for electronic intercept of Internet communications, an 
entire cablehead or gateway should be considered a “facility” within the meaning of FISA. 
Because the Government could demonstrate that FP/AFPs use the Internet, the Justice 
Department argued the court should make a probable cause finding in regard to the facility 
generally and leave it to the government to determine specific targets, which communications 
 
206 In re Application of the United States for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises 
and Pers. Prop., GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16–19 
(1981). “The language of the FISA clearly limits the authority of the judges designated to sit as judges of the 
FISC to the issuance of orders approving ‘electronic surveillance’ as that term is defined in the act. Id. at 17. In re 
All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, GID.C.00002 (FISA Ct. 2002) 
(Lamberth, J.). “Clearly this Court's jurisdiction is limited to granting orders for electronic surveillances and 
physical searches for the collection of foreign intelligence information under the standards and procedures 
prescribed in the Act.” Id. at 614, GID.C.0002, at 614. 
207 To order electronic surveillance, the Court must find “probable cause to believe that — (A) the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power . . . . ; and (B) each of the facilities or 
places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or 
agent of foreign power.” 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2) (West) (emphasis added).” The order must also specify “the 
identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance,” “the nature and location of each of 
the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will be directive, if known,” and “the type of 
information sought to be acquired and the type of communication or activities subjected to the surveillance.” Id. § 
1805(c)(1)(A) – (C).  
208 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(B). 
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related to them should be collected, and the like. This would have shifted analysis to the 
minimization procedures, making them something exercised by the executive branch—not an 
aspect of judicial review. To accept this reading, the court would have had to find that the 
backbone of the Internet was the facility under which surveillance would be directed.  
 
Judge Vinson rejected this interpretation. Even if surveillance occurred on the backbone, the 
government would not be acquiring everything travelling across the circuit. Instead, only 
content to or from particular phone numbers or addresses would be obtained. He therefore 
understood those particular numbers as the facility being targeted. Zooming out and applying 
probable cause, the government’s interpretation would create a disconnect between the court’s 
probable cause finding, who was actually being targeted for surveillance, and what was being 
required. As a textual analysis, if the government was only acquiring a small fraction of the 
communications at a larger facility, and selecting communications by reference to other, 
smaller facilities (like phone numbers), then the facilities at which the acquisition of the 
communications is being directed are the smaller facilities. The court rejected the 
government’s request.209 
 
The volume of information that would thereby be obtained under the government’s 
interpretation, and the implications for U.S. citizens’ communications flowing into and out of 
the U.S., raised jurisdictional concerns. The court wrote: 
 
[G]iven the large number of selectors involved [REDACTED] it appears likely that 
this surveillance would acquire some indeterminate number of communications to 
or from persons in the United States. See, e.g., id. at 6-8. [REDACTED] In view of 
this apparent likelihood, the government’s implicit request that the Court exercise 
jurisdiction over the submitted application, the Court’s prior acceptance of 
jurisdiction in Docket No. [REDACTED] and prior decisions of this court that have 
accepted jurisdiction in similar cases [REDACTED] I assume for purposes of this 
order and opinion that this case does involve “electronic surveillance” as defined by 
FISA, such that this Court has jurisdiction. However, I believe that the jurisdictional 
issues regarding the application of FISA to phone numbers and e-mail addresses that 
are used exclusively outside the United States merit further examination.210 
 
In 2019, the issue again arose in the context of the statutory requirement that the facilities at 
which ELSUR is directed must be used (or be about to be used) by the target of the 
surveillance.211 The court appointed amici curiae to assist, one of whom took the position that 
the proposed facility did not meet the statutory definition. The amicus argued for a narrow 
interpretation of “facilities” to ensure that FISA be applied with caution in a technological 
context that could not be foreseen when the statute was first enacted. Presiding Judge 
Rosemary Collyer concluded otherwise, stating that Congress “did not intend the term 
‘facilities’ in § 1805(a)(2)(B) to be interpreted in that narrow fashion.212 To support its broad 
reading of the term, the court looked to the dictionary from 1976, which defined facility in 
 
209 See Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00012, at 6–10, 12–
16 (FISA Ct. Apr. 3, 2007) (Vinson, J.) (rejecting the government’s identification of facilities at which 
surveillance was directed for purposes of the probable cause requirement now codified at § 1805(a)(2)(B) and 
denying application for lack of probable cause). 
210 Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00012, at 8 n.12 (FISA 
Ct. Apr. 3, 2007) (Vinson, J.). 
211 Opinion, In re [REDACTED] Non-U.S. Persons, No. 19-218, GID.C.00287, at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Mar. 5, 2020) 
(Collyer, J.). 
212 Id. at 6. 
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relevant part as “the means used to facilitate an action or process; convenience; provision: the 
facilities of a library.”213 Judge Collyer further noted that the statutory language (which 
referred to “the facilities or places”) suggested that Congress meant it to apply widely.214 She 
also noted that while the meaning of what constituted a facility for ELSUR may have been 
fixed at the time when the statute was enacted, new applications of the term could arise in 
light of new technologies.215 
 
The most remarkable part of the decision is that the court went on to rule that the statutory 
requirement that probable cause apply to “each” facility did not mean that it had to apply to 
“all” facilities; instead, the court determined that the probable cause standard “requires only a 
fair probability.”216 The new technology essentially made it possible to target multiple 
facilities, but then failed to provide a way to delimit the number of facilities thus surveyed. 
Because the government stated that it could not separately target each facility “without altering 
the manner in which the surveillance would be conducted,” instead of rejecting the use of the 
technology to carry out the surveillance, the court relaxed the probable cause “each” 
requirement.217 The case is a great example of the problem created where technology allows 
for acquisition but not specificity in a manner that comports with the statutory language. 
 
Which collection techniques fall within the definition of ELSUR matters because whether the 
court has jurisdiction over the type of communication in question turns, at least for purposes 
of Title I, on the status of those communications. In one heavily redacted opinion, it appears 
that the government interpreted the statutory provisions in a manner with which the court 
disagreed, issuing “an order authorizing electronic surveillance . . . of all communications to 
or from” a particular facility.218 The court objected on the grounds that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the type of foreign intelligence collection it was being asked to authorize.219 
In another opinion, the court held that the type of surveillance requested did constitute 
“electronic surveillance” as defined in FISA, but it was not clear who constituted the type of 
carrier contemplated by the statute.220 
 
The language of some of the opinions suggests that the government is trying to bring collection 
otherwise conducted outside the statute into the FISA framing—which is consistent with Jack 
Goldsmith’s discussion of his time at OLC.221 For instance, in one opinion whose date is 
redacted (likely 2005), the court set out its reasons for adding clarification for its jurisdiction 
and the scope of its authorization into the surveillance order language.222 In this case, the court 
was focused on an FBI application. The judge wrote that the court did not have jurisdiction, 
“to authorize the acquisition of wire communications that fall outside the applicable” statutory 
language.223 The Court also recognized that the “Executive Branch has long asserted the 
 
213 Id. at 7 n.5 (emphasis in original) (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
469 (new college ed. 1976)). 
214 Id. at 7–9.  
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216 Id. at 23. 
217 See id. at 23–24. 
218 Memorandum Opinion as to Electronic Surveillance Pursuant to [REDACTED], [REDACTED], No. 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00143, at 3 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
219 See id at 3. 
220 See Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00149, at 1, 4–7 (FISA Ct. 
[REDACTED]) (Hogan, J.). 
221 See Donahue, supra note 30. 
222 Order and Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00153 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Davis, J.) 
(pincite is to the opinion, not the order). 
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authority, consistent with but outside of FISA, to acquire [REDACTED] other than those 
described in [REDACTED].224 
 
As with the definition of ELSUR and facilities, FISC opinions that have been made public 
demonstrate a struggle with how to incorporate mobile technologies and roving surveillance 
into the statutory language.225 Judge Thomas Hogan’s opinion that the government had 
exceeded the scope of its statutory authorization provides one example.226  
 
So, too, does the line between ELSUR and physical search fall under pressure in the context 
of new technologies. In one case that the court confronted, the government argued, based on 
the use of the term “intercept” in FISA legislative history and Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, that it should be understood in a particular manner.227  
 
With an eye towards new technologies, it is worth mentioning that, to the extent that 
information is obtained directly from a mobile device itself, as opposed to communications 
obtained in transit (e.g., Section 702 upstream collection), then a colorable argument could be 
raised that what is happening is actually a physical search, which must comport with Title III. 
While there is no released opinion that appears to address this, it would match with the general 
tension in this category. If you are getting information directly from a device, then it is not an 
intercept. Simultaneously, it is different from the type of search (i.e., of real property) that 
drove the language in the 1994 Act. A similar, colorable argument could be raised for search 
of any stored data. 
 
As a matter of physical search, the FISC determined in 1981 that it did not have authority for 
physical searches under ELSUR.228 The distinguishing factor was whether the court could 
authorize the search of real property. The FISC determined that “the clearly expressed intent 
of Congress to withhold authority to issue orders approving physical searches” makes it moot 
to “consider whether a judge of the FISC nevertheless has some implied or inherent authority 
to do so.”229 It continued, “[W]here a given authority is denied it cannot be supplied by resort 
to principles of inherent, implied or ancillary jurisdiction.”230 This holding suggests that the 
government had been arguing that the Court could grant physical search warrants by nature of 
its status as an Article III court. After Congress amended FISA, following the Aldrich Ames 
investigation, to allow for physical search, the court acknowledged that its jurisdiction 
extended to granting warrants to search real property.231 
 
224 Id at 4. 
225 See Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00138, at 4 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) 
(Hogan, J.).  
226 Id. at 1. 
227 Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00139, at 3 n.3 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) 
(Feldman, J.). Because of the redactions in the document, we don’t know exactly what the surveillance was or 
which side of the divide it fell on; however, we do know that it was relatively recent, having been issued 
sometime between 2010 and 2017, when Judge Feldman, who authored the opinion, served on the court. 
228 In re Application of the United States for an Ord. Authorizing the Physical Search of Nonresidential Premises 
and Pers. Prop., GID.C.00001 (FISA Ct. June 11, 1981) (Hart, J.), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 97-280, at 16–19 
(1981). 
229 Id. at 19. 
230 Id. 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 5-15. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 
103-359, sec. 807(a)(3), § 302(a)(1)(A)(i), 108 Stat. 3423, 3444 (1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 
1822(a)(1)(A)(i) (West)); In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 
614, GID.C.00002, at 614 (FISA Ct. 2002) (Lamberth, J.) (“Clearly this Court's jurisdiction is limited to granting 
orders for electronic surveillances and physical searches for the collection of foreign intelligence information 
under the standards and procedures prescribed in the Act.”)  
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B. Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices 
 
A number of the opinions that are publicly available center on pen register/trap and trace 
(PRTT).232 As a matter of the incorporation of new technologies into the statutory language, 
the court has had to address at least three prominent issues: email and Internet metadata, 
content versus non-content, and post-cut-through-dialed-digits (PCTDDs). 
 
Perhaps the most significant opinion in this realm was the decision by Judge Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly sometime in or around 2004, which transferred parts of the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program to the FISA framing.233 It appears to be the first opinion to expand PRTT beyond 
individual targets. The document notes that the government request implicates a “much 
broader type of collection than other pen register/trap and trace applications and therefore 
presents issues of first impression.”234 The court held that bulk Internet metadata collection 
was consistent with 50 U.S.C. Sections 1841–1846 in that it met the definition of what 
constitutes a pen register or trap and trace, the type of information to be obtained did not 
include the contents of the communications, the type of data constituted dialing, routing, 
address, or signaling information (DRAS), and the manner in which it would be obtained was 
consistent with the statute.235 It is not clear from the redacted version whether the court 
considered how Internet information could be construed differently because of the type of 
information that was revealed. Subject information in an email, for instance, frequently reveals 
what the message is about—indeed, that is the whole point of the subject line. So, too, does 
knowing which URLs or websites are visited indicate the content of the material being 
accessed. 
 
The court, nevertheless, held that the restrictions on retention, accessing, use, and 
dissemination of such information satisfies the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1842, and that the 
installation and use of the PRTT devices for bulk email and Internet metadata collection is 
consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments—despite the acknowledgment that “The raw 
volume of the proposed collection is enormous,” and will result in the collection of USPs 
inside the country “who are not the subject of any FBI investigation.”236 
 
The problem with other data being collected along with DRAS was presented to the court 
sometime between 2010 and 2013. Judge Bates noted that the court had set certain categories 
that the government could collect, and others which it could not—but that the government had 
not abided by the order. According to Judge Bates, “the government acknowledges that NSA 
 
232 See, e.g., Supplemental Opinion and Primary Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00034 (FISA 
Ct. Dec. 18, 2008) (Vinson, J.); Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 
GID.C.00092 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Bates, J.) (circa 2010–2013). 
233 See Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], GID.C.00091, at 1, 10 n.8 (FISA Ct. 
[REDACTED]) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (circa 2004-2009). 
234 Id. at 2. Kollar-Kotelly, J. added, “This is the first application presented to this Court for authority to 
[READACTED] under pen register/trap and trace authority. The Court understands that FBI devices 
implementing prior pen register/trap and trace surveillance authorized by this Court have not obtained 
[REDACTED].” Id. at 10 n.8. 
235 Id. at 2–3. 
236 Id. at 1–2, 39. There is another Judge Kollar-Kotelly opinion on PRTT issues, together with business records, 
but heavily redacted and not thoroughly analyzed. See Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], 
GID.C.00159, at 3–4 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (circa 2002-2009) (applying the rule in Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 743–44 (1979), indicating persons had no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
phone numbers dialed, and thus, did not have a “Fourth Amendment right to keep the information form being 
turned over to the Government.”). 
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exceeded the scope of authorized acquisition continuously during the more than 
[REDACTED] years of acquisition under these orders.”237 Although the government stated 
that “all the technologies used by NSA to implement the authorizations granted by docket 
number PR/TT [REDACTED] and previous docket numbers only collect, or collected, 
authorized metadata,” there had been systemic overcollection continuously since the initial 
authorization.238 As a result, nearly every PRTT record generated by the program included 
some data that was not authorized for collection.239 A second ruling by Judge Bates addressed 
limited collection authority for several categories of metadata collection.240  
 
These opinions generate insight into the difficult role that the court has of ensuring that the 
government is collecting and using data in the approved manner. They also illustrate the 
challenge of what to do with information collected outside the prescribed limits.241 With very 
few exceptions, the government’s position has been to request that it be allowed to keep the 
data.  
 
PCTDDs (i.e., the use of numbers on a telephone keypad to navigate commercial activity) 
have also caused concern, not least because, by definition, they include content. When a 
customer calls the bank and uses the number pad to transfer money from her savings account 
to her checking account, she enters her social security number, her bank account number, and 
how much money is being transferred. This is content. In 2016, the court had to determine 
whether it had the authority to authorize the collection of all PCTDDs under a PRTT order. 
The FISCR found in the affirmative—once again, because the technology was not 
sophisticated enough to distinguish between content and non-content DRAS—subject to a 
prohibition on the affirmative investigative use of any content.242 The court of review also 
found that “incidental collection of content information during the collection of post-cut-
through digits . . . is constitutionally reasonable, even when done without a probable-cause 
warrant.”243 
 
C. Business Records, Bulk Collection and § 702 
 
A number of opinions accept the proposed minimization procedures for tangible things.244 The 
most important law and technology question that arose in this context appears to have been 
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for Fourth Amendment purposes: “(1) the paramount interest in investigating possible threats to national security; 
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FISC judge.” Id. at 607–08, GID.CA.00003, at 31–32. 
244 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things 
from [REDACTED], No. BR 14-96, GID.C.00103 (FISA Ct. June 19, 2014) (Zagel, J.). 
 35 
whether in Section 215 could be used for bulk collection of internet and telephone metadata.245 
However, the first time the court appears to have confronted the issue, it summarily applied 
Smith v. Maryland, and, after just a half a page of discussion, it granted the order.246 
 
Further questions accompanied the querying of the data obtained. Training proved a persistent 
concern.247 In 2013, the query issue again arose. Judge Claire Eagan determined that non-
content queries met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.248 Two months later, in 
October, Judge McLaughlin agreed with Judge Eagan that collection of bulk telephone 
metadata met the Section 215 relevance standard and, under Smith, that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply. Although Justice Sonia Sotomayor had suggested in United States 
v. Jones that the Supreme Court may need to revisit third party doctrine, the principle remained 
intact.249  
 
Once the statutory language changed in 2015 to prohibit bulk collection, the court had to turn 
its attention to the new statutory requirements, as is typical whenever Congress alters FISA.250 
One of the most notable decisions at the time was authored by Judge Mosman, who approved 
continued retention of bulk telephony metadata under Section 215 after November 28, 2015 
and limited access to two purposes: first, for a limited time as a comparison set to verify the 
completeness and accuracy of call detail records produced under the targeted (non-bulk) 
production orders issued after November 28, 2015; and, second, for retention to comply with 
litigation-related obligations.251  
 
In 2015, Judge Hogan also addressed the statutory changes, providing detail about the new 
requirements under § 1861.252 The court noted that the statute requires for applications to have 
a specific selection term to be used as the basis for production. For production on an ongoing 
 
245 Business records and bulk collection are covered by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 501, 
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West)). 
246 Opinion, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00159, at 3–4 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.) (circa 2002–2009). Note also that for telephony metadata, the court as a consequence had to address 
tension between 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 and 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2702–2703 (§ 2702 gives apparently exhaustive set of 
circumstances under which service provider may provide non-content records; § 2703 describes apparently 
exhaustive set of means by which government may compel provider to produce them). See Supplemental 
Opinion, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, GID.C.00033 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 
2008) (Walton, J.) (deciding call detail records were obtainable via § 1861). 
247 At one point, for instance, the NSA created an email distribution list with 189 analysts on it, only 53 of whom 
had been trained, and then shared the business records query results with them. The court went on to order a more 
detailed report, as it was concerned that the NSA was querying the metadata without reasonable articulable 
suspicion (RAS). Supplemental Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. 
of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-15, GID.C.00048, at 3, 5–6 (FISA Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) 
(Walton, J.). 
248 Amended Memorandum Opinion and Primary Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. 
of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, GID.C.00083, at 6–9 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (Eagan, 
J.). See also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
249 Memorandum and Primary Order, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-158, GID.C.00086, at 5 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013) (McLaughlin, J.).  
250 See, e.g., Opinion and Ordrt, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, 
Nos. BR 15-75, Misc. 15-01, GID.C.00117, at 1 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015) (Mosman, J.) (authorizing continued 
collection of bulk telephone metadata under § 215 for 180 days until the USA FREEDOM Act takes effect); 
Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, Nos. BR 
15-77, 15-78, GID.C.00114, at 13 (FISA Ct. June 17, 2015) (Saylor IV, J.) (determining that the USA 
FREEDOM Act reinstated the § 215 BR provision of the PATRIOT Act that had lapsed on June 1, 2015). 
251 Opinion and Order, In re Application of the FB. for an Ord. Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from 
[REDACTED], No. BR 15-99, GID.C.00122, at 6–8 (FISA Ct. Nov. 24, 2015) (Mosman, J.).  
252 Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for Ords. Requiring the Prod. of Call Detail Recs., No. 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00123, at 3–6 (FISA Ct. Dec. 31, 2015) (Hogan, J.).  
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basis of call detail records, there must also be a statement of facts showing there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the call detail records sought to be produced based on the specific 
selection term are relevant to an authorized international terrorism investigation as well as a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that those terms are associated with a foreign power.253 
 
In sum, the main emphasis of the court’s jurisprudence in the statutory realm has to do with 
how to fit new technologies into the statutory language and, when Congress does alter the 
statute, how to implement the new provisions in light of the technologies available. To the 
extent that the latter represents an effort by the legislature to get up to speed on new forms of 
collection and communication, the basic struggle remains: how to think about the quality of 
the information available, how to access it, and how to take account of limitations that would 
otherwise protect individuals from undue government surveillance of their private lives.  
 
IV. Cluster 3: Constitutional Rights 
 
The Church Committee hearings, which gave birth to FISA, showed that the intelligence 
community had placed Americans under surveillance based on what they said and did—and 
with whom. Decisions were made on the basis of political views, and in some cases, religious 
beliefs. Targets ranged from the Women’s Liberation Movement to “every Black Student 
Union and similar group regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders,” federal 
judges, Members of Congress, and political candidates.254 Intelligence collection reflected 
partisan politics. In drafting FISA, the Senate thus expressed particular concern “that the 
surveillance authorized . . . not result in the retention or dissemination of information which 
would adversely affect the exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights.”255  
 
Ten separate requirements incorporated into FISA, accordingly, center on the First 
Amendment, with the result that every form of surveillance that can target a U.S. person is 
explicitly limited. No U.S. person targeted for ELSUR or physical search can “be considered 
an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States.”256  Similarly, the Attorney General 
can apply for an order or extension of PRTT “provided that [] investigation of a United States 
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment to the Constitution.”257 The applicant must certify to the Court that the 
investigation is not premised on First Amendment activities.258 Similar requirements mark 
applications for business records.259 For Sections 703 and 704, similar to Title I, the judicial 
determination as to whether a U.S. person is or is not a foreign power or an agent thereof 
cannot be premised solely on First Amendment activities.260 
 
 
253 See id.; 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b) (West). 
254 FBI Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civ. & Constitutional Rts. of the H.R. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong., pt. 3, at  426-27 (1976). 
255 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 42 (1978). 
256 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(a)(2); see id. § 1824(a)(2)(A). 
257 Id. § 1842(a)(1). 
258 Id. § 1843(a). 
259 Id. § 1861(a)(1) (stating that the FBI may make an application for an order requiring the production of 
tangible things “for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States 
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such 
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first 
amendment.”) The statute also states: “An investigation conducted under this section shall…not be conducted of 
a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.” Id. § 1861(a)(2). 
260 Id. §§ 1881b(c)(2), 1881c(c)(2). 
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With such an emphasis on the First Amendment, one might expect, correspondingly, a 
significant number of opinions to address it. But, thus far, only two public opinions handle 
First Amendment issues in any depth. Indeed, there are triple the number of cases addressing 
the First Amendment right of access, which derives not from the associational rights, but from 
the right to petition. 
 
What has garnered considerably more attention than either of these areas are concerns related 
to the Fourth Amendment. FISA requires that acquisition of foreign intelligence collection 
under Section 702 be consistent with the Fourth Amendment.261 Queries of Section 702 data 
must also comport with it.262 Government certification must attest that the targeting and 
minimization procedures, and guidelines adopted by the Attorney General and the Director of 
National Intelligence to ensure compliance, are similarly consistent.263 The court, in turn, must 
ascertain whether the targeting, minimization, and querying procedures are consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment.264 The statute requires the court, in the event that the clause is not 
satisfied, to direct the government to correct any deficiency within 30 days and to “cease, or 
not begin, the implementation of the authorization for which such certification was 
submitted.”265 
 
Quite apart from the statutory requirements, surveillance must comport with the First and 
Fourth Amendments, as well as the other aspects of the Bill of Rights, such as Fifth 
Amendment due process rights. Reflecting their changing role from merely granting orders 
for narrowly-targeted ELSUR to handling complex surveillance programs impacting millions 
of people, the FISC and FISCR have increasingly been forced to address the relationship of 
foreign intelligence collection to individual rights. 
 
A. First Amendment Associational Rights 
 
Congress continues to express concern about how FISA impacts free speech and association 
and freedom of religion and the press. Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Mike Lee (R-UT), 
arguing for their amendment to the FISA bill (which easily passed the Senate in spring 2020), 
emphasized the importance of seeking greater input from amici in all sensitive cases, “such as 
those involving significant First Amendment issues—thereby adding a layer of protection for 
those who will likely never know they have been targeted for secret surveillance.”266  
 
There is a disconnect, however, between Congress’s emphasis and concerns, and the 
intelligence community guidelines and practices that govern foreign intelligence. To some 
extent this reflects the broader structure: open source intelligence collection is almost entirely 
premised on First Amendment-type activities.267 Neither the Department of Defense manual 
governing similar collection nor the Attorney General Domestic Investigations Operations 
Guide provide a heightened predication standard for allegations potentially implicating the 
 
261 Id. § 1881a(b)(6). 
262 Id. § 1881a(f)(1). 
263 Id. § 1881a(h)(2)(A)(iv). 
264 Id § 1881a(j)(3)(A). 
265 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(j)(3)(B). 
266 Patrick J. Leahy & Mike Lee, FISA Needs Reform. Our Amendment Would Do That—and Protect 
Constitutional Rights, WASH. POST (May 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/10/fisa-
needs-reform-our-amendment-would-do-that-protect-constitutional-rights/ [https://perma.cc/TT5Z-2WUD]. 
267 See, e.g., CIA, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACTIVITIES: PROCEDURES APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, at 14 (Jan. 17, 2017) (basic collection includes publicly 
available information), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053881 [https://perma.cc/9JKC-
NN5Q]. 
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First Amendment.268 Minimization procedures approved by the court, such as the FBI’s 
Section 702 procedures, fail to contemplate the full range of First Amendment activity in their 
exposition of sensitive information—which, in any event, can still be retained, analyzed, and 
disseminated.269 
 
As a judicial matter, the statute’s emphasis on “solely” has come into play, rendering the 
requirement far less effective than it might otherwise be in protecting individual rights. In 
2013, Judge Bates determined that the FISC could issue an order for business records even 
where “[n]one of the conduct or speech” attributed to the subject of the investigation fell 
“outside the ambit of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”270 He looked to “related conduct” by others 
which was not constitutionally protected.271  The court considered a statement made by the 
target, noting that it “seems to fall well short of the sort of incitement to imminent violence or 
‘true threat’ that would take it outside the protection of the [F]irst [A]mendment. The 
government’s own assessment of [REDACTED] points to the conclusion that it is protected 
speech.”272 Judge Bates reflected, “Under the circumstances, the [c]ourt is doubtful that the 
facts regarding [REDACTED] own words and conduct alone establish reasonable grounds to 
believe that the investigation is not being conducted solely on the basis of the first 
amendment.” 273 
 
Nevertheless, the court read 50 U.S.C. § 1861 as permitting consideration of related conduct 
“in determining whether the [F]irst [A]mendment requirement is satisfied.”274 In other words, 
the court looked to the conduct of others, together with entirely protected First Amendment 
activity, to find that the proposed collection comported with the statutory requirements. Judge 
Bates explained: 
 
The text of Section 1861 does not restrict the Court to considering only the activities 
of the subject of the investigation in determining whether the investigation is “not 
conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment.” Rather, 
the pertinent statutory text focuses on the character (protected by the first amendment 
or not) of the “activities” that are the “basis” of the investigation.275 
  
The activities of a non-U.S. person could be used in conjunction with protected First 
Amendment protected activities to target a U.S. person. 
 
 
268 DEP’T OF DEF., DOD MANUAL 5240.01: PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF DOD INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES (Aug. 8, 2016), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053876 
[https://perma.cc/H5DF-CEUK]; FBI, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2016), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053180 [https://perma.cc/K25P-VTYU]. Note, however, 
that the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide makes a number of references to the First Amendment in 
Parts 1 and 2. 
269 § 702 Minimization Procedures (2019)—William P. Barr, Exhibit D: Minimization Procedures Used by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to 
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended, [REDACTED], No. 
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2019), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1060321. 
270 Opinion, In re Application of the FBI for an Ord. Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], 
No. BR 13-25, GID.C.00080, at 4 (FISA Ct. Feb. 19, 2013) (Bates, J.) (emphasis added). 
271 Id. at 5. 
272 Id.  
273 Id.  
274 Id. 
275 Id. According to the application, the government was investigating the target not just based on “his own 
personal words and conduct (which, as noted, suggest sympathy toward, if not support of, international 
terrorism), but also on the basis of the admitted or suspected [REDACTED].” Id. 
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The court has also considered the First Amendment in the context of using PRTT to obtain 
Internet metadata.276 The application included the requisite certification that the investigation 
of the target, a U.S. person, did not solely rely upon First Amendment-protected activities. 
The investigation had been conducted under Executive Order 12333.277 Judge Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly suggested that the “unusual breadth” of the proposed collection, “and its relation to 
the pertinent FBI investigations” called for further attention to the First Amendment 
concerns.278 
 
Usually, PRTT collection would be directed at a particular facility being used by an individual 
of investigative interest. In the case before the court, though, the government was directing 
collection at metadata. It is not clear how such a shift fit the statutory language. Judge Kollar-
Kotelly leapt to the legislative purpose, instead of the actual requirements, suggesting that it 
was “best effectuated at the querying stage, since it will be at a point that an analyst queries 
the archived data that information concerning particular individuals will first be compiled and 
reviewed.”279 It was a remarkable move, since the impact on the target’s First Amendment 
activity occurs at the point of collection—not query. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court ordered that the NSA modify its proposed criterion for querying the 
archived data to bring it into line with the First Amendment requirement.280 The court applied 
the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, writing: 
 
an e-mail account used by a U.S. person could not be a seed account if the only 
information thought to support the belief that the account is associated with 
[REDACTED] is that, in sermons or in postings on a web site, the U.S. person 
espoused jihadist rhetoric that fell short of “advocacy . . . directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.”281 
 
The court also directed the government to address “the general First Amendment implications 
of collecting and retaining this large volume of information that is derived, in part, from the 
communications of U.S. persons.”282 The government, in turn, acknowledged that surveillance 
acquiring “the contents of communications might in some cases implicate First Amendment 
interests, in particular the freedom of association,” but then went on minimize any 
constitutional intrusion brought about by the collection of non-content addressing 
information.283 
 
Bafflingly, the court looked to the Fourth Amendment to determine whether there were any 
First Amendment implications, concluding that because metadata did not implicate the former, 
 
276 Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], GID.C.00091 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) 
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 
277 Id. at 55. 
278 Id. at 56. 
279 Id. at 57. 
280 Id. at 57–58 (“[REDACTED] will qualify as a seed [REDACTED] only if NSA concludes, based on the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts 
giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular known [REDACTED] is associated with 
[REDACTED] provided, however, that an [REDACTED] believed to be used by a U.S. person shall not be 
regarded as associated with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are protected by the First 
Amendment.”) 
281 Id. at 58 (quoting Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)). 
282 Id. at 66. 
283 Id. 
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the impact on the latter was only incidental.284 What made this remarkable is that the entire 
point of collecting the metadata was to establish associational details—part of the core 
protections extended by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the court determined that a good 
faith exception existed, particularly in light of the compelling national security interest at 
stake.285 
 
The court remained uneasy, however, about the breadth of information being collected, noting 
that such collection carried “with it a heightened risk that collected information could be 
subject to various forms of misuse, potentially involving abridgement of First Amendment 
rights of innocent persons.”286 So the judge put into place special restrictions on the access, 
retention, and dissemination of such information.287 She distinguished what the government 
was asking to do from a 1978 case from the District Court in New Jersey, which had held that 
a mail cover on a dissident political organization violated the First Amendment.288 In contrast, 
in the case before the FISC, the PRTT did not specifically target a political group, and it had 
been authorized by statute on the grounds of being relevant to an investigation to protect 
against international terrorism.289 
 
The court further pointed to United States v. Falvey, a 1982 case from the Eastern District of 
New York, which had upheld FISA provisions as constitutional on their face.290 In that case, 
the court noted that Congress put restrictions on the government to prevent political abuse 
(e.g., the judge makes the probable cause finding in regard to whether the target is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power). “Hence, to obtain a FISA surveillance order, the 
Government must provide the FISA judge with something more than the target's sympathy for 
the goals of a particular group, in this case, the IRA.”291 
 
To meet any remaining concerns, the court required that a “First Amendment proviso” be 
included as part of the “reasonable suspicion” standard querying archived meta data; adopted 
a date after which data could not be retained (four and a half years); and enhanced the role of 
the NSA Office of General Counsel.292 
 
While only two opinions are available that address First Amendment associational rights, it 
appears that on at least one other occasion, the FISC wrestled with similar questions. A Justice 
Department Office of Inspector General (IG) report into the use of Section 215 orders for 
 
284 Id. at 66–68. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 68. 
287 Id. at 68–69. 
288 Id. at 69 n.49 (citing Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773, 780–82 (D.N.J. 1978)). 
289 Id.  
290 Id. (citing United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
291 Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1314. 
292 [REDACTED], GID.C.00091, at 69 n.50; see also Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], 
GID.C.00004, at 23-24 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) (Baker, J.) (“Where a particular surveillance is especially 
likely to acquire communications that pertain to activities protected by the First Amendment, minimization 
procedures should be tailored to address the heightened concern that information could be used in a way that 
chills such activity”); id., at 24 (“The committee is concerned that the surveillance authorized . . . not result in the 
retention or dissemination of information which would adversely affect the exercise of first amendment rights.”)  
(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 42 (1978)); id. (“For a wiretap of ‘a foreign spy acting as a newspaper reporter, . . 
. the committee expects that the minimization procedures . . . would be more strict to assure that information 
unrelated to his spy activities was not misused.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 61 (1978)); id. (“The 
technique in question results in an overbroad acquisition of communications that are [REDACTED], and 
therefore to the purpose of the particular surveillance, but that do relate to activities of non-target U.S. persons 
protected by the First Amendment.”) 
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business records, issued in March 2008, took note.293 When a Section 215 request was twice 
presented to the FISC, the IG notes, “[o]n both occasions, the FISA Court indicated it would 
not sign the order because of First Amendment concerns.”294 Later in the document, the IG 
explained, “The FISA Court declined to approve the first application. OIPR and NSLB e-mails 
state that the FISA Court decided that ‘the facts were too “thin” and that this request implicated 
the target’s First Amendment rights.’”295 The problem was that when FISC refused the FBI 
permission to undertake the surveillance, the FBI had simply gone on to use National Security 
Letters to get the same information—despite the same First Amendment prohibitions in the 
parallel statutes.296 
 
B. First Amendment Right to Petition 
 
Despite the desuetude of the right to petition, the Framers considered it one of the most critical 
constitutional protections.297 It surpassed the associative rights (speech, press, and assembly) 
in importance.298 It allowed individuals to seek redress for wrongs and “could force the 
government’s attention on the claims of the governed when no other mechanism could.”299 
Subjects could go directly to the Crown to challenge lesser tribunals and authorities.300  
 
The right to petition is distinct from the other expressive rights in that it protects (a) active 
political engagement; (b) directed at a particular body of persons; (c) demanding an action in 
response; and (d) not diluted through representation, giving citizens a better opportunity to be 
heard.301 It ensures that changes in society are reflected in government.302 It prevents the 
government from being the guardian of the collective public will.303 It gives citizens the ability 
to act on their concerns. 
 
The right of access to agencies and courts has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as 
“part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment.”304 Citizens cannot petition and 
seek redress, if they cannot access the law. The case is even stronger in relation to government 
 
293 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR 
BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2006 (Mar. 2008, as released in redacted form in Feb. 2016), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1058990 [https://perma.cc/TF8Q-FZRR]. 
294 Id. at 33–34; See also id. at 65 (“the FISA Court had twice declined to approve a Section 215 application 
based on First Amendment concerns.”). 
295 Id. at 68. 
296 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1) (requiring that the FBI certify that the investigation of a U.S. person “is not 
conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.”) 
297 1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 4 
(1986). 
298 See Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut 
from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17, 34–39 (1993); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law 
Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 
1165–67 (1986). 
299 Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution, The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2157 (1998). 
300 Id. at 2163. 
301 Id. at 2157. 
302 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545–46 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
303 See id. at 545. 
304 Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). Accord Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio 
R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990); NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963); see also Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the 
Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 595–625 (1999) (finding 
historical, textual, and policy support for reading the First Amendment to include a right of access to the courts). 
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malfeasance, where remedies for unlawful conduct create a “constitutional antidote” to 
sovereign immunity.305 “These expressly guaranteed freedoms share a common core purpose 
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”306  
 
The First Amendment thus:  
 
embodies more than a commitment to free expression . . . ; it has a structural role to 
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government. . . . Implicit 
in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” but also the antecedent assumption that 
valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be informed.307  
 
It protects the “conditions of meaningful communication” by prohibiting the government “from 
limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.”308 For court 
records, the test is “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and 
general public,” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning 
of the particular process in question.”309 The courts include witness testimony, voir dire, 
preliminary hearings, bail pleas, sentencing hearings, and criminal and civil trials.310 
 
In light of the history and scope of the right to petition, it is not surprising that following the 
release of the Snowden documents, numerous motions filed before the FISC demanded a First 
Amendment right of access to the court’s opinions and, in some cases, orders. As a result, about 
half a dozen FISC/FISCR opinions in the public domain raise the issue. Just two cases reached 
the First Amendment question on the merits. 
 
The first, from December 2007, related to an ACLU motion for the release of court orders and 
government pleadings that related to the Terrorist Surveillance Program.311 The court 
determined that while it had jurisdiction over the motion, no First Amendment right of access 
attached.312 At that point, there was no tradition of openness or public access to government 
briefing materials. The “experience” test could not be satisfied.313 Similarly, the “logic” test 
failed because, focusing on national security concerns, the “detrimental consequences of a 
broad public access to FISC proceedings or records would greatly outweigh any such 
 
305 James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue 
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 899 (1997). 
306 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980); accord Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218 (1966); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940). 
307 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
308 Id. at 588; id. at 576 (majority); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972). 
309 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); see also id. at 8–10 (discussing the 
experience and logic test). 
310 See, e.g., id. at 10–15; Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 505-510 (1984); 
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603–06. 
311 Specifically, based on statements by government officials, the ACLU sought “the unsealing of (i) orders 
issued by this Court on January 10th, 2007 []; (ii) any subsequent orders that extended, modified, or vacated the 
January 10th orders; and (iii) any legal briefs submitted by the government in connection with the January 10th 
orders or in connection with subsequent orders that extended, modified, or vacated the January 10th orders.” In re 
Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 485 n.2, GID.C.00021, at 1 n.2 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.).  
312 Id. at 486, GID.C.00021, at 2. 
313 Id. at 491-93, GID.C.00021, at 13–15. 
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benefits.”314 Even partial releases of declassified information with redactions “may confuse or 
obscure, rather than illuminate, the decisions in question.”315 
 
The second case, from February 2020, addressed the aforementioned ACLU/MFIAC motion, 
in regard to which the FISCR had previously determined that the movants had standing.316 The 
court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the motion, but, largely along the 
lines adopted by Judge Bates in the 2007 case, that the First Amendment did not confer a 
qualified right of public access to the material sought. Nor, Judge Collyer determined, was 
“there reason for the [c]ourt to exercise any discretion” or inherent authority “it may have to 
grant the relief requested.”317 
 
In applying the experience-and-logic test to the FISC opinions, the court found itself in a rather 
different position than it had been in 2007.318 Hundreds of orders and nearly 80 FISC opinions 
were, at that point, in the public domain. Nevertheless, the court determined that it still did not 
have a history of openness to its opinions and that much of what was available was because of 
the executive branch, and not the court.319  
 
Setting aside for the moment the fact that the executive branch cannot bind an Article III court 
in this manner, the court’s assumption was not correct. Of the 88 FISC opinions currently in 
the public domain, at least 35% have been released by the FISC, while approximately 40% 
have been released in the course of FOIA suits in regular Article III courts. Only some 25% 
of the opinions in the public domain had been released in redacted form by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, which, in some cases, has been the result of being ordered 
to do so by the FISC. 
 
In the 2020 decision, the court went on to find the logic test similarly unsatisfied.320 It reasoned 
that release of the requested material could (a) create a chilling effect that could damage 
national security interests if the government failed to search or surveil legitimate targets in 
order to retain control over sensitive information; (b) create an incentive for the government 
to avoid judicial review, and (c) threaten the free flow of information to the FISC needed for 
an ex parte proceeding to result in sound decision making and effective oversight.321 
 
The FISCR, on review, declined to consider the merits, dismissing the Petition for lack of 
jurisdiction over constitutional claims.322 The court noted three limitations on it: first, that the 
issue constitute a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III (given effect by various 
judicial doctrines, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and no advisory opinions); second, 
that the action arise under the Constitution, a law, or a treaty of the U.S. or fall within one of 
the other enumerated categories of Article III(2); and third, that the action is described by any 
jurisdictional statute as the kind of action that Congress intended to be subject to a court’s 
 
314 Id. at 494, GID.C.00021, at 17. 
315 Id. at 495, GID.C.00021, at 19. 
316 Opinion, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00267, at 2–4 (FISA Ct. Feb. 11, 2020) (Collyer, J.). 
317 See id. at 4.   
318 Id. at 19 (contrasting the quantity opinions and orders which have been made public since 2007 to those made 
public prior). 
319 See id. at 23. 
320 Id. at 26–27. 
321 Id. (quoting In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496, GID.C.00021, at 20 (FISA Ct. 
2007)). 
322 In re Ops. & Ords. by the FISC Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 
957 F.3d 1344, 1347, GID.CA.00013, at 3 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2020) (per curiam). 
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adjudicatory authority.323 For the court, the third category was problematic: movants had not 
brought a dispute within one of the statutorily enumerated areas over which the court had 
appellate jurisdiction.324 The court explained, “If a dispute is not of the kind that Congress has 
determined should be adjudicated, we ‘have no business deciding it, or expounding the law.”325 
Further, for the court, the movants themselves were not authorized by Congress through statute 
to seek review.326  
 
The FISCR has jurisdiction to review denials of applications, production or nondisclosure 
orders (Section 215), directives issued to electronic service providers (Section 702), and orders 
approving certifications and targeting, minimization, and querying procedures for Section 702 
acquisition.327 FISA also authorizes consideration of questions of law certified by the FISC.328 
But FISA is very specific about which parties can come before the court:  the government may 
file a petition of review and any person receiving a production or nondisclosure order, or an 
electronic communication service providers receiving a directive, could come before it.329 No 
provision had been statutorily made for parties such as the ACLU or MFIAC to come before 
the FISCR. Congress, moreover, had elsewhere given district courts the authority to raise 
Constitutional concerns.330 
 
What is surprising about the FISCR’s decision is the assumption that Congress could, by 
majority vote, either establish or override a constitutional right to petition. As Judge Bates and 
Judge Collyer had previously acknowledged, the movants were trying to exercise a 
constitutionally protected right to access judicial documents.331 Congress does not have the 
right to take away such a claim.  
 
Though Congress nowhere provided explicitly for the FISC or FISCR to consider Fourth 
Amendment rights in relation to Titles I, III, or IV, such constitutional questions nevertheless 
are well within the courts’ domain. No one would object on the grounds that Congress had not 
specifically empowered the court to consider such claims, as the legislature lacks the power 
to divest courts of their ability to handle constitutional matters by mere majority vote. 
Specialization does not affect Article III courts’ position as guardians of the Constitution. 
Should someone challenge a ruling in the bankruptcy court as a violation of due process, for 
instance, it matters naught whether Congress has provided in the statute establishing 
bankruptcy courts that they can hear Fifth Amendment arguments.  
 
The FISCR decision also ignored the fact that under the doctrine of inherent powers, other 
courts cannot provide relief. Only the FISC and FISCR control their records. That is how the 
federal system works. It would be impossible, for instance, to go to Southern District of New 
York to petition for the judicial records of the Northern District of California. To obtain relief 
 
323 Id. at 1349, GID.CA.00013, at 6–7. 
324 Id. at 1350-51, GID.CA.00013, at 9–12. 
325 Id. at 1350, GID.CA.00013, at 8 (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). 
326 Id. at 1351, GID.CA.00013, at 11–12. 
327 Id. at 1350-51, GID.CA.00013, at 10–11. 
328 Id. at 1351, GID.CA.00013, at 11. FISC “shall certify for review . . . any question of law that may affect 
resolution of the matter in controversy that the court determines warrants such review because of a need for 
uniformity or because consideration . . . would serve the interests of justice. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(j) (West). 
329 In re Ops. & Ords., 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1351, GID.CA.00013, at 11–12. 
330 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under 
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”) 
331 See In re Motion for Release of Ct. Recs., 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, GID.C.00021 (FISA Ct. 2007) (Bates, J.); 
Opinion, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance 
Act, No. Misc. 13-08, GID.C.00267 (FISA Ct. Feb. 11, 2020) (Collyer, J.). 
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under either common law or the First Amendment right of access, you have to go to the court 
that had control over the original determination. The FISCR declined to rely on any ancillary 
authority that it had over the petition.332 The decision also sidestepped the common law right 
of access claim, which the litigants had not raised, but which the amicus had addressed in 
detail.333 
 
Where the decision reflected stronger reasoning was in its observation that an “application 
made under this chapter” in 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) generally refers to government applications 
for surveillance—not applications from individuals outside the FISA structure334. But if the 
court was right to suggest that FISCR lacked jurisdiction over this particular appeal, then it 
simply could not hear the case. This would leave the lower decision intact. 
 
That is not what happened. Instead, the FISC followed the decision by dismissing three 
separate motions for access to judicial decisions for lack of jurisdiction.335 The Court held that 
“the FISC is not empowered by Congress to consider constitutional claims generally, First 
Amendment claims specifically, or freestanding motions filed by persons who are not 
authorized by FISA to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”336 The court continued that because 
the “reasons why the FISCR found it unwarranted to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the 
ACLU motion apply to” the pending motion, “the FISC is foreclosed from doing so here.”337 
But if the FISCR did not have jurisdiction over the motion in the first place based on the 
argument in regard to the appeal, it is not clear how their opinion could control the FISC in 
this regard. 
 
C. Common Law Right of Access 
 
At the founding of the United States, the First Amendment right to petition incorporated the 
common law right of access into its auspices. The Supreme Court applies a historical test to 
determine common law rights incorporated in the Constitution. It has consistently held, for 
instance, that the common law encapsulated in the Seventh Amendment refers to “the common 
law of England.”338 In similar fashion, the writ of habeas corpus “became an integral part of 
our common-law heritage by the time the Colonies achieved independence.”339 “[A]t the 
absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed in 1789.”340 The Court 
 
332 In re Ops. & Ords., 957 F.3d 1344, 1356-57, GID.CA.00013, at 22–23. 
333 Brief of Amicus Curiae, In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. June 13, 2018), at 3, 8, 21, 22, 30, 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1056066/Misc%252013-
08%2520Brief%2520of%2520Amicus%2520Curiae%2520180613.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Reply Brief 
of Amicus Curiae, In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. Aug. 1, 2018), at 11, 17, 34-45, 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/1056071/Misc%252013-
08%2520Reply%2520Brief%2520of%2520Amicus%2520Curiae%2520180802.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
334 In re Ops. & Ords., 957 F.3d at 1352. 
335 See Opinion and Order, In re Motion for Publ’n of Recs., No. Misc. 19-01, GID.C.00286 (FISA Ct. Sept. 15, 
2020) (Boasberg, J.); Opinion and Order, In re Ops. & Ords. of this Ct. Containing Novel or Significant 
Interpretations of L., No. Misc. 16-01, GID.C.00285 (FISA Ct. Sept. 15, 2020) (Boasberg, J.); Opinion and 
Order, In re Motion of ProPublica, Inc. for the Release of Ct. Recs., No. Misc. 13-09, GID.C.00284 (FISA Ct. 
Sept. 15, 2020) (Boasberg, J.). 
336 In re Motion of ProPublica, GID.C.00284, at 3. 
337 Id. 
338 United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (Story, J.); see also Balt. & Carolina Line, 
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913). 
339 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–74 (2004) (citation and quotation omitted). 
340 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (quotation omitted). 
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looked to the writ’s “historical core” to prevent the executive from wrenching habeas from the 
Court’s jurisdiction.341 Like habeas, the right of access to judicial opinions arose centuries ago, 
becoming “an integral part of our common-law heritage.”342 
 
English common law recognizes and relies upon a public right of access to judicial opinions. 
Since the time of Edward II, who ruled England 1307-1327, English judicial records have been 
public.343 In 1372, Parliament expanded the common law right of access to include court 
records and evidence, even where it might be used as evidence against the Crown.344 Sir 
Edward Coke cited the right to the petition as undergirding the rule that records and reports be 
available to any English subject to uncover legal precedent:  
 
[W]hensoever a man is enforced to yield a reason of his opinion or judgment, that then 
he set down all authorities, precedents, reasons, arguments and inferences whatsoever 
that may be probably applied to the case in question.[] These records, for that they 
contain great and hidden treasure, are faithfully and safely kept (as they well deserve) 
in the King’s Treasury. And yet not so kept but that any subject may for his necessary 
use and benefit have access thereunto, which was the ancient law of England, and so 
is declared by an act of Parliament in 46 Edw. 3.345 
 
Even the deplorable Star Chamber “heard cases in public.”346 As a consequence, together with 
the presence of lawyers, the court’s decisions and their reasoning would be known.347 
 
Common law depended upon the promulgation of judicial decisions, initially for “common 
erudition” and thereafter for authoritative case law.348 Genera customes “guided and directed” 
the “proceedings and determinations in the king’s ordinary courts of justice.”349 They depended 
“upon immemorial usage . . . for their support.”350 Judges served as “the depositary of the laws,” 
their decisions providing “the principal and most authoritative evidence” of the law.351  
Blackstone noted the importance of public access: 
 
The judgment itself, and all the proceedings previous thereto, are carefully registered 
and preserved, under the name of records, in publick repositories set apart for that 
particular purpose; and to them frequent recourse is had, when any critical question 
arises, in the determination of which former precedents may give light or assistance.352 
 
Judicial decisions were “not only preserved as authentic records in the treasuries of the several 
courts,” but they were “handed out to public view in the numerous volumes of reports.”353 
According to Blackstone, the reports included “histories of the several cases, with a short 
 
341 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474. 
342 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). 
343 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71–72. 
344 Compare 46 Edw. 3 (1372) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE 196–97 (Danby Pickering ed., 
1762), with 14 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 14 (1340) (Eng.). 
345 2 EDWARD COKE ET AL., THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE IN THIRTEEN PARTS vi (London, Joseph 
Butterworth and Son new ed. 1826). 
346 5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 156 (3d ed. 1922-1938). 
347 Id.  See also WILLIAM HUDSON, A TREATISE OF THE COURT OF THE STAR CHAMBER 48 (Francis Hargrave ed., 
1986) (1792). 
348 See JOHN BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: VOLUME VI: 1483-1558, at 488–89 (2003). 
349 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 343, at *68. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. at *69. 
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353 Id. at *71. 
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summary of the proceedings, which are preserved at large in the record; the arguments on both 
sides; and the reasons the court gave for their judgment.”354 As Greenleaf later summarized, 
“[I]n regard to the inspection of public documents, it has been admitted, from a very early 
period, that the inspection and exemplification of the records of the king's courts is the common 
right of the subject.”355 
 
In recognition of this heritage, U.S. courts have long recognized a common law public right 
of access to judicial opinions. In 1834, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a court 
reporter could not hold a copyright to judicial records, as they were part of the public 
domain.356 No more so could a bookseller hold an exclusive copyright to the written opinions 
of state judges: “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and 
interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it 
is a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or a statute.”357 As 
recognized by lower courts, “The right to examine certain records and papers . . . . exists as to 
the books containing the docket or minute entries of the judgments and decrees of the court.”358 
 
State courts followed suit. All persons, even if they were not citizens, had a right to inspect 
court records.359 As early as 1894, the District of Columbia recognized public access. The court 
denounced a motion for court records to be “preserved in secrecy,” distinguishing between 
judicial records and “other mere official records.”360 “The rules of the Patent Office have no 
application to the proceedings of this court . . . . They may be very necessary and proper for 
conducting the affairs of that office . . . but it does not follow that similar rules should be 
adopted and enforced as applicable in an appellate court of record.”361 
 
Permeating these decisions was the understanding that the court’s legitimacy depended upon 
open and public access both to its proceedings and to its decisions.362 These principles have 
continued to be embraced from the mid-20th century, up through the present day.363  
 
In the latter half of the 20th century, different methods of reproduction brought new questions 
to the fore. The courts reiterated the common law right to inspect judicial records. Third parties 
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361 Id. at 405. 
362 See, e.g., Ex parte Gay, 20 La. Ann. 176, 177 (La. 1868) (requiring the trial of a case to be tried in open 
court); Scott v. Stutheit, 121 P. 151, 154 (Colo. App. 1912) (“The law is well settled . . . that . . . a judgment or 
decree, to be valid, must be rendered in open court during term time . . . .This is the general rule in this country, 
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363 See 45 AM. JUR. Records and Recording Laws § 16, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021); 53 C.J.S. Records 
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sought non-documentary evidence introduced at trial.364 The courts doubled down, stating, 
“[t]he existence of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is beyond 
dispute.”365 Where denied, it tended to be in the service of competing rights, such as fair trial 
or freedom of the press.366 Judges also looked to the role that the documents played in the 
adjudicative process and their relationship to substantive rights.367 What was not questioned 
was whether the public had a right to actual decisions. To the contrary, since 1834, the courts 
have explicitly recognized that judicial opinions belong to the People.368 
 
The First Amendment encapsulates and expands the common law right of access to judicial 
opinions; however, the common law right itself still exists. And FISC has had to confront it.  
 
In 2007, Judge Bates responded with his take on the First Amendment right of access: it is 
inapplicable to documents traditionally cloaked from public view. “In the FISA context, there 
is an unquestioned tradition of secrecy, based on the vitally important need for national 
security.”369 FISC/FISCR records are kept under a statutory scheme intended to protect them 
from public disclosure. For Bates, there was “no role for this Court independently to review, 
and potentially override, Executive Branch classification decisions,” and thus the controlling 
statute preempts any right of common law access that might otherwise exist.370  
 
In the ACLU/MFIAC case decided by FISC and FISCR in 2020, the movants did not raise a 
common law claim and neither court addressed whether it might apply.371 Nevertheless, Judge 
James E. Boasberg in dismissing a suit on the strength of the FISCR First Amendment ruling 
suggested that “FISA does not grant the FISC jurisdiction over claims asserting a common-law 
right of access either.”372 The common law right, though, does not require any statutory 
permission for its enactment. Indeed, it is a judicially-created right of access that dates back 
centuries. 
 
D. Fourth Amendment 
 
Numerous opinions issued by the foreign intelligence courts find applications or certifications 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.373 The key questions that the court has wrestled with 
in this area have been the significant purpose test, the warrant requirement, what constitutes a 
search, the reasonableness requirement, and the contours of probable cause. Underscoring the 
importance of FISC/FISCR opinions being made public is how the courts have approached 
the constitutional questions, in the process carving out an exception to the warrant requirement 
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in the context of national security. These changes, and replacement of the primary purpose 
with the significant purpose test, have had a profound impact on U.S. persons’ constitutional 
rights.  
 
The key case on the shift from the primary purpose to the significant purpose test famously 
came with the FISCR decision In re Sealed Case, which dealt with a Title I order.374 The FISC 
had determined that proposed standard minimization procedures (SMPs) were not reasonably 
designed because their purpose and technique were not “consistent with the need of the United 
States to obtain, produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence information.”375 The court had 
blocked intelligence and sharing procedures which the government claimed could be used 
primarily for a law enforcement purpose.376 It also had set extensive conditions for information 
sharing and coordination under the SMPs, for the first time setting down in a judicial opinion 
what the court believed the practice hitherto had been in regard to maintaining the wall 
between foreign intelligence and criminal investigations.377 
 
In 2002, the FISCR overturned the lower court’s decision, bringing down the wall that had 
previously existed within the Department of Justice and FBI between foreign intelligence 
collection and criminal investigations.378 The court held that FISA did not require the 
government to demonstrate that its primary purpose in conducting electronic surveillance was 
foreign intelligence. The USA PATRIOT Act’s addition of the word “significant” imposed a 
requirement that the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than 
just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes.379 “So long as the government 
entertains a realistic option of dealing with the [foreign] agent other than through criminal 
prosecution, it satisfies” the statutory requirements for acquisition.380 
 
According to the court, SMPs are designed to protect, as far as reasonable, against the 
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublic information that is not foreign 
intelligence information.381 Evidence of criminal activity, however, can be retained and 
 
374 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). 
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disseminated. SMPs do not limit prosecutorial advice to FBI intelligence officials regarding 
the initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA surveillance.382 
 
Even as it adopted this broad view, the FISCR recognized some limitations: the FISA process 
could not be used to investigate ordinary crimes wholly unrelated to foreign intelligence.383 
Where “the FISC has reason to doubt that the government has any real non-prosecutorial 
purpose in seeking foreign intelligence information it can demand further inquiry into the 
certifying officer's purpose—or perhaps even the Attorney General's or Deputy Attorney 
General's reasons for approval.”384 
 
In 2008, a second major Fourth Amendment decision emerged as the FISC recognized a 
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.385 The government had moved to 
compel Yahoo!, Inc. to comply with a directive issued pursuant to the Protect America Act of 
2007 (PAA).386 The company had refused to comply on the grounds that the directives violated 
the statutory language and the Fourth Amendment, as well as separation of powers.387 It was 
a matter of first impression for the court. Although the PAA had sunset, the directives 
temporarily remained in effect.388 
 
Ruling on the constitutional question, the court noted that for the exception to apply, it must 
be within the 2002 FISCR determination: i.e., a significant purpose must be the acquisition of 
foreign intelligence, and “a sufficiently authoritative official must find probable cause to 
believe that the target of the search or electronic surveillance is a foreign power or its agent.”389 
In United States v. Bin Laden,390 the reasonableness of surveillance targeted at a U.S. person 
abroad had taken into account the existence of minimization procedures, the duration of 
monitoring, the nature of the threat being investigated, and the extent to which the targeted 
facilities were used in support of the activity being investigated.391 For the FISC, the factors 
going to the reasonableness determination for the targeting of U.S. persons overseas were 
slightly different. They included the minimization procedures, the duration of the surveillance, 
authorization by a senior government official, and identification of the facilities to be 
targeted.392 As a threshold matter, such surveillance must also meet the criteria of the foreign 
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  
 
 
382 Id. at 731, GID.CA.00001, at 731. The court determined that the reasonableness of this approach depends on 
facts and circumstances of each case. Less minimization at the acquisition stage may be justified if the language 
is coded, there is a widespread conspiracy, or the intercepts are in a foreign language when no contemporaneous 
translator is available. Id. at 740-41, GID.CA.00001, at 740–41. 
383 Id. at 735–36, GID.CA.00001, at 735–36. 
384 Id. at 736, GID.CA.00001, at 736. 
385 Memorandum Opinion, In re Directives to Yahoo!, Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intel. 
Surveillance Act, No. 105B(g): 07-01, GID.C.00025, at 59 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2008) (Walton, J.). 
386 Id. at 1 (citing Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552). 
387 Id. at 3. 
388 See id. at 2-4. 
389 Id. at 59. The court first observed that for U.S. persons inside the United States, surveillance under FISA is 
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes based the fact that there is some degree of prior judicial scrutiny, 
probable cause to believe that the target is an agent of a foreign power (or a foreign power itself) and likely to use 
the facility being targeted, at least some constitutionally-required determinations are made by the senior 
Executive Branch officials. In addition, the orders could extend to 90 days, particularly when there is Court 
oversight or minimization procedures, and such minimization procedures are in place and being applied. Id. at 77. 
390 United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
391 In re Directives, GID.C.00025, at 80. 
392 Id. at 86. 
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Upon review, in In re Directives, the FISCR determined that the exception was akin to a 
“special needs” exception for domestic foreign intelligence collection targeted at foreign 
powers or agents of foreign powers outside the U.S.393 The warrant exception is undertaken 
for national security purposes (of which the government’s interest is particularly intense) and 
involves acquisition from overseas foreign agents or regarding foreign intelligence.394 To 
determine the reasonableness of a particular government action, a court must consider the 
totality of the circumstances: i.e., the nature of the intrusion and how it is implemented. The 
more important the government’s interest, the greater the intrusion that may be constitutionally 
tolerated. In the case of national security, “the relevant governmental interest . . . is of the 
highest order of magnitude.” 395 The court continued, “Collectively, these procedures require 
a showing of particularity, a meaningful probable cause determination, and a showing of 
necessity.”396 The duration (90 days) had already been found reasonable, and the risks of error 
and abuse are within “acceptable limits and effective minimization procedures are in place.”397 
 
The month after In re Directives issued, the FISC took a similar tack to find that Section 702 
certification and targeting and minimization procedures also fell within the foreign 
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.398 The court looked to 
the pre-targeting determination, the post-targeting analysis, and documentation and oversight 
to determine that the procedures met the demands of reasonableness in light of the significance 
of the national security interest and the mitigation of unintentional incidental collection by the 
retention procedures in place.399 
 
The FISC has also confronted reasonableness in the context of PRTT and search of the 
captured data. In the 2016 case In re Certified Question of Law, the FISC had issued an order 
approving a PRTT application, including the proviso that the government “not make any 
affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits acquired through pen register 
authorization that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, 
unless separately authorized by this Court.”400 The order served on the provider required that 
it furnish “all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the 
installation and operation of the . . . device(s).”401 That authorization was consistent with prior 
practice of the court: as noted by the FISCR, since at least 2006, PRTT orders had authorized 
the acquisition of PCTDDs, “while generally prohibiting the use of those digits that do not 
constitute dialing information.”402 Throughout that time period, the government had argued 
that despite a statutory prohibition that contents not be obtained through PRTT devices, as a 
statutory matter, the government was only required to “use technology reasonably available 
to it . . . so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic communications.”403 In light 
of the difference in practice between the FISC and ordinary Article III courts, the FISC judge 
considered it appropriate to certify the question to the court of the review. 
 
393 In re Directives to Yahoo! Inc. Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 
1011, GID.CA.00002, at 14–15 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (Selya, J.).  
394 Id., GID.CA.00002, at 15. The Court also reiterates that “a significant purpose” standard is the correct 
standard to apply. See id., GID.CA.00002, at 15–16. 
395 Id. at 1012, GID.CA.00002, at 19. 
396 Id. at 1016, GID.CA.00002, at 27–28.  
397 Id., GID.CA.00002, at 28. 
398 See Memorandum Opinion, In re DNI/AG Certification [REDACTED], No. 702(i)-08-01, GID.C.00030, at 35 
(FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.). 
399 See id. at 37–41. 
400 In re Certified Question of L., 858 F.3d 591, 593, GID.CA.00003, at 4 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2016) (per curiam). 
401 Id., GID.CA.00003, at 4. 
402 Id. at 594, GID.CA.00003, at 5. 
403 Id. at 595, GID.CA.00003, at 6 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3121(c) (West)). 
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The FISCR determined that the search of PCTDDs is reasonable even without a warrant.404 A 
key consideration for the court was that technology that would enable the government to 
distinguish between content/non-content DRAS was not available. To distinguish the matter 
before the FISC from the ordinary criminal law context, the court looked to: 
  
(1) the paramount interest in investigating possible threats to national security;  
(2) the investigative importance of having access to the dialing information provided 
by the post-cut-through digits,  
(3) the incidental nature of the collection of content information from post-cut-
through digits,  
(4) the relatively slight intrusion on privacy entailed by the acquisition of post-cut-
through digits,  
(5) the prohibition against the use of any content information obtained from the pen 
register or trap-and-trace device,  
(6) the steps taken by the government to minimize the dissemination of post-cut-
through digits; and  
(7) the fact that FISA pen register interceptions are conducted only with the approval 
and under the supervision of a neutral magistrate, in this case a FISC judge.405 
 
In 2018, the FISC turned to the scope of the search of communications collected under Section 
702 and held, contrary to the amici who had been appointed in the case, that the query of the 
communications did not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment search event subject to its 
own reasonableness analysis.406 Nevertheless, under a totality of the circumstances test, the 
court arrived at the same conclusion as the amici, which was that the FBI query procedures 
being proposed were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.407 For the court, the privacy 
interests were substantial, as “the FBI has conducted tens of thousands of unjustified queries 
of Section 702 data.”408 Judge Boasberg noted that “the reported querying practices present a 
serious risk of unwarranted intrusion into the private communications of a large number of 
U.S. persons.” 409 The court explained: 
 
 
404 Id. at 605, 610, GID.CA.00003, at 26, 37. 
405 Id. at 607-08, GID.CA.00003, at 31–32. 
406 [REDACTED], 402 F. Supp. 3d 45, 86, GID.C.00258, at 86–87 (FISA Ct. 2018) (Boasberg, J.). The FISA 
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, had required that the querying procedures comport with the Fourth 
Amendment. Pub. L. No. 115-118, sec. 101(a), § 702(f)(1), 132 Stat. 3, 4 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 
1881a(f)(1) (West)). Section 702(f)(2), moreover, requires the FBI to obtain a FISC order in certain 
circumstances prior to examining any content obtained by query of the data. Sec. 101(a), § 702(f)(2), 132 Stat. at 
4-5. Amici pointed to these alterations as requiring the court to re-visit its early approach, suggesting that 
“Congress has acknowledged the reality that FBI agents querying databases containing raw 702 information for a 
variety of purposes are, in effect, undertaking new ‘searches,’ some of which now require a court order.” 
[REDACTED], 402 F. Supp. 3d at 85, GID.C.00258, at 85 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae at 56-57, 
[REDACTED], 402 F. Supp. 3d 45 (No. [REDACTED]) (brief not publicly available)). Amici had further noted 
that evolution of caselaw: in 2014, the Supreme Court in Riley v. California required law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant to search mobile phones obtained incident to arrest. Id., GID.C00258, at 86 (citing Riley v. California, 
573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014)). Various lower court cases affirmed that even where objects might come into the 
possession of law enforcement, subsequent inspection constitutes a separate event for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. Id. at 85, GID.C.00258, at 85. The court rejected these arguments, noting that the statutory changes 
instituted by Congress were just that: statutory (not expansions of constitutional rights) and that in a number of 
the cases presented, the objects in question had been provided to the law enforcement by third parties—whereas 
the government already held the content of communications under § 702. Id. at 86, GID.C.00258, at 86-88. 
407 Id. at 86, GID.C.00258, at 88. 
408 Id. at 87, GID.C.00258, at 88. 
409 Id., GID.C.00258, at 89. 
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The goal of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals from arbitrary 
governmental intrusions on their privacy. . . . The FBI’s use of unjustified queries 
squarely implicates that purpose: the FBI searched for, and presumably examined 
when found, private communications of particular U.S. persons on arbitrary grounds 
. . . . The government is not at liberty to do whatever it wishes with those U.S.-person 
communications, notwithstanding that they are “incidental collections occurring as 
a result of” authorized acquisitions.410 
 
In re Directives had relied on the assurance that the government does not maintain a database 
of incidentally-collected information. Here, however, not only was there a database, but the 
FBI was regularly querying it. 
 
In 2011, the FISC similarly determined that intrusion caused by the NSA's targeting and 
minimization procedures, as related to its acquisition of Internet multi-communication 
transactions (MCTs) authorized by Section 702, was not reasonable under Fourth 
Amendment.411 The NSA was acquiring a large number (i.e., tens of thousands) of Fourth 
Amendment-protected MCTs that had no direct connection to any targeted facility, and thus 
did not serve national security needs underlying FISA. The government’s proposed handling 
of MCTs tended to maximize retention of such information and hence to enhance risk that it 
would be used and disseminated.412  
 
The NSA amended its procedures, which the court subsequently approved as consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment.413 The new version addressed different types of MCTs, based on 
whether the active user was the target, and, if not, the nationality and location (to the extent 
known) of the active user. It provided for the more problematic categories of MCTs to be 
sequestered and instituted a shorter retention period put into place, whereby an MCT of any 
type could not be retained more than 2 years after expiration of certification under which it 
was acquired, unless applicable retention criteria met.414 The provisions categorically 
prohibited NSA analysis from using known U.S. person identifiers to query the results of 
upstream Internet collection.415 The protections, such as they were, proved short-lived.416 
 
E. Fifth Amendment (Due Process) 
 
 
410 Id., GID.C.00258, at 89 (citations and quotations omitted). 
411 [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 78–79, 80, 2011 WL 10945618, at *28 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 
2011) (Bates, J.). 
412 [Judge] Bates explained, “Both in terms of its size and its nature, the intrusion resulting from NSA’s acquisition 
of MCTs is substantial. The Court now understands that each year, NSA’s upstream collection likely results in the 
acquisition of roughly two to ten thousand discrete wholly domestic communications that are neither to, from, nor 
about a targeted selector, as well as tens of thousands of other communications that are to or from a United States 
person or a person in the United States but that are neither to, from, nor about a targeted selector.” Id. at 72, 2011 
WL 10945618, at *26. By using to/from/about upstream (see infra discussion Part V), the NSA could collect an 
entire MCT for which active user was a non-target and that mostly pertained to non-targets, merely because a 
single, discrete communication within the MCT was to, from, or contained a reference to a tasked selector—even 
if non-target active user was United States person in the United States and MCT contained a large number of 
domestic communications that did not pertain to a foreign intelligence target. The Court concluded, “NSA could 
do substantially more to minimize the retention of information concerning United States persons that is unrelated 
to the foreign intelligence purpose of its upstream collection.” Id. at 61. 2011 WL 10945618, at *22. 
413 [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00076, at 1, 22, 2011 WL 10947772, at *1, *7 (FISA Ct. Nov. 30, 
2011) (Bates, J.). 
414 Id. at 7–11, 2011 WL 10947772, at *3–*5. 
415 Id. at 9, 2011 WL 10947772, at *4. 
416 See, Part V(C), infra. 
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The final area of constitutional adjudication has to do with Fifth Amendment due process. 
Only one case, from 2014, appears to address it. There, the court denied a motion for disclosure 
of prior FISC decisions on the grounds that “neither FISA nor the . . . [FISC] Rules of 
Procedure . . . require, or provide for discretionary, disclosure of the Requested Opinions in 
the circumstances of this case,” and determined that the due process clause “does not compel 
the requested disclosure.”417 Instead, it requires the court to review an application, order, and 
other materials relating to ELSUR in camera or ex parte if the Attorney General’s affidavit 
indicates that disclosure would harm national security. Disclosure may only occur where it is 
necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance.418 
 
V. Cluster 4: Process and Compliance 
 
The fourth and final cluster of FISC/FISCR opinions centers on the tension between public 
and private accountability. They reveal that the government continually pushes the boundaries 
set by the court and Congress, at times crossing them entirely. The courts, caught in the middle, 
have to work to ensure compliance, further underscoring how much their roles have altered 
since 1978. While some of the transgressions have been minor, others have had a tremendous 
impact on citizens’ rights, making it even more important that the courts’ determinations be 
made public. In a democratic state, it is critical that the people know how the government is 
using powers it has been afforded. It is all the more important when the government 
inadvertently, or at times deliberately, flouts judicial orders—and then (as discussed in Part 
IV, supra) attempts to prevent findings revealing malfeasance from reaching light of day.  
 
As a practical matter, the FISC has had to account for irregularities in regard to special 
minimization procedures, as well as SMPs and targeting and querying procedures. It has 
confronted inaccurate, materially omitted, erroneous, and false statements by the government. 
And it has found itself in a data dilemma: what to do with information (which the government 
asks to retain and continue to use) obtained outside statutory authority or requirements put into 
place by the courts. Efforts by the government to request that the court approve such behavior 
borders on pushing the FISC to issue an Advisory Opinion – well outside the bounds of Article 
III. 
 
While earlier in its history, the FISC appears to have been more deferential to the government, 
it has become less patient in light of the government’s repeated failure to comply with judicial 




FISA requires that the court ensures that the intrusiveness of electronic intercepts and physical 
search is consistent with the need to collect foreign intelligence information from foreign 
powers and their agents.419 The first time judicial concerns appears to have arisen in regard to 
SMPs appears to have been in In re All Matters.420 The court rejected the government’s 
proposed 2002 minimization procedures because it would have empowered criminal 
prosecutors to “advise FBI intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation, 
 
417 Opinion on Motion for Disclosure of Prior Decisions, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00112, at 3 
(FISA Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.). 
418 Id. at 8–9. 
419 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616, GID.C.00002, at 
616 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED] 2002) (Lamberth, J.), rev’d by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 
(FISA Ct. Rev. [REDACTED] 2002) (per curiam). 
420 In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, GID.C.00002, at 611. 
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continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or surveillance,” allowing the government to use 
FISA primarily for a law enforcement purpose.421 In In re Sealed Case, as the prior section 
noted, the FISCR overturned the lower court. 
 
Similar process questions arose in 2004, when the FISC determined that the government could 
not mark the identities of non-target U.S. persons during the retention process for the purpose 
of facilitating subsequent retrieval of those persons’ communications.422 The SMPs did not 
allow for using alternative or additional means of recording identities of those not party to a 
communications. The government practice therefore violated the procedures.423 
 
Again in 2007, the government tried to convince the FISC that alternative, extra-statutory 
minimization procedures met the requirements. In this case, the NSA was unilaterally 
initiating surveillance of foreign telephone numbers or e-mail addresses without express 
judicial approval—even after the fact.424 The court rejected the practice. According to Judge 
Roger Vinson, it failed to follow either the letter or the spirit of the statute.425 
 
Perhaps nowhere has the pressure on the court from the government to expand what is allowed 
under the minimization procedures been more evident than in the Section 702 context, which 
ten opinions address. A clear tension between the statutory prohibition on intentionally 
targeting and incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications exists. The matter appears 
to have first come to the fore in a 2008 opinion authored by Judge McLaughlin. At that point, 
the court went with the government representation, finding the minimization procedures 
sufficient.426 The statute’s prohibition on intentionally targeting a U.S. person or someone 
within the U.S. still permitted the retention of mistaken, but reasonable beliefs that the target 
was a non-U.S. person outside the U.S. 427 
 
In 2010, Judge Bates again confronted a similar question.428 But his most consequential 
decision came in October 2011, when he ruled that the NSA's minimization procedures, in 
relation to its upstream collection of internet MCTs, were not reasonably designed to minimize 
retention of non-publicly-available information concerning nonconsenting U.S. persons, given 
that the NSA did not limit access to specially-trained analysts or require those analysts to mark 
relevant portions of MCTs.429 In that opinion, as discussed in Part IV, supra, Judge Bates ruled 
that the intrusion caused by NSA's targeting and minimization procedures, as related to its 




421 Id. at 623, GID.C.00002, at 623 (quotations omitted).   
422 Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00004, at 20 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED] 2004) 
(Baker, J.). 
423 Id.  
424 Order and Memorandum Opinion, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00012, at 17–20 (FISA 
Ct. Apr. 3, 2007) (Vinson, J.). 
425 See id. at 17–20. 
426 Memorandum Opinion, In re DNI/AG Certification [REDACTED], No. 702(i)-08-01, GID.C.00030, at 24–25 
(FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.). 
427 Id. at 25–27 (FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.). 
428 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00060 (FISA Ct. 
[REDACTED] 2010) (Bates, J.). Note that Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00061 (FISA Ct. [REDACTD] 2010) (Bates, J.), contains similar language and analysis 
as [REDACTED], GID.C.00060. 
429 [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 59–63, 2011 WL 10945618, *20–22 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 
2011) (Bates, J.). 
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The reason the practice failed constitutional muster was because the NSA had been acquiring 
a large number—tens of thousans—of Fourth Amendment-protected MCTs that had no direct 
connection to any targeted facility and thus did not serve national security purpose. Its 
proposed handling of MCTs, moreover, tended “to maximize the retention of such information 
and hence to enhance risk that it would be used and disseminated.”430 
 
In the following month, November 2011, the court approved amended minimization 
procedures and Section 702 collection resumed.431 The additional measures related to:  
 
(1) the post-acquisition segregation of those types of transactions that are most likely 
to contain non-target information concerning United States persons or persons in the 
United States; (2) special handling and marking requirements for transactions that 
have been removed from or that are not subject to segregation; and (3) a two-year 
default retention period for all upstream acquisitions.432 
 
Numerous opinions approve ELSUR/Physical surveillance SMPs as well as those adopted in 
the Section 702 context.433 These, and other rulings, demonstrate a steady pattern of special 
amendments and exceptions that expand access to information obtained via FISA. In 2012, for 
example, the government obtained permission for the FBI to provide the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with raw data relating to international terrorism (as opposed 
to derivative information) and to permit NCTC to review, retain, and disseminate such 
information.434 The same year, the NSA amended their minimization procedures to allow for 
the sharing of unminimized communications obtained from Internet Service Providers.435 The 
following year, the FISC accepted further amendments to the § 702 procedures.436  The court 
approved new FBI SMPs to allow for the storage of unminimized FISA-acquired information 
in “ad hoc” FBI databases that do not comply with Section III of the minimization 
procedures.437 The purpose was to enable FBI personnel to review and analyze the 
information, which apparently could not be completed within the compliant systems.438 
 
The steady expansion continued. In 2014, the government amended SMPs for ELSUR and 
physical search to allow for the dissemination to the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children (NCMEC) for law enforcement purposes, and to exempt information from removal 
 
430 Id. at 78–79, 2011 WL 10945618, at *28. 
431 See [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00076, at 21–22, 2011 WL 10947772, at *7 (FISA Ct. Nov. 
30, 2011) (Bates, J.). 
432 Id. at 7, 2011 WL 10947772, at *3. 
433 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00039 (FISA Ct. Apr. 
7, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.); Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00256 
(FISA Ct. Sept. 20, 2012) (Bates, J.); Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], 
GID.C.00089 (FISA Ct. Dec. 13, 2013) (Walton, J.); Memorandum Opinion and Order Compelling Compliance 
with Directives, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00111 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED] 2014) (Collyer, J.). 
434 Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Elec. Surveillance, Physical Search, & Other Acquisitions Targeting 
Int’l Terrorist Grps., Their Agents, & Related Targets, No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00077 (FISA Ct. May 18, 
2012) (McLaughlin, J.). 
435 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00079, at 1, 5–6, 20 (FISA Ct. 
2012) (Bates, J.) (holding the amendments consistent with the Fourth Amendment). 
436 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00089, at 27–28 (FISA Ct. 
Dec. 13, 2013) (Walton, J.) (holding that that the Nov. 15, 2013 amended minimization procedures are consistent 
with the requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) and the Fourth Amendment). 
437 See id. at 22–27. 
438 Id. at 25.  
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that might be required for litigation-related reasons.439 The FISC also approved amendments 
to allow the FBI to retain information longer than the normal retention period if considered 
necessary for administrative, civil, or criminal litigation, as long as the Bureau informed the 
court.440 And in 2017, the court approved extending the retention periods for upstream 
collection from two years to five years.441 Part of the rationale at the time was that the scope 
of upstream acquisition had narrowed from TFA to only communications to or from a selector 
associated with the target; however, this condition is subject to change at the discretion of the 
Executive with just thirty days’ notice to Congress (and no notice in exigent circumstances). 
 
The pattern that emerges is one familiar to scholars who focus on the history of surveillance: 
the steady expansion of the type of information obtained, the purposes to which it is put, and 




While numerous FISC opinions have found Section 702 targeting procedures consistent with 
the statutory and constitutional requirements, there has been a significant amount of concern 
generated by the government’s effort to expand targeting to communications not just to or 
from a target, but also about a target or a selector associated with a target.443 
 
The first engagement with to/from/about (TFA) collection in the Section 702  context appears 
in a 2008 opinion, in which Judge McLaughlin determined that the procedures were 
reasonably designed to ensure that the users of tasked selectors are reasonably believed to be 
abroad, and to prevent the intentional acquisition of  about communications to which the 
sender and all intended recipients were known to be inside the U.S.444 The agencies could 
reach out to foreign governments for technical and linguistic assistance.445 
 
In 2009, the court had to address an overcollection issue in which the government argued that 
the procedures, not implementation, mattered. The Section 702 submissions indicated that the 
government would be collecting telephone and internet communications. For the former, the 
targeting would only be to/from; for the latter, it would be TFA, to ensure the collection of 
communications that would contain a reference to the name of the tasked account.446 While 
 
439 Opinion and Order, In re Standard Minimization Procs. for FBI Elec. Surveillance & Physical Search 
Conducted Under the Foreign Intel. Surveillance Act, Nos. Multiple including [REDACTED], GID.C.00105, at 1 
(FISA Ct. Aug. 11, 2014) (Collyer, J.). 
440 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00106, at 21–26, 41–42 (FISA 
Ct. Aug. 26, 2014) (Hogan, J.). 
441 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00282, at 46, 49 (FISA Ct. 
Dec. 6, 2019) (Boasberg, J.) 
442 For one of the better publicly-available summaries of targeting procedures, see Memorandum Opinion and 
Order Compelling Compliance with Directives, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00111, at 6–10 
(FISA Ct. 2014) (Collyer, J.). 
443 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00060 (FISA Ct. 
2010) (Bates, J.); Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00062 (FISA Ct. 
2010) (McLaughlin, J.); [REDACTED], 402 F. Supp. 3d 45, 55–64, GID.C.00258, at 10–45 (FISA Ct. 2018) 
(Boasberg, J.). 
444 Memorandum Opinion, In re DNI/AG Certification [REDACTED], No. 702(i)-08-01, GID.C.00030, at 19 
(FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2008) (McLaughlin, J.). In 2007 Judge Vinson considered a similar question in regard to Title 
I ELSURV. Order, In re [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00016, at 12-13 (FISA Ct. May 31, 2007) 
(Vinson, J.) (approving collection not just to or from but also about a selector). 
445 Id. at 28–29. 
446 The court determined that the CIA and NSA minimization procedures comported with FISA and the Fourth 
Amendment. Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00039 (FISA Ct. 
Apr. 7, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.). Those procedures permit U.S. person queries and require a written explanation of 
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substantial implementation problems could speak to whether targeting procedures were 
reasonably designed, statutory compliance was merely a matter of procedure.447 Judge 
McLaughlin rejected the government’s approach and took the actual instance of overcollection 
on board.448 
 
The following year, Judge Bates held that the enhanced and remedial measures for NSA’s 
failure to effectively purge databases of Section 1881a information required under 
minimization procedures, and NSA’s backlog in conducting post-targeting review of selectors 
for which NSA had indications such selectors might have been used within the U.S., were 
adequate to address concerns.449 The court determined that the relatively few post-tasking 
review problems compared to the total number of tasking decisions, coupled with the limited 
duration of any improper taskings in those cases, and the assurance that the process has been 
improved, did not undermine basis for approval of targeting and minimization procedures.450 
 
Although the court in April 2011 approved the Section 702 submissions, the following month, 
on May 2, the government filed a supplemental letter disclosing that NSA’s upstream 
collection included the acquisition of entire transactions, which “may contain data that is 
wholly unrelated to the tasked selector, including the full content of discrete communications 
that are not to, from, or about the facility tasked for collection.”451 The NSA had significantly 
exceeded approved scope of collection.  
 
In October 2011, Judge Bates wrote, “the Court is troubled that the government’s revelations 
regarding NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions mark the third instance in less than three 
years in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the 
scope of a major collection program.”452 It turned out that the NSA had been acquiring Internet 
transactions since before the Court approved the first Section 702 certification in 2008.453 This 
information spurred Judge Bates to observe that FISA makes it a crime “(1) to ‘engage[] in 
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized’ by statute or (2) to ‘disclose[] 
or use[] information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having 
 
the basis for their assessment (at the time of targeting) “that the target possesses, is expected to receive, and/or is 
likely to communicate foreign intelligence information concerning [the] foreign power or foreign territory” about 
which foreign intelligence information is being sought. Id. 
447 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00039, at 23 (FISA Ct. 
Apr. 7, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.) (“The Court is unpersuaded by the government’s contention that compliance with 
Section 1881a(d)(l) is purely a matter of intent. Substantial implementation problems can, notwithstanding the 
government’s intent, speak to whether the applicable targeting procedures are ‘reasonably designed’ to acquire 
only the communications of non-U.S. persons outside the United States.”) 
448 Id. at 23–24. The court found that the “enhanced measures recently implemented by NSA to detect and filter 
out such non-targeted communications [REDACTED] before such communications enter repositories that are 
accessible to analysts . . . provide a basis for finding, despite overcollections, that the NSA Targeting Procedures 
are reasonably designed.” Id. The government indicated that it identified [REDACTED] overcollection incidents 
(regarding Internet communications), and the NSA was able to identify the causes for [REDACTED] incidents. 
Id. at 18. Further, the NSA purges all files erroneously acquired. Id. at 19. The government claims that it adopted 
substantial remedial and preventing measures to alleviate overcollection (such measures are redacted). Id. at 21. 
449 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00060, at 9–10 (FISA Ct. 
2010) (Bates, J.). 
450 Id. at 10–11. 
451 [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 5; 2011 WL 10945618, at *2 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) 
(Bates, J.). 
452 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 16 n.14; 2011 WL 10945618, at *5 n.14. The other misrepresentations 
marked the Section 215 program as well as PRTT, discussed infra. 
453 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 17; 2011 WL 10945618, at *6. 
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reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic surveillance not 
authorized’ by statute.454 
 
Although the Court had authorized acquisition of certain categories of “about” 
communications, moreover, dating from McLaughlin’s 2009 opinion, the NSA had been 
collecting all of them: “The Court now understands that all ‘about’ communications are 
acquired by means of NSA’s acquisition of Internet transactions through its upstream 
collection.455  
 
In addition, as aforementioned in the Fourth Amendment analysis, the NSA was not just 
collecting discreet communications, but also “internet transactions”—including some that 
include a single, discrete communication (single communication transaction or SCT) as well 
as MCTs. Judge Bates wrote, “[F]or the first time, the government has now advised the Court 
that the volume and nature of the information it has been collecting is fundamentally different 
from what the Court has been led to believe.”456 As a result, the NSA was knowingly collecting 
tens of thousands of entirely domestic communications—precisely the types of 
communications prohibited by statute. 
 
The government reached for a familiar trope, arguing that the technology was insufficient to 
know at moment of collection whether the transaction is a SCT or MCT, or to identify parties 
to any particular communication within the transaction.457 The court had previously 
understood—from the government—that it could use technical measures to prevent 
acquisition of entirely domestic communications. The expansion basically meant that the NSA 
had, “as a practical matter, circumvented the spirit” of the law.458 
 
The issues did not end in 2011. Five years later, the government again informed the court of 
significant noncompliance with NSA and FBI querying procedures.459  A subsequent hearing 
proved insufficient to address the court’s concerns and to assess the procedures submitted with 
the certifications.460 Although the executive branch made further submissions in January 2017, 
discussing what it was doing to try to even understand the scope and the causes of the 
compliance issues, and to propose potential solutions, the court still did not find that the 
government had adequately ascertained the scope of the issues.461 
 
Unable to address the problem with TFA and under pressure from the court, the government 
agreed to sequester and then to destroy raw upstream Internet data previously collected and to 
substantially narrow to breadth of information collected upstream. “Most significantly,” the 
court explained, “the government will eliminate ‘abouts’ collection altogether, which will 
have the effect of eliminating acquisition of the more problematic types of MCTs.”462 The 
government would make quarterly report s to the court over the next year as it undertook the 
 
454 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 17 n.15; 2011 WL 10945618, at *6 n.15 (quoting 50 U.S.C.A. § 1809(a) 
(West)). 
455 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 17 n.16; 2011 WL 10945618, at *6 n.16. See also Memorandum Opinion and 
Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00039 (FISA Ct. Apr. 7, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.). 
456 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 28; 2011 WL 10945618, at *9. 
457 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 43; 2011 WL 10945618, at *14. 
458 [REDACTED], GID.C.00073 at 48; 2011 WL 10945618, at *16. 
459 See further discussion, Part IV(D), infra. 
460 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00130, at 4 (FISA Ct. Apr. 26, 
2017) (Collyer, J.). 
461 Id. at 5. The government requested an extension until May 26, 2017, which the court approved only through 
April 28, 2017. Id. 
462 Id. at 23. 
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process. Under the amended procedures, the NSA could still acquire MCTs, but only when it 
could ensure that the target was an active user (i.e., a party to the entire MCT).463 
 
The opinion was issued April 26, 2017, and released the same day. Two days later, the NSA 
announced that it was choosing to eliminate the upstream data—without explaining that the 
NSA had been collecting information outside of either statutory or constitutional constraints 
for seven years.464 
 
The public about-face and release of the court opinion underscored the already heightened 
public concern about TFA. Accordingly, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 
limited the acquisition of “communications that contain a reference to, but are not to or from, 
a target of an acquisition authorized” under Section 702.465 The statute provided for the 
government to resume abouts collection with 30 days’ notice to Congress, with an exception 
for exigent circumstances.466 In the interim, the government must “fully and currently inform” 
the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate of “significant 
noncompliance . . . concerning any acquisition of abouts communications.”467 In light of the 




Both the § 215 bulk collection program and § 702 upstream collection have been beset by 
concerns about the querying procedures and the government’s violation of judicial orders. 
 
According to the FISC, in March 2009, the NSA telephony bulk collection under § 215 was 
“premised on a flawed depiction of how the NSA uses [the acquired] metadata.”468 The 
misperception by FISC started from day one, in May 2006, “buttressed by repeated inaccurate 
statements made in the government’s submissions, and despite a government-devised and 
Court-mandated oversight regime.”469 Contrary to the government’s repeated assurances, the 
NSA had been routinely running queries of the metadata using terms that did not meet the 
required standard of reasonable, articulable, suspicion (RAS). The Court concluded that 
requirement had been “so frequently and systemically violated that it can fairly be said that 
this critical element of the overall . . . regime has never functioned effectively.”470 
 
In regard to § 702, as aforementioned, in October 2016, the government informed the court 
that it had been violating the restrictions established by Bates in 2011 that forbade using U.S. 
person identifiers to query upstream data. As the court explained in 2017: “The October 26, 
2016 Notice informed the Court that NSA analysts had been conducting such queries in 
violation of that prohibition, with much greater frequency than had previously been disclosed 
 
463 Id. at 24–26. 
464 See Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Halts Collection of Americans’ Emails About Foreign Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-terrorism-privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/U6MQ-KK9V]. 
465 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115–118, §§ 103(a)(3)(5), 702(b)(5), 132 Stat. 
3, 10 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(b)(5) (West)). 
466 Id. § 103(b)(2)-(4). 
467 Id. §§ 103(b)(5)(B), § 702(m)(4), 132 Stat. at 12–13. 
468 In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], GID.C.00036, at 10–11, 2009 WL 9150913, at *5 (FISA 
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) (Walton, J.). 
469 Id. at 11; 2009 WL 9150913, at *5. 
470 Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], GID.C.00036 at 11; 2009 WL 9150913, at *5. 
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to the Court.”471 Preliminary reports by the NSA inspector general suggested that the problem 
was widespread.472 The government had not been forthright: as Judge Collyer explained, “The 
full scope of non-compliant querying practices had not been previously disclosed to the 
Court.”473 The court considered it an institutional “lack of candor,” and noted it was “a very 
serious Fourth Amendment issue.”474 
 
Even as the government was forced to jettison TFA collection, it pressed the court to allow it 
to begin querying upstream data using known U.S. person identifiers, subject to a requirement 
that the facts establishing the use of any such identifier as a selection term was reasonably 
likely to return foreign intelligence information.475 The court agreed with the amended 
procedures, stating that it was satisfied that the same restrictions applied as existed in regard 
querying other forms of 702-acquired data (which Bates had said was acceptable in his 
October. 3, 2011 memorandum opinion).476 
 
The 2017 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act, in addition to limiting TFA, also provided 
new measures to address querying procedures, requiring that they be “consistent with the 
requirements of the fourth amendment . . . for information collected.”477 Under the statute, a 
“query” means “the use of one or more terms to retrieve the unminimized contents or 
noncontents located in electronic and data storage systems of communications of or 
concerning United States persons obtained through acquisitions authorized” under § 702 
certification.478  
 
In prior years, minimization procedures for § 702 included rules for querying raw data.479 But 
following introduction of the new statute, the AG and DNI adopted separate querying 
procedures for each agency.480 Under all of them, a U.S. person  (USP) query term is defined 
as “a term that is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific” USPs which “may be 
either a single item of information or information that, when combined with other information, 
 
471 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00130, at 19 (FISA Ct. Apr. 
26, 2017) (Collyer, J.). 
472 Id.; see also Exhibit A: Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting Non-United States 
Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States to Acquire Foreign Intelligence 
Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended at 2, 
[REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Mar. 30, 2017) (No. [REDACTED]), available at 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053027 [https://perma.cc/P7G9-28S2]; Exhibit B: 
Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign 
Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as 
Amended, § 3(b)(4)b, at 4, [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Mar 30, 2017) (No. No. [REDACTED]), available at 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1053259 [https://perma.cc/D5LM-G5U7] (amended 
minimization procedures to state that Internet transactions acquired after Mar. 17, 2017 that were not to/from 
target “are unauthorized acquisitions and therefore will be destroyed upon recognition.”) 
473 [REDACTED], GID.C.00130, at 4. 
474 Id. at 19 (quotations omitted).  
475 See id. at 28–29. 
476 Id.. 
477 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, §§ 101(a)(1), 702(f)(1)(A), 132 Stat. 3, 
4 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(1)(A) (West)). 
478 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(3)(B). 
479 See, e.g., Exhibit D, Minimization Procedures Used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Connection with 
Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, as Amended, § III.D., at 11-12, [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Sept. 26, 2016) (No. [REDACTED]), 
available at https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1056245 [https://perma.cc/6PCK-43SL]. 
480 For reference, see the separate querying procedures starting in 2018 for the FBI, NSA, CIA, and NCTC. See 
Statutory and Regulatory Authorities, DIGITAL GEO., 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1052817 [https://perma.cc/95F7-L3XM] (last visited Apr. 
3, 2021). 
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is reasonably likely to identify one or more specific” USPs.481 Depending on context, names 
or unique titles, government-associated personal or corporate identification numbers, street 
addresses, or telephone numbers, could all constitute USP query terms.482 The FISC 
determines whether such procedures satisfy the statutory requirements.483 
 
Under certain circumstances, the government must obtain a FISC order prior to accessing § 
702-acquired information.484  This applies only to the FBI (and not to the CIA, NSA, or NCTC) 
for queries made using a USP query term that was not designed to find or to extract foreign 
intelligence information.485 The court order to access contents is further limited to queries 
made “in connection with a predicated criminal investigation opened by the [FBI] that does 
not relate to the national security of the United States.”486 Thus, the FBI cannot query § 702 
data for domestic law enforcement purposes, and review the metadata of any returns, but it 
cannot examine the substance without FISC approval. The FBI does not have to go to the court 
if it determines there is a reasonable belief that the contents could help to mitigate/eliminate a 
threat to life or serious bodily harm.487 
 
The 2017 Reauthorization Act also introduced a new requirement that the querying procedures 
“include a technical procedure whereby a record is kept of each [USP] query term used for a 
query.”488 Despite the plain language of the statute, in 2018 and 2019, the FISC was again 
forced to address the government’s effort to resist restrictions on querying the data.  
 
In the first review of the new procedures, the court found that the FBI’s proposed measures 
did not comply with record-retention provisions.489 The FBI argued that because it kept all the 
terms used to query the database, it did not need to specify which ones were USP-specific.490 
Judge Boasberg made it clear that to meet the statutory requirement, a log must be kept. The 
FBI querying and minimization procedures were further inconsistent with both the statutory 
minimization requirements and Fourth Amendment in that they failed to “require adequate 




481 See Exhibit I: Querying Procedures Used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Connection with 
Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, as Amended, § III.A., at 1, [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Sept. 18, 2018) (No. [REDACTED]), 
available at https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1058714 [https://perma.cc/G3EM-B6L2]. 
All four agencies’ querying procedures have the same language.  
482 “Query” is defined as “the use of one or more terms to retrieve the unminimized contents or noncontents 
located in electronic and data storage systems of communications of or concerning United States persons 
obtained through acquisitions authorized under Section 702. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(3) (West). 
483 See id. § 1881a(f)(1)(C), (j)(3)(A)-(B). 
484 See id. § 1881a(f)(2). 
485 See id. § 1881a(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(F). 
486 Id. § 1881a(f)(2)(A). 
487 Id. § 1881a(f)(2)(E). 
488 FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, §§. 101(a)(1)(B), 702(f)(1)(B), 132 
Stat. 3, 4 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(f)(1)(B)). 
489 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00258, at 62 (FISA Ct. Oct. 18, 
2018) (Boasberg, J.). 
490 Id. at 49–52. 
491 Id. at 133–34. 
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The FBI had had several non-compliance issues since April 2017 in which FBI queries were 
not reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime.492 The 
court also noted some new non-compliance issues.493 
 
Dissatisfied with the FISC’s ruling, the government appealed to the FISCR, which agreed with 
FISC’s determination. The proposed query procedures failed to comply with the plain 
statutory language.494 Because the result required amendment of the procedures, the court did 
not reach whether the proposed query and minimization procedures complied with FISA and 
the Fourth Amendment.495  
 
The case therefore came back to the FISC with amended procedures that acknowledged the 
FBI’s statutory responsibility to keep a record of all U.S. person query terms.496 Further 
amendments required that “[p]rior to reviewing the unminimized contents of section 702-
acquired information retrieved using a United States person query term,” FBI personnel must 
“provide a written statement of facts showing that the query was reasonably likely to retrieve 
foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime.”497 The court held that this met 
statutory and 4th Amendment requirements and agreed to an implementation strategy, 
requiring a written report by September 26, 2019 and every 45 days thereafter until the FBI 
fully complied.498  
 
As a result of the legislation and the court’s opinions, each agency’s querying procedures now 
require the agency to “generate and maintain an electronic record of each United States person 
query term used for a query of unminimized information acquired pursuant to section 702.”499 
The records are retained for at least five years. The CIA, NCTC, and FBI require that users 
record the query term(s) used, the date of the query, and who ran the inquiry.500 The NSA 
retains the query term(s) used or approved; date of query/approval of query terms; identity of 
the user who conducted query or sought approval; and, for content queries, the approving 
official in NSA OGC office, as well as the duration of the approval.501 
 
D. Erroneous Statements and Material Omissions 
 
 
492 Id. at 68–72. 
493 Id. at 127–32 (including NSA’s backlog in processing purge orders and insider threat monitoring). 
494 In Re DNI/AG 702(h) Certifications 2018 [REDACTED], GID.CA.00008, 941 F.3d 547, 549–50, 555,  (FISA 
Ct. Rev. 2019) (per curiam).  
495 Id. at 549–50, 555–56, GID.CA.00008, at 3–4, 42–43. 
496 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00259, at 7–8 (FISA Ct. Sept. 
4, 2019) (Boasberg, J.) (“The FBI must generate and maintain an electronic record of each United States person 
query term used for a query of unminimized content or noncontent information acquired pursuant to section 
702.”) The court held that this provision did meet the requirements of Section 702(f)(1)(B). Id. 
497 Id. at 9 (quotations omitted). 
498 Id. at 16–18. 
499 See id. at 7. The procedures also indicate that if an electronic record cannot be generated, the FBI must 
generate and keep a written record. Id. 
500 See, e.g., Exhibit J: Querying Procedures Used by the Central Intelligence Agency in Connection with 
Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, as Amended, § IV.B., at 3–4, [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2019) (No. [REDACTED]), 
available at https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1060328 [https://perma.cc/X4YN-7PUH]. 
501 Exhibit H: Querying Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of 
Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as 
Amended, § IV.B., at 4, [REDACTED] (FISA Ct. Sept. 17, 2019) (No. [REDACTED]), available at 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1060326 [https://perma.cc/TUE8-4T7B]. 
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About a dozen opinions in the public domain raise concern about inaccurate, materially 
omitted, erroneous, or false statements to the court. Although the Russia investigation attracted 
a significant amount of attention in recent years, the problem did not begin there. Indeed, it 
started before the September 11 attacks. 
 
In March 2000, the government informed the FISC that it had been disseminating FISA 
information to criminal squads in the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office without the required 
authorizations of the Court in four or five separate cases.502 This was followed in September 
2000, with the government confessing to errors in 75 separate FISA applications related to 
major terrorist attacks, including:  
 
a) an erroneous statement in the FBI Director's FISA certification that the target of 
the FISA was not under criminal investigation; b) erroneous statements in the FISA 
affidavits of FBI agents concerning the separation of the overlapping intelligence 
and criminal investigations, and the unauthorized sharing of FISA information with 
FBI criminal investigators and assistant U.S. attorneys; and, c) omissions of material 
facts from FBI FISA affidavits relating to a prior relationship between the FBI and a 
FISA target, and the interview of a FISA target by an assistant U.S. attorney.503 
 
The government reported similar misstatements in another series of applications, transgressing 
the wall between intelligence collection and criminal investigations: all of the agents involved 
participated in the same squad, with screening done not by the Office of Intelligence Policy 
Review, but by a supervisor simultaneously overseeing both investigations.504 The court, 
however, did not take a strong stance on these violations.505 
 
The modern era has fared little better in terms of government submissions. Even the practice 
of reporting noncompliance has failed to comport with the requirements. In 2009, for example, 
the court noted that the government had been picking and choosing what it decided to reveal 
to the court, omitting, for instance, failures to de-task accounts even after the NSA discovered 
that the targets had entered the United States.506 The court had to order the government to 
report every compliance incident that relates to the operation of the targeting or minimization 
procedures.507 
 
In another case, the government misdescribed the actual scope of what it was collecting under 
Title I.508 It was far from the first time. The court wryly noted: 
 
The government has exhibited a chronic tendency to mis-describe the actual scope 
of NSA acquisitions in its submissions to this Court. These inaccuracies have 
previously contributed to unauthorized electronic surveillance and other forms of 
 
502 In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620, GID.C.00002, at 620 
(FISA Ct. 2002) (Lamberth, J.), rev’d by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, GID.CA.00001 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(per curiam). 
503 Id. at 620. 
504 Id. at 621.   
505 Id. at 620. 
506 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00050, at 12–14 (FISA Ct. 
2009) (Hogan, J.). Note that is opinion is very similar to Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00051 (FISA Ct. 2009) (Hogan, J.), but with slightly different language and redactions. 
507 [REDACTED], GID.C.00050, at 14. 
508 See Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00254, at 9–11 (FISA Ct. [REDACTED]) 
(Hogan, J.) (NSA’s acquisition of [REDACTED] constituted unauthorized electronic surveillance because it 
failed to comply with 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804(a)(2), (a)(3)(B) (West)). 
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statutory and constitutional deficiency. It is evident that the government needs every 
incentive to provide accurate and complete information to the Court about NSA 
operations, whenever such information is material to the case.509 
 
Once again, the court ordered the government to submit a report of its effort in identifying and 
purging information obtained from the acquisition.510  
 
The executive branch has made inaccurate representations to the court about the post-tasking 
review process.511 There are numerous other examples.512 These are in addition to the queries 
of § 215 metadata being run absent RAS, the bulk collection of Internet metadata outside the 
scope of the FISC’s orders, and Judge Bates’s now famous October 2011 opinion noting that 
the government had made substantial misrepresentations regarding the scope of § 702.513  
 
Getting caught does not necessarily alleviate the problem. In 2012, for instance, the court 
reiterated its concern about NSA misrepresentations regarding upstream collection.514 The 
issue did not abate: the court was surprised to learn by notice in July 2015 that the NSA had 
not been deleting overcollected Section 702 records placed on the Master Purge List in 
accordance with a May 2011 Opinion and Order.515 The court was also dismayed that it took 
the government four years of continued retention before proposing a resolution to the court.516 
The government further informed the court about two NSA databases that were not compliant 
with minimization procedures.517 This was all prior to the October 26, 2016 hearing in which 
Collyer lamented the NSA’s query of § 702 data using USP identifiers despite the prohibition 
in the minimization procedures, noting the government’s “lack of candor” and the serious 
constitutional questions thereby raised.518 
 
The most prominent example of government malfeasance arises in the context of the Russian 
investigations. The FBI opened Crossfire Hurricane on July 31, 2016 to determine whether 
individuals associated with the Trump campaign were either wittingly or unwittingly 
coordinating with the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential 
election.519 The investigation came on the heels of a foreign government informing the 
administration that George Papadopoulos (a campaign adviser) had indicated that Russia had 
 
509 Id. at 13–14 (citations have been redacted). 
510 Id. at 14. 
511 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00062, at 20–21 (FISA Ct. 
2010) (McLaughlin, J.). 
512 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], GID.C.00092, at 2–3 (FISA Ct.) 
(Bates, J.). 
513 [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 15-18, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5–6 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 
2011) (Bates, J.). 
514 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00256, at 26–33 (FISA Ct. 
Sept. 20, 2012) (Bates, J.). Note that this is a more complete version of [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], 
GID.C.00078, 2012 WL 9189263 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 2012) (Bates, J.). The reported version only included the 
discussion of the scope of the NSA upstream collection. 
515 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [Redacted], No. [Redacted], GID.C.00121, at 57–58 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 
2015) (Hogan, J.). 
516 Id. at 58. 
517 Id. at 65–68.    
518 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00130, at 19 (FISA Ct. Apr. 26, 
2017) (Collyer, J.). 
519 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUST., REVIEW OF FOUR FISA APPLICATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF 
THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE INVESTIGATION i (revised Dec. 20, 2019) [hereinafter CROSSFIRE HURRICANE 
REPORT], https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1058716. 
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reached out to the Trump team to offer to release information that would be damaging to the 
democratic candidate.520 
 
On December 9, 2019, Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz completed a 
twenty-month inquiry into Crossfire Hurricane and the investigation of four members of the 
presidential campaign: Papadopoulos, Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and Michael Flynn.521 
Having poured over more than one million documents held by the DOJ and FBI and 
undertaken more than 170 interviews with more than 100 witnesses, Horowitz found 
significant discrepancies between law, policy, and practice.522  
 
In regard to the FISC applications for Title I surveillance of Carter Page, the IG found that the 
first application in October 2016, and the three renewal orders thereafter, which resulted in 
about eleven months of surveillance, was premised in part on a dossier provided by 
Christopher Steele.523 Steele, a former intelligence officer, had formed a consulting firm that 
specialized in corporate intelligence and investigative services. In 2016, Steele was hired by a 
Washington, D.C. investigative firm to do political opposition research into the Russian role 
in the election. The reports that he produced for them became known as the Steele dossier. 
From July through October 2016, Steele passed several of these reports on to the FBI, which 
failed to press him on either his funding source, or his role in a Yahoo! News article focused 
on ties between Trump advisor and Kremlin.524  
 
In his report, Horowitz launched a scathing critique of the investigation. The applications to 
the FISC for surveillance of Page left out information that cut against FBI or was inconsistent 
with what they were telling the court that went directly to probable cause. The FISC Rules of 
Procedure required that the Page applications contain all material facts. 525 Although they did 
not define “material,” FBI policy considered that a fact was “material” where it was relevant 
to the court’s probable cause determination.526 The Woods procedures also required that all 
factual statements in FISA application be “scrupulously accurate.”527 It turned out that the 
application relied on four assertions from the Steele dossier, none of which was corroborated 
by other information—and none of which was made clear to the FISC.528 In addition, the 
 
520 Id. at ii. 
521 See id. at  i, 8. 
522 See id. at i, ii–xviii. 
523 Id. at vi. The first application was filed Oct. 21, 2016, while three renewal applications were filed on Jan. 12, 
Apr. 7, and June 29, 2017. A different FISC judge approved the requested orders, and all four orders issued 
resulted in about eleven months of FISA coverage targeting Carter Page, from October 21, 2016 to September 22, 
2017. Id. 
524 Id. at v–vi. 
525 Id. at vi. FISC R. PROC. 13(a) (Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-Compliance. (a) 
Correction of Material Facts. If the government discovers that a submission to the Court contained a 
misstatement or omission of material fact, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to 
whom the submission was made of: (1) the misstatement or omission; (2) any necessary correction; (3) the facts 
and circumstances relevant to the misstatement or omission; ( 4) any modifications the government has made or 
proposes to make in how it will implement any authority or approval granted by the Court; and (5) how the 
government proposes to dispose of or treat any information obtained as a result of the misstatement or omission.)  
526 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE REPORT, supra note 519, at vi–vii. 
527 Id. at vii. 
528 Id. vii–viii. The four assertions included: “Compromising information regarding Hillary Clinton had been 
compiled for many years, was controlled by the Kremlin, and had been fed by the Kremlin to the Trump 
campaign for an extended period of time; During a July 2016 trip to Moscow, Page met secretly with Igor Sechin, 
Chairman of Russian energy conglomerate Rosneft and close associate of Putin, to discuss future cooperation and 
the lifting of Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia; and with Igor Divyekin, a highly-placed Russian official, 
to discuss sharing with the Trump campaign derogatory information about Clinton; Page was an intermediary 
between Russia and the Trump campaign's then manager (Manafort) in a ‘well-developed conspiracy’ of 
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application contained seven further inaccuracies and omissions, none of which were brought 
up at any of the renewals, at which point ten addition omissions of fact, misstatements, and 
significant errors occurred.529   
 
Horowitz expressed concern, “That so many basic and fundamental errors were made by three 
separate, hand-picked teams on one of the most sensitive FBI investigations that was briefed 
to the highest levels within the FBI, and that FBI officials expected would eventually be 
subjected to close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the FBI chain of command's 
management and supervision of the FISA process.”530  
 
As if those discoveries were not enough, Horowitz found that an FBI lawyer, Kevin 
Clinesmith, had falsified an email from the CIA to state that Page was not a source for the 
agency, resulting in assuaging concerns that the declarant had about whether there was such a 
source relationship. As a result, nothing in the application indicated that there might be a 
relationship between Page and the CIA—information that went directly to the probable cause 
determination of whether Page was an agent of a foreign power.531 Horowitz went on to report 
that the agents had not shared pertinent information with key DOJ and FBI officials, with the 
result that DOJ leadership “did not have accurate and complete information at the time they 
approved the applications.”532 Horowitz was so concerned about the findings that he initiated 
a second audit focused on FBI compliance with the Woods procedures in FISA applications 
targeting USPs in counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations.533 
 
The report shook congressional confidence in FISA, with the failure to include exculpatory 
evidence hearkened as a Fifth Amendment due process concern. Political leaders took aim at 
the court. Sen. Lindsey Graham announced, “I’m a pretty hawkish guy, but if the court doesn’t 
take corrective action and do something about being manipulated and lied to, you will lose my 
support. . . . I would hate to lose the ability of [FISC] to operate at a time, probably when we 
need it the most. But after your report, I have serious concerns about whether the FISA court 
can continue unless there is fundamental reform.”534 
 
The FISC took the offensive: on December 5, 2019, Collyer issued a classified order directing 
the government to identify all matters before the FISC on which Clinesmith had worked.535 
 
cooperation, which led to Russia's disclosure of hacked DNC emails to WikiLeaks in exchange for the Trump 
campaign's agreement to sideline Russian intervention in Ukraine as a campaign issue; and, Russia released the 
DNC emails to WikiLeaks in an attempt to swing voters to Trump, an objective conceived and promoted by Page 
and others.” Id. (citations omitted). 
529 Id. at viii–ix, xi–xii. 
530 Id. at xiv. 
531 Id. at ix. (“Omitted Page's prior relationship with another U.S. government agency, despite being reminded by 
the other agency in June 2017, prior to the filing of the final renewal application, about Page's past status with 
that other agency; instead of including this information in the final renewal application, the OGC Attorney altered 
an email from the other agency so that the email stated that Page was "not a source" for the other agency, which 
the FBI affiant relied upon in signing the final renewal application”); see also Matt Zapotosky, Ex-FBI Lawyer 
Avoids Prison After Admitting He Doctored Email in Investigation of Trump’s 2016 Campaign, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/kevin-clinesmith-fbi-john-
durham/2021/01/28/b06e061c-618e-11eb-afbe-9a11a127d146_story.html [https://perma.cc/GFS2-XLNC]. 
532 CROSSFIRE HURRICANE REPORT, supra note 519, at 367–68. 
533 Id. at xiv. 
534 S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Inspector General Report on Origins of FBI’s Russia Inquiry, C-SPAN, at 47:04 
(Dec. 11, 2019), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?466593-1/justice-department-ig-horowitz-defends-
report-highlights-fisa-problems [https://perma.cc/BC3Q-JMCG]. 
535 Order, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. Misc. 19-02, 
GID.C.00261, at 2 (FISA Ct. Dec. 5, 2019) (Collyer, J.). 
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Less than a fortnight later, the court issued an unclassified order rebuking the FBI over their 
actions and noting that the agency had failed to fulfill the “heightened duty of candor” that 
accompanies in camera, ex parte applications.536 Collyer wrote, “The frequency with which 
representations made by FBI personnel turned out to be unsupported or contradicted by 
information in their possession, and with which they withheld information detrimental to their 
case, calls into question whether information contained in other FBI applications is 
reliable.”537 She ordered the government to inform the court what it had done to address the 
errors and to ensure that similar inaccuracy and omissions did not happen again.538 She also 
previously raised the question about any other matters involving Clinesmith and whether any 
bar association or disciplinary referrals had been made.539 
 
The FBI responded with an unclassified submission to the court laying out its approach going 
forward.540 Judge Boasberg, who had become Presiding Judge of the FISC at the turn of the 
new year, appointed former DOJ National Security Division Assistant Attorney General David 
Kris as amicus curiae to assist court in evaluating government’s response.541 Kris found the 
proposed measures insufficient and recommended several ways to expand and mprove 
assurances.542 Soon after, the FISC declassified the order about the DOJ’s handling of the Page 
application.543  
 
In early March 2020, the FISC issued one of its strongest opinions to date, responding to 
government malfeasance. Judge Boasberg noted, “There is . . . little doubt that the government 
breached its duty of candor to the Court with respect to [the Carter Page] applications.”544 The 
frequency and seriousness of the misstatements to the Court called into question the reliability 
of other FBI information contained in applications.545 Separate classified proceedings were 
underway dealing with how to sequester information acquired pursuant to the four FISA 
authorizations concerning Page.546 Boasberg highlighted problems with reliance on the Steele 
dossier, and he analyzed and proposed remedial actions relating to the FISA application 
procedures, improvements in training and other institutional changes, and greater oversight.547 
 
 
536 In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, 411 F. Supp. 3d 333, 336-337, 
GID.C.00260, at 2–3 (FISA Ct. Dec. 17, 2019) (Collyer, J.). 
537 Id. at 337, GID.C.00260, at 3. 
538 Id., GID.C.00260, at 3–4. 
539 In re Accuracy Concerns, GID.C.00261, at 2. 
540 Response to the Court’s Order Dated December 17, 2019, In re Accuracy Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to 
the FISC, No. Misc. 19-02 (FISA Ct. Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1057438 [https://perma.cc/7BYJ-S4ZV]. 
541 Order Appointing an Amicus Curiae, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, 
No. Misc. 19-02, GID.C.00263 (FISA Ct. Jan. 10, 2020) (Boasberg, J.). 
542 See Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae David Kris, In re Accuracy Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, 
No. Misc. 19-02 (FISA Ct. Jan. 15, 2020), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1057439. 
543 Order Regarding Handling and Disposition of Information, In re Carter W. Page, Nos. 16-1182, 17-52, 17-
375, 17-679, GID.C.00265 (FISA Ct. Jan. 7, 2020) (Boasberg, J.). 
544 Corrected Opinion and Order, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. 
Misc. 19-02, GID.C.00272, at 1 (FISA Ct. Mar. 5, 2020) (Boasberg, J.). 
545 Id. 
546 Id. at 3–4. 
547 See id. at 5–13, 17–19 (e.g., including all contradictory information in FISA applications, with the aim of 
providing information that may undermine probable cause; revising the Woods form to emphasize an obligation 
to re-verify factual assertions and specify what steps must be taken during legal review before submitting to FBI 
director; potential for DOJ attorneys to visit FBI field offices to meet with case agents and review investigative 
files; and, requiring the FBI case agent attest to FISA application). 
 69 
The FISC ordered that the government provide details on the new changes, training, audit, and 
compliance mechanisms.548 It banned any DOJ or FBI personnel “under disciplinary or 
criminal review relating to their work on FISA applications [to] participate in drafting, 
verifying, reviewing, or submitting such applications to the court.”549 Beginning March 9, 
2020, the court required that all Title I/III, PRTT, Section 1881b or Section 1881c applications 
include a statement verifying that the application fairly reflected “all information that might 
reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any FBI 
assessment in the application, or otherwise raise doubts about the requested findings.”550 From 
the FBI in particular, the Court required an additional statement attesting that the Justice 
Department’s Office of Intelligence had “been apprised of all information that might 
reasonably call into question the accuracy of the information or the reasonableness of any FBI 
assessment in the application, or otherwise raise doubts about the requested findings.”551 
 
Soon after the FISC issued its order, another memorandum from Horowitz came out, having 
examined 29 separate FISC applications targeting USPs between 2014–19.552 Remarkably, 
every single one of the applications had errors.553 The Woods procedures were not being 
followed in all of the cases; indeed, in at least four cases, there were no files at all backing up 
the application.554 In those cases where there were files, some facts were not supported or 
corroborated by the documentation, or there were inconsistent claims being made to the FISC. 
On average, each application had approximately 20 issues, with up to 65 issues in just one of 
the applications examined.555 
 
Within a week of the publication of the IG report, the FISC issued an order to the government 
directing it to provide the court with the names of the targets and docket numbers for the 29 
applications reviewed by the OIG and specify which targets/docket numbers correspond to the 
4 applications where there was no Woods file.556 The government had to assess to what extent 
the 29 applications involved material misstatements or omissions, and whether any such 
material misstatements and omissions rend authorizations granted by the court for that target 
 
548 See id. at 17–19. The Court ordered the government to provide: 1) a copy of the CHS (confidential human 
sources) checklist and status on its implementation; 2) a description of the current responsibilities FBI OGC 
lawyers have throughout the FISA process; 3) planned and implemented technological improvements to the 
process of preparing FISA applications; 4) a report on suggested ways of improving DOJ proactiveness in 
ensuring the completeness in FISA applications; 5) description of steps taken to have FBI field agents to serve as 
declarants in FISA applications; 6) a description of DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Oversight Section’s process and 
methodology for conducting completeness reviews, and the results of such reviews presented every six months 
starting Sept. 1, 2020; 7) a summary description of the FBI case-study training and FISA-process training 
courses, and confirmation, by July 3, 2020, that FBI personnel involved in the FISA process have been trained 
and certified; 8) a description of any audit, review, or compliance mechanisms planned or implemented bearing 
on the efficacy of the aforementioned remedial measures; 9) no DOJ or FBI personnel under disciplinary or 
criminal review relating to their work on FISA applications shall participate in drafting, verifying, reviewing, or 
submitting such applications to the Court; and 10) each application submitted to the Court shall have 
representations or attestations indicating that all information that reasonably calls into question the accuracy of 
the information, the FBI assessment, and the requested findings. Id. 
549 Id. at 18. 
550 Id. at 19. 
551 Id. 
552 Management Advisory Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., to Christopher Wray, Dir., 
FBI, regarding the Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Execution of its Woods Procedures for 
Application Filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Relating to U.S. Persons at 2 (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/1058475 [https://perma.cc/V9N9-2DHH]. 
553 Id. at 3, 7–8. 
554 Id. at 7. 
555 Id. 
556 In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. Misc. 19-02, GID.C.00274, at 3, 
2020 WL1975053, at *2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 3, 2020) (Boasberg, J.). 
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invalid.557 By June 15, 2020, the government was to make sworn submission reporting on 
conduct and results of the assessment—including where determined not to render applications 
invalid.558 The order further required from June 15, 2020 onward that every two months the 
government provide a progress report on the Woods files for all dockets on or after January 
2015.559 
 
E. Overcollection and the Data Dilemma 
 
Overcollection is, as has already been noted, a consistent problem in the government’s 
implementation of FISA. It appears to affect nearly every area of collection.  
 
In 2010, for instance, unauthorized surveillance under Title I lasted between fifteen months 
and three years, resulting in what appears to be thousands of improperly intercepted 
communications.560 The communications obtained were “presumably . . . unrelated to 
[redacted] or any other subject of foreign intelligence interest.” 561 In that case, Judge Scullin 
ordered the government to report on whether all of the information obtained had been 
destroyed (with limited exceptions) and how SMPs would apply to proposed retention.562 The 
following year, assumedly because it hadn’t been destroyed, the same judge ordered that it be 
eliminated and prohibited any further use or disclosure of the information.563 
 
In another case, the government collected too much information as part of its bulk collection 
of Internet metadata under the PRTT provisions. The government did not come clean until 
August 11, 2009—five years after it had been adopted; nevertheless, the problem persisted.564 
 
In 2008, the government reported overcollection in the context of Section 702.565 While the 
NSA had apparently implemented measures to filter out non-targeted communications prior 
to the communications entering repositories accessible to analysts,566 in 2010 it emerged that 
the NSA had failed to purge databases of § 1881a information required under minimization 
procedures and had a backlog on post-targeting review of selectors.567 Information that should 
have been deleted possibly ended up in reports disseminated by NSA.568  
 
In 2011, the government proposed in regard to a Title I application that it be allowed to retain 
the fruits of unlawful surveillance.569 The court was surprised to learn four years later that the 
 
557 Id., 2020 WL 1975053, at *2. 
558 Id., 2020 WL 1975053, at *2. 
559 Id. at 3–4, 2020 WL 1975053, at *2. 
560 See, Opinion and Order Regarding Fruits of Unauthorized Electronic Surveillance, [REDACTED], Nos. 
[REDACTED], GID.C.00059, at 1–2 (FISA Ct. Dec. 10, 2010) (Scullin, Jr., J.).  
561 Id. at 5. 
562 Id. at 8. 
563 Opinion and Order Requiring Destruction of Information Obtained by Unauthorized Electronic Surveillance, 
[REDACTED], Nos. [REDACTED], GID.C.00067, at 9 (FISA Ct. May 13, 2011) (Scullin Jr., J.). 
564 [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00073, at 16-17 n.14, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5 n.14 (FISA Ct. 
[REDACTED]) (Bates, J.). Note that the Westlaw citation has the relevant information omitted. 
565 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00039, at 17, 28-29 (FISA Ct. 
Apr. 7, 2009) (McLaughlin, J.).  
566 Id. at 23–-24. 
567 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00060, 9–12 (FISA Ct. 2010) 
(Bates, J.). 
568 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00062, at 3 (FISA Ct. 2010) 
(McLaughlin, J.). 
569 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], Nos. [REDACTED], GID.C.00067 (FISA Ct. May 13, 
2011) (Scullin, Jr., J.). 
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NSA still had not been deleting overcollected § 702 records placed on the master purge list in 
accordance with a May 2011 Opinion and Order.570 
 
These and other cases point to what could be termed the data dilemma, which really has two 
constituent parts: first, what to do with communications intercepted outside the statutory and 
judicial restrictions; second, how to ensure that the government does with the information 
what it has been told to do. The courts’ roles in both regards is very different than what it was 
originally designed to do. In large part this stems from the programmatic nature of collection 
under FISA—an instrument designed for more narrowly-targeted surveillance. 
 
The data dilemma also gives rise to an associated concern, which is that the requests being put 
to it by the government come perilously close to the line in terms of asking for Advisory 
Opinions—an authority denied to Article III entities under the case-or-controversy 
requirement. 
 
VI. FISC/FISCR Jurisprudence Going Forward 
 
Over the past two decades, the roles assumed by the FISC and FISCR have evolved well 
beyond what Congress originally envisioned. Instead of just determining whether orders 
should be issued for electronic surveillance, they have had to grapple with their authority as 
Article III courts with specialized subject matter jurisdiction and to ascertain the extent to 
which they can rely on their non-statutory, inherent powers. The tension between new and 
emerging technologies and old statutory language has put the court into the position of having 
to delve deeply into telecommunications, mobile computing, and network sciences. Tension 
among ever more sweeping surveillance programs, national security concerns, and individual 
rights has forced the court to address difficult constitutional questions.  
 
Persistent misbehavior on the part of the government presents an increasingly difficult 
challenge. Part of the problem derives from the ever more complex nature of the statutory and 
regulatory regime, as well as the technologies involved. Legal and technical expertise have 
historically been kept separate. More rigorous training and altering institutional arrangements, 
such as embedding NSD attorneys in NSA operations, may go some way toward meeting this 
challenge. But the underlying issue in some ways is much broader and relates to the decades 
of specialization that mark expertise in these different areas. Conflict between the need for 
discussion and protecting sensitive national security information further complicates the 
picture.  
 
Compounding the situation is the limited insight that the courts have into the inner workings 
of the Executive Branch—a concern at times augmented by the government’s persistent 
disregard of statutory and judicial limits. While FISA provides for criminal penalties, the court 
and the Justice Department have been reluctant to invoke them. To the contrary, in a number 
of cases of overcollection, the government has actively sought permission simply to keep the 
data obtained outside statutory or judicial authorization. 
 
 
570 Memorandum Opinion and Order, [REDACTED], No. [REDACTED], GID.C.00121, at 58 (FISA Ct. Nov. 6, 
2015) (Hogan, J.) (citing to Opinion and Order Regarding Fruits of Unauthorized Electronic Surveillance, 
[REDACTED], Nos. [REDACTED], GID.C.00059, (FISA Ct. Dec. 10, 2010) (Scullin, Jr., J.); Opinion and 
Order Requiring Destruction of Information Obtained by Unauthorized Electronic Surveillance, [REDACTED], 
Nos. [REDACTED], GID.C.00067, at 9 (FISA Ct. May 13, 2011) (Scullin Jr., J.)). 
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Going forward, one alternative may be for Congress to create an independent entity, with deep 
technical expertise, which will allow for careful oversight of how the agencies conduct their 
operations. Such an organization could be either attached to the court or to the agencies in 
question, with an independent head of operations appointed by Congress—much like a 
number of the offices of Inspectors General. Such entities would have the additional advantage 
of providing a focal point for reporting, which has in many ways gotten out of control. Absent 
an institutional fix, it falls to the FISC/FISCR, and to government attorneys acting in good 
faith, for the system to work. Looked at in this light, the FISC’s recent actions following 
Horowitz I and II were both necessary and important. 
 
As we look toward the future, there are a few trends of note in terms of what we should expect 
to see. First, the demand for FISC opinions will likely, if anything, increase. What is being 
adjudicated is law, and the public does and will demand the right for access to it. 
Simultaneously, it is likely that these opinions will continue to demonstrate the four tensions 
identified in this Article. In addition, there may be movement in two key areas: first, notably 
absent from the opinions that have been made public is information related to §§ 703-704. 
Undoubtedly, this area, like the others, will fall subject to the concerns highlighted above. 
Second, we have seen only two opinions, out of nearly 90, which deal with the associational 
rights of the First Amendment. As non-specialized, geographically focused Article III courts 
begin to wrestle more with these issues in the context of new and emerging technologies, in 
light of FISA’s emphasis of First Amendment protected activities, it is likely that we will see 
more discussion of these vital constitutional rights. 
 
